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I. Introduction
1. D ig ita l Television in the Context o f Multim edia
Digitalization is the term of the hour when one discusses the future development of the 
electronic media. Many observers see the electronic media as going through a phase of 
revolutionary changes caused by technological innovations, mainly the evolution of digital 
technology. The traditional notion of broadcasting and television has become strongly 
contested. Television finds itself in a process of reorientation in the new age of the much 
heralded and proclaimed information society. Triggered through technical change, a 
process of convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting is observed in the 
media sectors, which has been equated in its significance with the Industrial Revolution.* 
The character of the broadcast media is expected to be changed fundamentally by the 
blurring of technical differences between video telecommunication services and interactive 
broadcasting services and between the different transmission media.1 2 The broader context 
in which the digitalization of the broadcast media appears is the ubiquitous debate about 
multimedia and information superhighways. Digital television, more or less interactive can 
be viewed as a segment of multimedia.3 Although there is a lot of confusion about the 
definition of the term multimedia, there are certain characteristics widely agreed upon by 
experts. These are the integrated use of different media as well as the possibility of
1 Europe and the Global Information Society. Report o f the High-Level Group on the Information Society, Brussels,
May 1994 (the “Bangemann Report”).
2 See Schoof/Watson Brown, Information Highways and Media Policies in the European Union, in:
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 19, p. 325; see also Hege, Wege in die digitale Zukunft, Berlin, 1995, pp. 13-14; 
Pitzer, Digitales Fernsehen, in: Tendenz, Hl/1995, p. 5; Holznagel, Probleme der Rundfunkregulierung im 
Multimedia-Zeitalter, in: ZUM, 1/1996, p. 17.
3 Schrappe, Digitales Fernsehen * Marktchancen und ordnungspolitischer Regelungsbedarf, München, 1995, p. 3.
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interactivity. However, perhaps one has to see the term rather as an expression of a 
common vision for the direction of new visual communication opportunities and markets, 
in which the barriers to communication and self expression in media have been removed.4 *
The bases for these applications are meant to be digital technology and digital 
compression.3 Besides the common vision of multimedia a larger, more natural process is 
underway, the conversion of all information into the digital realm. In these developments 
the emergence of a digital network for the television broadcasting can be regarded as a 
step on the road towards an expansion of the electronic superhighway.4 *6 Many observers 
see interactive television as possible now through digitalization as the best chance to bring 
about the breakthrough of the multimedia revolution with far reaching effects for both the 
working world and the private home.7
2. W hy D igital Television?
Only its significance for the realization of the common vision of multimedia and the 
information society can explain the immense proliferation of activities in the field of digital 
television. The market players broadcasting (media, telecommunication and computer 
companies) engage in alliances and joint ventures, they integrate them vertically and 
horizontally dissolve them and build new ones with different constellations.8 In the
4 A sto n /S ch w arz , M u ltim ed ia : G a tew a y  to  th e  N e x t M illenn ium , C a m b rid g e , M ass., 1994, p . 12.
s B ooz, A lle n  &  H a m ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim ed ia : G rund lagen , M ä rk te  und  P ersp ek tiv en  in D e u tsc h a ln d , F ra n k fu rt am  
M ain  , 1995 , p . 17.
4 R ep o rt to  th e  S w ed ish  M in ister o f  C u ltu re  a n d  the  H ead o f  M in istry : F ro m  M assm ed ia  to M u ltim e d ia  - 
D ig ita liza tio n  o f  S w ed ish  T e lev is io n , (SO U  1996:2), S tockho lm , F e b ru a ry  1996, p. 5.
7 S a lo m n y , M u ltim e d ia  - w as ist d a s , w e r w ill d a s . w ie  m acht m an  d as? , in : N ew  M arkets w ith  M u ltim e d ia , ed ited  by 
E b ersp ac h er, B e rlin , H e id elb erg , 1995, p. 9.
* See  fo r th e  a llian c e  be tw een  B erte lsm an n  A G , R u p e rt M u rd o ch ’s  B ritish  S k y  B roadcasting , C a n a l P lus a n d  the 
F rench  m ed ia  c o m p a n y  H avas, In te rn a tio n a l H e ra ld  T ribune , 8 M arch  1996, p. 1; see also  N e u e  Z ü ric h e r  Z eitu n g , 
9 710 . M ä rz  1996, p. 2 7 ; see the fo r  a lliance  b e tw ee n  B erte lsm an n  A G  an d  the  C om pagnie  L u x em b o u rg o ise  de
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meantime the regulators, mainly the governments on the national and European 
Community (EC) level, try to establish a sufficient regulatory framework in time before 
unwanted structures emerge. However, the market forecasts for multimedia applications 
are ambiguous. In the end the customer will decide how the future information society will 
look like, but his choices are hard to predict because of the complexity of the multimedia 
market.* 9 No one wants to be left out of the digital television scene: it is considered one of 
the entrance doors to the more promising multi-media market because of the possible 
introduction of interactivity; furthermore, some of its applications offer profits in the short 
term (expansion of pay-television, pay-per-view, special interest channels etc. In the USA 
digital television via direct broadcast satellite has been a reality since 1994. Since the 
beginning of 1995, with the positioning of a second direct broadcast satellite, 150 
television channels have been available. In the final stage, 300 television channels are 
supposed to be offered via four satellites.10 However, the main legal debate regarding
T éléd iffu s io n , In te rn a tio n a l H e ra ld  T rib u n e , 4  A pril 1996, p. 11; L e  M o n d e , 5 A vril 1996, p . 30; se e  fo r  the  jo in t  
v en tu re  o n  the in tro d u c tio n  o f  a  d e c o d e r  fo r d ig ita l te lev ision  in  G e rm an y , th e  M ultim edia  B e trieb sg ese llsch aft 
(M B B G ), F ocus, 8 /1996 , p. 164 ff.; see  th e  p u llin g  ou t by R u p e r t M u rd o c h ’s  B ritish  Sky B ro ad castin g  o f  the 
a llian c e  w ith  B e rte lsm an n , C an a l P lu s an d  H a v as  and  its  n ew  a llian ce  w ith  th e  K irch  G ro u p , In te rn a tio n a l H erald  
T r ib u n e , " M e d ia  G ia n ts  U nite E u ro p ea n  T e le v is io n  M ark e t" , 9  Ju ly  19 9 6 , p . 1,8; see  for th e  b re ak -u p  o f  the  
a llian c e  b e tw ee n  B erte lsm an n  A G  and  C a n a l P lu s , S ü d d eu tsch e  Z e itu n g , "C a n a l Plus b e en d e t s tra te g isch e  A llianz  
m it B e r te lsm a n n " , 1. A ugust 1996, p. 17; se e  fo r  th e  c o -o p era tio n  b e tw ee n  the B erte lsm ann  A G  an d  th e  K irch  
G ro u p , S ü d d e u tsc h e  Z eitu n g , "B e r te lsm a n n  v e rb ü n d e t sich  m it K irch " , 2 3 . Ju li 1996, p. 1; se e  fo r th e  a llian c e  
b e tw ee n  N e th o ld , an  in te rnational p a y -te le v is io n  p ro v id er a n d  D ire c tT V  th e  lead ing  d ig ita l te lev is io n  b ro a d ca ste r  
in th e  U S , T h e  T im e s , 13 A u g u st 1996, p. 2 8 ; se e  fo r the  m o st re ce n t p la n n e d  m ega-m erger in  p ay -te le v is io n  
b e tw ee n  C an al P lu s  o f  F rance  an d  th e  in te rn a tio n a l pay-te le  v is io n  p ro v id e r  N etho ld , Le M o n d e , 8 /9  S e p tem b re , p. 
1 ,1 4 .
9 S ch o o f/W atso n  B ro w n , In fo rm ation  H ig h w ay s an d  M ed ia  P o lic ies  in th e  E u ro p ean  U nion, p . 331 ; S e e g e r,
S tru k tu rv e rä n d e ru n g e n  d es R u n d fu n k s  in E u ro p a , in: P e rsp ek tiv en  d e r In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft, e d ite d  b y  
H o ffm a n n -R iem /V estin g , B aden  B ad en , 1995 , p. 125; W ö ssn e r, M ark , C h ie f  E xecutive o f  th e  B e rte lsm an n  A G , 
D ie g lo b a le  In fo rm a tio n s in fra s tru k tu r  u nd  ih re  M ärk te , R ede a u f  d em  V . D eu tsch en  W irtsc h aftsk o n g re ß  in  K öln  
am  15. M ä rz  1995 , p. 7 ; M id d e lh o ff, Z u k u n ft M u ltim ed ia , in: B e rte lsm an n  B riefe  D o kum en ta tion , H c rb s t/W in te r  
1995, p . 5 ff.; fo r  d e ta ils  abou t th e  d ifficu lties  o f  m ark e t fo rcasts  se e  B o o z , A llen  &  H am ilton , Z u k u n ft M u ltim ed ia , 
P- 4 2 .
10 Y ad o n , B ro a d ca s tin g  in  the In fo rm atio n  A g e , in : M ultim edia : G a tew a y  to  th e  N ex t M illen n iu m , e d ite d  b y  
A sto n /S c h w a rz , C am b rid g e , M ass ., 1994, p . I2 8 f ;  W este rk am p , D ig ita le s  S a te llite n -F em seh e n  in  d e n  U S A , in: 
M e d ien sp ie g e l, N r. 2 5 ,1 9 .  Juni 19 9 5 , p. 9 ,1 5 ;  G e lle r, R e g u lie ru n g sk o n ze p te  fü r  das F e rn seh en  im  n ä c h s te n  
Ja h rta u se n d , in: B e rte lsm an n  B rie fe , H eft 134 , H erb st/W in te r 1995 , p . 5 6 .
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television still evolves around traditional broadcasting and cable television. In Europe the 
development of digital television lagged behind, but is rapidly catching up now. In almost 
all major European countries digital television has in the meantime been or is to be 
introduced in the very near future.11 In France the pay-television channel Canal Plus 
entered the digital TV age at the end of April 1996 with its CanalSatellite offering a 
package of 24 channels via satellite. And there is also another joint venture Télévision par 
satellite (TPS) between TF 1, France Télévision, la Compagnie Luxembourgoise de 
Télédiffusion (CLT), M6 and la Lyonnaise des Eaux to offer digital television in the very 
near future.12 In Great Britain the government presented a White Paper in August 1995 
which foresees the introduction of at least 18 terrestrial digital channels until 1997. Before 
that date BSkyB already wants to have set up 120 digital television channels transmitted 
via satellite.13 In the meantime the British government has already introduced the new 
Broadcasting Act of 1996 which contains already provision regarding digital terrestrial 
television. The pay-television channel Telepiu owned by the German Kirch Group, Rupert 
Murdoch and the international pay-television provider Nethold, has started to provide 
digital television via satellite in Italy in March 1996 and claims to be the first broadcaster 
in Europe to launch a digital-direct-to-home satellite service.14 There exist also plans to 
launch digital television very soon in Spain with an expected involvement of the German
11 See fo r a n  o v e rv ie w  o f  the recen t d e v e lo p m en ts  in E urope w ith  a  focus o n  d ig ita l-pay -te lc  v is io n , Z im m e r, Pay-T V : 
D u rc h b ru ch  im  d ig ita le n  F e rn seh en , in: M e d ia  Perspek tiven , 7 /1 9 9 6 , p p . 3 8 7 -3 9 1 .
12 S ee  L e  M o n d e , 2 7  A v ril 1996, p . 2 4 .
13 S ee  S te e m e rs , D ig ita le  M e d ien p o litik  in G ro ß b ritan n ien , in: M e d ia  P e rsp e k tiv e n , 7 /1996 , p . 4 0 2 ff; se e  a lso  D oy le , 
K abel- u n d  S a te lliten p ro g ram m e in G ro ß b ritan n ien , in: M ed ia  P e rsp e k tiv e n , 9 /1995 , p. 4 5 2 ; P itzer, D ig ita le s  
F e m se h e n , p. 13.
14 See  F in a n c ia l T im e s  B usiness R eport: N ew  M e d ia  M arkets , 7 M a rc h  1996.
4
WrHigiPiijgííim^ ^
Kirch Group and the Spanish telecom company Telefonica.15 Nethold, an international 
pay-television company with channels in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, already 
provides digital television to about 80000 subscribers in the Benelux countries.16 In 
Germany, the largest television market in Europe,17 the Kirch Group became the front­
runner in starting with satellite transmitted digital television called Digitales Fernsehen 1 
(DF1) at the end of July 1996.18 Its great counterpart in the German market, the European 
media giant Bertelsmann AG wants to follow as early as possible. It planned to offer 15 
special interest channels through its the already existing pay-television channel Premiere 
and the recently founded joint venture with the media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, the owner 
of British Sky Broadcasting, Canal Plus and the French media company Havas.19 
However, this alliance failed and the Bertelsmann AG found itself in such a weak position 
that it had to offer the Kirch Group a compromise concerning the introduction of only one 
instead of two digital decoder systems.20 The Kirch group and the Bertelsmann AG were 
heading two opposing alliances who each wanted to introduce its digital decoder and 
conditional access system essential for the realization of digital television to the German 
market.21 Now it looks like the Kirch Group has become the dominant player in digital
15 S ee  T h e  W all S tre e t  Jo u rn a l E u ro p e , ‘T e le fo n ic a ,  K irch  P u rsu e  V e n tu re  F o r  D ig ita l T V ” , 2 6  A u g u s t 19 9 6 , p . 3.
16 S ee  T h e  T im e s , 13 A u g u s t 1996, p. 29 .
17 See fo r  a  g o o d  d e sc rip tio n  o f  the G erm an  te le v is io n  m arket. D e r  S p ieg e l, “ D as en tfesse lte  F e rn se h e n " , 2 9 /1 9 9 6 , p. 
22 ff.
'* S ü d d e u tsc h e  Z e itu n g , 2 . A pril 1996 , p. 19; F ra n k fu r te r  A llg em ein e  Z e itu n g , “ D as R ennen  is t  e rö ffn e t” , su p p lem en t 
T e c h n ik  u n d  M o to r , 2. Ju li 1996, p . T I .
19 S ee  fo r  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  the o p p o sin g  a llian c es , In fo rm atio n  S o c ie ty  T re n d s , Issue n u m b e r  5  -(1 .4 .9 6 -2 3 .4 .9 6 ), 
p u b lish ed  by  th e  D irec to ra te  G en era l X III o f  th e  E uropean  C o m m iss io n , p p . 2 -3 ; S ü ddeu tsche  Z eitu n g , 8 . M ärz  
1996, p . 1; D er S p ie g e l, “ E in  B efre iu n g ssch lag ” , 1 1 /1 9 9 6 , p . 122; L e M o n d e , 9  M ars 1996, p. 11.
31 S ee  S ü d d e u tsc h e  Z e itu n g , “B erte lsm an n  v e rb ü n d e t s ich  m it K irc h ” , 23 . Ju li  1996, p . I ;  see  D e r  S p ie g e l, “ R eden  
und  S tre ite n " , 3 1 /1 9 9 6 , p. 71 .
5
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television in Germany also due to a newly founded alliance with Rupert Murdoch.21 2 The 
Kirch Group and the Bertelsmann AG agreed on a cooperative scheme for the distribution 
of digital television through Kirch’s digital platform, also including the digital programs 
offered by Premiere, the only German pay-television channel co-owned by the Kirch 
Group, the Bertelsmann AG and Canal Plus.23 However, this created a lot of confusion, 
since Bertelsmann is also a member of the Multimedia Betriebsgesellschaft (MMBG), a 
consortium of the German Telecom, the German public broadcasters ARD, ZDF, private 
broadcasters, RTL and program suppliers like UFA and others which plans to introduce its 
own digital platform.24 At the moment it cannot be predicted how the digital television 
landscape will look like in the near future or who the dominant market players will be.
3. The A nalytical A pproach
The transformation process of the electronic media spurred by digitalization as depicted 
above calls for a broad academic discussion in different fields, economics, political science, 
sociology and in particular law.25 The law is supposed to provide the framework for the 
development of the new electronic media landscape. Among the multitude of regulatory
21 T h e  K irc h  G ro u p  in tro d u ced  as d e co d e r its d -b o x , w hile  the M u ltim e d ia  B e trieb sg ese llsch aft (M B B G ), w here  the 
B erte lsm an n  A G . th e  G erm an  T e lec o m . C L T , A R D , Z D F, R T L  and  C an a l P lus ho ld  sh a res  favo rs its  m ed ia -box , 
D er S p ie g e l, 9 /1 9 9 6 , ‘T e c h n ik  re in p rü g e ln " , p . 102; C able  an d  S a te llite  E xpress, 7 M arch  1996, V o l. 13, N o  5 , p. 
9 ; se e  a lso  T h e  E co n o m ist, “Sky  lig h ts" , Ju ly  13th 1996, p. 6 9 .
22 In te rn a tio n a l H e ra ld  T rib u n e , "M e d ia  G ian ts  U n ite  E uropean  T e le v is io n  M ark e t" , 9  Ju ly  1996, p. 1 ,8 .
25 S ü d d e u tsc h e  Z e itu n g , “ M urdoch  so ll  bei P re m ie re  e in s te ig en " , 24 . Ju li 1996, p. 22.
24 See  fo r  a n  o v e rv ie w  o f  the recen t d e v e lo p m en ts  in G erm any, Z im m er, P ay -T V : D urchbruch  im  d ig ita len  
F e rn se h en ? , p . 395 ff.
25 See fo r  a  m ore  p o litica l and so c io lo g ica l a n a ly s is , F an g m an n /S ch w em m le, M u ltim ed ia  - V o n  d e r  T e le m a tik  zur 
e le k tro n isch e n  M e d ien -In teg ra tio n , in: B lä tte r  fü r  deu tsche  u n d  in te rn a tio n a le  P o litik , F e b ru a r  1995, p . 2 0 3 -2 1 5 ; 
S tipp , W elch e  F o lg e n  h a t d ie  d ig ita le  R ev o lu tio n  fü r d ie  F em seh n u tzu n g ? , in : M ed ia  P e rsp e k tiv e n , 8 /1 9 9 4 , p . 392- 
400 ; see  fo r  an  e co n o m is t’s v iew  o n  the in fo rm a tio n  society , S to ck , E u ro p as W eg  in d ie  In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft, 
in: IFO  S c h n e lld ien s t, 6 /1995, p. 15-28.
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problems connected with this change I deal only with the ones which seem most crucial 
and pressing in the start up phase of digital television in order to prevent the emergence of 
structures right from the start which might prove detrimental for the years to come. These 
are the implications for competition and concentration on the electronic media market 
triggered by the introduction of digital television. The analysis will focus on the specific 
new legal problems created by the introduction of digital television and the technical 
infrastructure and equipment it requires. Therefore the set-top-box, the crucial technical 
device for introducing digital television, will be thoroughly investigated in regard to its 
central position for potential impediments of competition and control of the new television 
market. The same applies to the new phenomena introduced by digital television like the 
need for a navigation system and the practice of packaging. The method of transmission 
and the networks in general will only be dealt with to the limited extent they pose specific 
competition or concentration concerns regarding digital television as for example the 
tendency to vertical integration between the cable network operators, the channel 
providers and the program suppliers. After describing the concrete problems along with 
some of the technical characteristics of digital television they will be put into context 
regarding more general concerns already quite familiar. The particular situation of public 
broadcasting will not be a special concern, since this would lead into a fundamental 
discussion about the general role of television that would have to go beyond the scope of 
this analysis and distract from the its real focus.26 The further peculiarity of the approach 
followed in this paper will be its European perspective instead of a national perspective in
M See fo r  a n  an aly sis  o f  the role o f  p u b lic  b ro a d ca stin g  in  the tran sfo rm a tio n  p ro cess o f  the e lec tro n ic  m ed ia , 
D rie s /W o ld t, T h e  R o le  o f  Public S e rv ice  B ro a d ca stin g  in the In fo rm a tio n  S o c ie ty , D üsse ldo rf, F eb ruary  1996.
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analyzing the problems. The potential legal and regulatory problems will be described and 
analyzed in an abstract way without reference to specific legal orders of Member States, 
although some examples of national characteristics and rules will be given for illustration. 
Instead the European Community legal framework will be assessed regarding the means it 
offers to deal with these problems and risks for competition and concentration. Here the 
decision of the European Commission27 to prohibit a concentrative joint venture, the 
Media Service GmbH which was aimed at providing technical and administrative services 
to organize digital pay television, will serve as a starting point for analyzing European 
competition law. I will also look at the competition problems related to the introduction of 
digital television in a more abstract and partly comparative way. Besides that the 
implications of digital television on the media concentration debate will be examined. The 
preparatory work and the proposal by the Commission regarding a Media Concentration 
and Pluralism Directive itself will be discussed.28 The overall European legal framework 
for that field will be assessed according to its capacity to deal with the described problems. 
The competence questions of which regulatory matters should be dealt with on a 
European and which on a Member State level will be left out. The same is true for the 
question of competence. The latter will be partly answered by the outcome of the analysis 
of the existing European legal framework. The former is at the end of the day rather a
27 M S G  M e d ia  S e rv ice  (C om m . D ec. 9 4 /9 2 2 /E C ), O J  1994 L 3 64 /1 .
28 C o m m iss io n  G reen  P aper, P lu ra lism  an d  M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n  in  th e  In tern a l M ark e t an A sse ssm e n t o f  th e  N eed  
for C o m m u n ity  A c tio n , C om  (92) 4 8 0 ; C o m m iss io n  C om m u n icatio n , F o llo w -u p  to  the C o n su lta tio n  P ro c e ss  to  the 
G reen  P a p e r  on  “ P lu ra lism  and M ed ia  C o n c en tra tio n  in  the In te rn a l M ark et a n  A ssessm ent fo r  C o m m u n ity  A ctio n , 
C om  (94 ) 353 ; C ra b it, “ Pluralism  a n d  M ed ia  C o n cen tra tio n ": 10 Q u estio n s  a n d  A nsw ers o n  the  C o m m iss io n ’s 
W ork , in: IR IS , 1995 spec ia l issue, p. 12-14.
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political than legal question. However* the following analysis prefers a functional 
approach.
II. Television Goes Digital
In the following chapter the main features of the digital technology will be briefly 
described as far as it is relevant to understand the legal problems caused by the 
introduction of digital television. In addition the main applications of the technology to 
television will be outlined.
1. The Technology
a) The General Concept of Digitalization
Digitalization means the translation of information through standardized codes into the 
binary system, which only knows and recognizes ones and zeros. Digital entails one 
common standard that enables the data and information to be output onto any format and 
enables the different data types such as audio, video animated graphics and alphanumeric 
text to be combined and displayed in a seamless manner.29 The digitalization of 
information is well known in the context of modem computer and telecommunication 
systems and digital processing has also been used in the television system, in the studio 
and in the receiver. However, until recently all systems used analogue technology for 
transmission of the program over the air and in cable networks to the viewer. This was 
due to the immense capacity needed to transport the huge stream of digitized information,
N A sto n / K le in , M u ltim e d ia  w ill ca rry  the F lag , in: M ultim edia : G a tew a y  to  the N ex t M illen n iu m , e d ite d  b y  
A sto n /S ch w arz , C am b rid g e , M ass., 1994, p. 10; H o ffm an n -R iem /V eslin g , E n d e  d e r  M a ssen k o m m u n ik a tio n ? , in: 
M ed ia  P e rsp e k tiv e n , 8 /1 9 9 4 , p. 3 82 .
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in particular video.30 Only recently has digital technology become powerful enough to set 
the stage for a putting all information into a single digital format.31
b) Digital Compression
Developments in digital compression techniques have now opened the possibility of fully 
digital television where the signal is digitized throughout the whole chain from the studio 
to the viewer.32 With digital compression techniques the digital information needed to 
transmit audio or video can be reduced to a margin of their uncompressed storage space. 
This is achieved through techniques which store and send not the whole picture 
information but only the information necessary to define the changes from one frame to 
the next.33 There exist already a couple of standards for video compression, the 
international most widely accepted are known as MPEGs, named after the Motion Picture 
Experts Group, an international standard setting body responsible for setting the criteria 
for compression of moving video and audio.34 In Europe the Digital Video Broadcasting 
Project Group, a private industry organization, deals with standard setting and has widely
3,1 S c h ra p e , D ig ita les  F ern seh en , p. 11.
31 A sto n / K le in , M u ltim e d ia  w ill c a n y  the F lag , p . 11.
31 C o m m iss io n  C o m m u n ica tio n  to  th e  C ounc il an d  th e  E uropean  P a rliam en t, D ig ita l V ideo B ro a d ca stin g , A
F ra m ew o rk  fo r C o m m u n ity  P o licy , C om  (9 3 ) 5 5 7  final, p. 4 ; s e e  fo r d e ta ils  S ch rape , D ig ita les  F e rn se h en , p . U f f .
33 S ee  fo r  tec h n ica l d e ta ils  M ü ller-R ö m er, E n tw ick lu n g slin ien  d ig ita le r  R u n d fu n k sy s tem e  u n d  n eue  
R u n d fu n k d ien s te , in : D igital T elev is io n  - D ig ita l R ad io  T ech n o lo g ie s  o f  T o m o rro w , e d ited  b y  M ü lle r-R ö m e r, 
B e rlin /H e id e lb e rg  1994, p. 16ff.; se e  a lso  S a n d o v a l, L a  té lév is io n  in te rac tiv e , Paris, 1995, p . 29 ff.; s e e  S ch rap e , 
D ig ita les  F e rn se h en , p . 12; R e v o lu tio n  K o m p ress io n , in: K abel u n d  S a te llit ,  F ernsehen  2 0 0 0  g lo b al, d ig ita l, 
in te ra k tiv , M ü n c h e n , 1994, p. 6; B o o z , A llen  &  H am ilton , Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p . 148; W ile y , T h e  C h a lle n g e  o f  
C h o ice , in : F ed .C o m .L aw  Jo u rn a l, V o l. 4 7 ,1 9 9 4 ,  p . 403.
34 M P G E  1 is  fo r c o d in g  tone  and M P E G  2 fo r c o d in g  pictures, see  S an d o v a l, L a  télév ision  in te rac tiv e , p . 7 6 ff .;  see 
W este rk am p , D ig ita le s  S a te lliten -F em seh en  in  d en  U S A , p. 12; Y adon , B ro ad castin g  in th e  In fo rm a tio n  A g e , p.
1 121; S e e g e r, S tru k tu rv erän d eru n g en  d es R u n d fu n k s  in  E uropa, p . 124; see  fo r the  techn ica l d e ta ils  M u sm a n n ,
V Stand  d e r  Q u e lle n co d ie ru n g  für B ild  und T o n , in: D ig ita l T e lev is io n  -  D ig ita l R ad io  T ec h n o lo g ie s  o f  T o m o rro w ,
\ X  ed ited  b y  M ü lle r-R ö m e r, B erlin / H e id e lb erg  1994 , p. 80ff.
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adopted the MPEG standards with further sophistication.3 *5 Most recently the European 
Community has passed a directive on standards for the transmission of television signals, 
which refers to standards brought forward by the DVB and standardized by a recognized 
European standardization body.36 The higher the factor of compression the less data has to 
go through the network, which lowers the transmission costs. However, there is a trade 
off between the picture quality and the degree of the compression.37 Until the function is 
integrated in new receiver sets the viewer at home needs a decoder, the famous set-top- 
box - dealt with in detail below - , to convert the digital signals again to analogue ones 
which can be received by the traditional television sets.38
c) Digital Transmission Media
Another important technical aspect concerning the start of digital television in order to 
understand the competition concerns of the tendency to vertical integration between 
service providers like telecommunication companies and cable operators and content 
providers are the different models of distribution. The way of transmitting digital signals is 
not confined to one medium. Digital broadcasting can be distributed via a terrestrial 
network, satellite, television cable, glassfiber and also via the telecom network.39 In
33 S ch rap e , D ig ita les  F ernsehen , p . 16; D ig ita l V id e o  B roadcasting , T h e  N ew  A ge o f  T e lev is io n , G en ev a , F eb ru ary
I 1996, p . 16; M ü lle r-R ö m e r, E n tw ic k lu n g slin ie n  d ig ita le r R u n d fu n k sy s tem e  und neue R u n d fu n k d ien s te , p. I6 ff.
w See D ire c tiv e  9 5 /4 7 /E C  o f  the E u ro p ean  P a rlia m en t and o f  the  C o u n c il o f  2 4  O ctober 1995 o n  the U se  o f  S tandards 
for the  T ra n sm iss io n  o f  T elev is ion  S igna ls , O J  1995 N o  L 281/51 d ealt w ith  below  in c h ap te r  V II; c o m m e n t by  the
E u ro p ean  B ro ad castin g  C om m itee  (E B U ) L eg a l C om m ittee , In fo rm atio n  d o cu m en t N o  9  (9 5 ), 1 D e ce m b er 1995.
37 R ev o lu tio n  K o m p ress io n , in: K ab el un d  S a te llit ,  p . 6 ; B ooz, A llen  &  H am ilto n , Z ukunft M u ltim e d ia , p . 148; 
E berle , M ed ien  u n d  M ed ien rech t im  U m b ru ch , in: G R U R  , 12 /1995 , p. 7 9 0 ; F la tau , A k tiv itä ten  d e r E u ro p ä isc h en  
U nion  a u f  dem  G e b ie t d e r M ed ien  un d  ihre  A u sw irk u n g en  a u f  d ie  F ilm - u n d  F e m se h w irtsch a ft - h ie r  im  
b eso n d e ren  N e tz träg e rsc h aft, in: Z U M , 11 /1995 , p . 776 ; H o lzn ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  
M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 16.
38 S c h ra p e , D ig ita le s  F ernsehen , p. 9 .
w Y adon , B ro a d c a s tin g  in  the In fo rm atio n  A ge , p . 119ff.; D a tah ighw ay , in: K ab e l und S a te llit, F e rn se h en  2 0 0 0  
g lo b a l, d ig ita l, in te rak tiv , M ünchen , 1994, p. 10-11.
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Europe satellite broadcasting will be the front-runner for digital television. Already since 
mid 1995 the satellite provider SES ASTRA has offered satellites for the transmission of 
digital television.40 The next medium to follow is expected to be cable, although this 
differs from Member State to Member State according to the penetration of cable.41 There 
exists also the possibility of transmitting pictures via the telecom network.42 This is already 
widely discussed in the USA, where the telecommunication companies undertake great 
efforts to enter the video broadcasting business.43 45However, because of the high amount of 
data still needed to transmit video in Europe the smallband of the telecommunication 
network is not considered to be an alternative in the near future for distributing television 
via broadband.44 45Next to the costs, the decisive factor in choosing the right distribution 
model is whether it is capable of providing interactivity where the viewer can call up a 
program of interest, on demand, then becomes an active participant in that program.43 
Interactivity is one of the added values that digital television is supposed to provide in the 
future. For this the network needs a return channel to give the viewer the possibility to 
communicate back to the content provider. Realistically a return cannel can only be 
installed within a cable network. Satellite broadcasting is conceived to be a one way
4,1 E berle , N eu e  Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  und V erfasssu n g srech t, in: Z U M , 4 /1 9 9 5 , p. 249; see  fo r the s ta r t  o f  d ig ita l 
te le v is io n  in F ra n c e  v ia  sa te llite , M e ise , S te in ig e r  W eg zur D a ten a u to b a h n , in: M edia P e rsp ek tiv en , 9 /1 9 5 , p. 440 .
41 P re d ic tin g  a s tep  b y  step  d ev e lo p m en t s ta rtin g  w ith  satellite, th en  cab le , se e  B ooz, A llen  &  H am ilto n , Z u k u n ft 
M u ltim ed ia , p . 8 0 ; see  for a g rap h ica l o v e rv ie w  fo r cab le  p en e tra tio n  in  E u ro p e , D ries/W o ld t, T h e  R o le  o f  Public  
S e rv ice  B ro a d ca stin g  in  the In fo rm ation  S o c ie ty , p. 27 , A nnex  B .
41 Y adon , B ro a d ca stin g  in  the  In fo rm atio n  A ge , p . 130ff.; R eport to  the S w ed ish  M in ister o f  C u ltu re  a n d  the  H ead  o f  
M in istry : F rom  M a ssm e d ia  to M u ltim e d ia  - D ig ita liza tio n  o f  S w ed ish  T e lev is io n , p. 11.
43 See  fo r th e  d isc u ss io n  in  the U S A , B renner, T e lep h o n e  C om p an y  E ntry  in to  V ideo  Services: A  F irst A m e n d m e n t 
A n a ly s is , in: N o tre  D am e  L aw  R ev ., Vol. 6 7 , 1991, p . 97- 150; P rice, V id e o  D ialtone: C o n c en tra tio n  o r  
C o m p e titio n , in: C o m m u n ica tio n  L a w  C o n sp ec tu s , V ol. 3 ,1 9 9 5 ,  pp. 42 -5 2 .
44 F la tau , A k tiv itä te n  d e r  E u ro p äisch en  U n ion  a u f  dem  G ebiet d e r  M ed ien  u n d  ih re  A u sw irk u n g en  au f d ie  F ilm - und  
F e m se h w ir tsc h a f t - h ie r  im  b eso n d e ren  N e tz träg e rsch aft, p. 7 7 5 .
45 Y adon , B ro a d ca stin g  in the In fo rm atio n  A ge, p . 124.
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communication medium and would need great efforts and investments to equip it with a 
return channel.46 If only a few data has to be transmitted, not video but voice and text the 
telephone network can be used. This is expected to be the solution at least for the 
beginning.47 For full scale interactivity an integrated broadband network with glassfiber 
would be necessary or the telecom network has to be upgraded.48 However, in the end the 
level of interactivity is just a question of costs and investment concerning the networks 
and the market and profitability forecasts will decide upon its speed and level of 
development.49
2. The Applications to Television
To understand the implications of the digitalization of television for competition and 
concentration in the media market one has to know what this transformation means for 
television. The question is how will the change in the way of transmitting the video signals 
transform the structure of television, the way we have understood television until today? 
Here the main features will be the multiplication of channels, the emergence of new 
services connected with interactivity and as a minor point the improved picture and sound 
quality. In describing these changes the perspective will be the legal implications.
46 B ooz, A lle n  &  H a m ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p . 79 .
47 F la tau , A k tiv itä te n  d e r  E u ro p äisch en  U n ion  a u f  d em  G ebiet d e r  M ed ien  u n d  ih re  A u sw irk u n g en  a u f  d ie  F ilm - und 
F e m seh W irtsch a ft - h ie r  im  b eso n d e ren  N e tz träg e rsch aft, p. 7 7 3 ; B ooz, A lle n  &  H am ilton , Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p. 
81; fo r th e  U S A  se e  Y adon . B roadcasting  in th e  Inform ation  A g e , pp. 124-125 .
** H ere a  lo t o f  re se a rc h  is done to f in d  new  in ex p e n siv e  so lu tions, se e  B o o z , A llen  &  H a m ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim ed ia , 
p. 75 ; W ö ssn e r, In te ra k tiv e s  F e rn seh en ; E ine  n e u e  D im ension  d e r  U n te rh a ltu n g  und In fo rm atio n . 
E in fü h ru n g ss ta tem e n t a u f  dem  M u lti m ed ia -K o n g re ss  am  12. Jn i 1995 in  H e id e lb erg , p. 11.
** See fo r  th e  a m o u n t o f  investm en ts n e ed e d  to  b u ild  the in fras tru c tu re  fo r in te rac tiv ity , B ooz, A llen  &  H a m ilto n , 
Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p. 80; see  fo r m ark e t fo rc a s ts  regard ing  d ig ita l te le v is io n  w ith  in te rac tiv ity  S c h ra p e , D ig ita les  
F e rn se h en , p. 106ff.
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a) The Multiplication of Channels
One of the main features of the introduction of digital television is the larger number of 
television channels that can be provided. The compression technology described above 
will allow the networks» cable or satellite to cany four to eight times the amount of 
channels possible with analogue technology. Within the frequency range required for 
broadcasting a single channel when using analogue technology with applying digital 
technology up to eight channels may be delivered.50 In Europe only via satellite with the 
two major operators SES ASTRA and Eutelsat an extension of the capacity to carry 
theoretically up to 1500 channels is expected by the end of 1997.51 *The enlarged number 
of channels made available through cable in the future will depend on the cable television
52penetration in the respective European country and the digitalization of the cable system. 
Terrestrial digital television is still in its beginnings, though also here an enlargement of the 
capacities is expected.
Due to the increase in distribution channels more special interest and thematic channels are 
expected to fill market niches.53 *5The range of audiovisual programs will become more *Sl5
5(1 R eport to  the S w ed ish  M in ister o f  C u ltu re  a n d  the  H ead o f  M in istry : F rom  M assm edia  to  M u ltim e d ia  - 
D ig ita liza tio n  o f  S w ed ish  T elev is io n , p. 20 ; Y adon , B ro ad castin g  in the In fo rm ation  A ge, p . 121; S c h ra p e , 
D ig ita le s  F e rn se h en , p. 48.
Sl P itze r, D ig ita le s  F e rn seh en , pp. 8 -9 ,
53 See fo r s ta tis tics  D riesA V oIdt, T h e  R ole  o f  P u b lic  Serv ice  B ro ad castin g  in th e  Inform ation  S o c ie ty , p . 2 7 , A nnex  B;
in G e rm a n y  w ith  a  v e ry  high cab le  p en e tra tio n  the  G erm an  T e lec o m  as the m ain  cable o p e ra to r  has a lre a d y  
re se rv ed  cap a c itie s  fo r dig ita l tran sm iss io n , see  E b erle , N eue Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  und V e rfa ssu n g s re c h t, p.
250; fo r  th e  fu tu re  p lan s see P itze r. D ig ita les  F e rn seh en , p. 11.
55 See  H e g e , W ege in  d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p. 12; see  also  S ch rap e , D ig ita les  F ernsehen , p. 4 8 ; E b erle , N e u e  
Ü b e rtra g u n g ste ch n ik e n  und V erfassu n g srech t, p . 250 ; K opp, M e d ien re ch t un d  neue tech n isch e  E n tw ick lu n g en  - 
R eak tio n en  und  P e rsp e k tiv e n , in: M a rk en a rtik e l, 8 /1995, p. 3 8 9 ; see fo r a c ritica l view  reg a rd in g  th e ir  eco n o m ic  
su ccess H o ffm an n -R icm /V estin g , E n d e  d er M a ssen k o m m u n ik a tio n ? , p . 3 8 5 ; fo r an eco n o m ic  an aly sis  o f  the 
m arke t c o n ce rn in g  co m p e titio n , c o n ce n tra tio n  an d  d iv ers ifica tio n , see S e u fe rt, W irtsch aftlich e  A sp ek te  e in e s  
V ie lk a n a lfe m seh c n s , in: P erspek tiven  der In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft, e d ited  b y  H o ffm an n -R iem /V estin g , B ad en - 
B ad en /H am b u rg , 1995 , p. 139.
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diversified which will increase the fragmentation of the market.54 Foreign channels will 
spread further over other countries, though the language barrier will still pose considerable 
obstacles.34 5 The new means of distribution also will make for more variety in modes of 
reception and payment possible. A promising future is predicted for different forms of pay- 
television, pay per channel, pay-per-view, near-video-on-demand, video-on-demand.36 
More arguments for this prediction are the inexpensive decrypting of programs that digital 
technology provides as well as more sophisticated and less expensive subscriber 
management systems that become possible.* 57 *Then the advertising financed commercial 
television will not be able to provide the great amount of thematic and special interest 
channels. Advertising financed television is widely seen as having reached its limits of 
expansion already. However, for pay-television, many European countries, in particular 
the German speaking countries, still offer a great market potential.58 59These predictions are 
confirmed by the digital television enterprises now started or about to be started in 
Europe. They mainly focus on special interest channels and pay-television.39 In the long
34 H o lz n ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 17.
55 D rie s/W o ld t, T h e  R o le  o f  Public  S erv ice  B ro ad castin g  in the In fo rm atio n  S o c ie ty , p. 5.
36 V o llp ro g ram m  2 0 0 0 , in: K abel u n d  S a te llit, F e rn seh en  200 0  g lo b a l, d ig ita l, in te rak tiv , M ü n c h e n , 1994 , p . 26 ; 
S eeg er, S tru k tu rv erä n d eru n g e n  d e s  R u n d fu n k s in E uropa, p. 125; E b erle , N eu e  Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  un d  
V e rfa ssu n g s re c h t, p. 250.
37 see H e g e , O ffe n e  W e g e  in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p. 46 ; see  a lso  H o lz n ag e l, P ro b lem e  d e r  R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  
M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p . 17; S c h ra p e , D ig ita les  F ern seh en , p . 2 1 f .
Ä S ee  fo r  th e  c o n n ec tio n  betw een  th e  d ig ita liz a tio n  o f  telev ision  an d  the g ro w th  o f  p ay -te lev ision , Z im m er, P ay-T V : 
D u rc h b ru ch  im  d ig ita le n  F ern seh en , p . 386; fo r  the lim its o f  c o m m e rc ia l te le v is io n  fin an ced  b y  a d v e rtis in g  see  
E b erle , Ö ffe n tlich -re ch tlic h e s  F e rn seh en  im  d ig ita le n  Z eita lte r, in : W a n d e re r  zw ischen  M u s ik , P o litik  u n d  R ech t, 
F e s tsc h rif t  fü r  R e in h o ld  K reile , e d ite d  by B e ck e r/L e rch e /M estm äck e r, B a d en  B aden , 1995, p . 170; fo r  a  c ritica l 
a sse ssm e n t o f  th e  m a rk e t p o ten tia l o f  p ay -te lev is io n  in E urope  s e e  S eeger, S tru k tu rv erä n d eru n g e n  d e s  R u n d fu n k s  
in  E u ro p a , p . 119; S ch o o f/W atso n  B row n, In fo rm atio n  H ig h w ay s and  M e d ia  P o licies in th e  E u ro p ean  U n io n , p. 
332 ; se e  fo r  th e  G e rm a n  pay -te lev isio n  m ark e t an d  a  c ritica l a n a ly s is  a b o u t th e  financ ing  o f  n e w  sp ec ia l in te re s t 
c h an n e ls , S eu fe rt, W irtsch aftlich e  A sp ek te  d es  V ie lk a n a lfe m seh e n s , p . 1 3 8 f.; se e  a lso  B o o z , A llen  &  H am ilto n , 
Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p . 45 .
59 S ee  the p ro jec t o f  C a n a l P lus C an alS  a te  Hite, L e  M onde, 27  A v ril 1996, p . 2 4 ; see  also  fo r F ra n c e , M e ise , S te in ig e r 
W eg z u r  D a ten a u to b a h n , p. 440; se e  fo r  the p lan s  o f  B erte lsm an n  A G  an d  i ts  a lliances. D e r  S p ie g e l, “ D e r
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run the program contents will become more and more crucial to fill all the planned 
channels. There the debate emerges whether state regulation is indispensable to guarantee 
open access to programming rights when network providers increasingly integrate with 
program suppliers.60
b) The New Services
Concerning returns on investment the above described thematic and special interest 
channels show the way for the commercial broadcasting stations to make profits in the 
near future.61 However, the aspect which is considered the real added value and 
revolutionary one for the electronic media, is the possibility of new television services with 
different levels of interactivity possible through the introduction of digital technology.62 
The viewer will have the possibility to participate actively in choosing programs and 
products. He will be able to compile his own personal program schedules by computer- 
aided pre-selection from his most preferred program categories. In the future it will 
possible for viewers to edit their own television program, e.g. by selecting the available 
cameras covering a football match or chose different viewing angles while watching a 
show. Audiences will be invited to address their opinion, and directly communicate with
B efre iu n g ssch lag ” , 11/1996, p. 122; see  for th e  e n te rp rise  o f  th e  K irch  G ro u p  “ D igitales F e m se h e n  1” , 
S ü d d e u tsc h e  Z e itu n g , 2 . A pril 1996, p . 19; fo r  th e  a c tiv ities  in  E u ro p e  g e n e ra lly  see  P itzer, D ig ita les  T V , p. lOff.
H o lz n ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 20 ; F la tau , A k tiv itä te n  d e r  
E u ro p ä isch en  U n io n  a u f  dem  G e b ie t d e r  M e d ien , p . 777 ; N iew iarra , F o lg e ru n g en  aus den  A k tiv itä te n  d e r  E U  für 
d ie  p r iv a te  F e m se h w irtsch a ft im  H in b lick  a u f  n e u e  A ngebo te  u n d  D ien ste , in : Z U M , 11 /1995 , p. 7 6 1 ; s e e  ru les  in  
the U S A  w hich  o b lig e  vertica lly  in teg ra ted  c o m p a n ies  to  o ffe r th e ir  p ro g ram s w ith  the sa m e  c o n d itio n s  to  
co m p e titin g  o p e ra to rs , see  Sec. 12 C a b le  T e le v is io n  C on su m er P ro te c tio n  an d  C om petition  A c t o f  1992 , 102d 
C o n g re ss  (2 d  se ss io n ) , P .L . 102-862 , S e p tem b e r 14, 1992.
61 N iew iarra , F o lg e ru n g en  aus den  A k tiv iä ten  d e r  E uropäischen  U n io n  fü r d ie  p riva te  F e m se h w irtsch a ft im  H in b lick  
a u f  n eu e  A n g e b o te  un d  D ienste, p . 7 6 1 .
62 S ch rap e , D ig ita le s  F e rn seh en , p. 38 .
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the producers of a program, take part in a quiz or join the jury in a contest.63 The 
realization of these applications depends on the introduction of interactivity to the 
television, which demands a return channel. The same is true for most of the applications 
that will only use the medium of television but have nothing in common with the 
traditional idea of television, like videogames to be delivered via television or 
teleshopping, telebanking or teleleaming.64 Among these teleshopping has been offered 
already for quite a while in the USA, Great Britain, other European countries and since 
recently also in Germany. However, the level of interactivity is usually, except in pilot 
projects, rather low, relying on the telephone. For full scale interactivity the transmission 
infrastructure has to be adapted to two-way data traffic. This is possible today with the 
digital compression technology, since now networks can also be used as return channels, 
which would have had a too limited transmission capacity before the introduction of the 
compression technology.65 However, full scale interactivity realistically is only possible by 
cable and demands high investments for upgrading the infrastructure, as explained above. 
For that reason the development is expected to proceed step by step depending on the 
anticipated profitability of the application and the inclination by the market players to 
make risky investments for the networks.66 45
45 D rie s /W o ld t, T h e  R o le  o f  Public S e rv ice  B ro a d ca stin g  in the In fo rm atio n  S o c ie ty , p. 5; R e p o rt to the S w e d ish  
M in is te r  o f  C u ltu re  a n d  the H ead  o f  M in istry : F ro m  M assm ed ia  to  M u ltim e d ia  - D ig ita liza tion  o f  S w ed ish  
T e lev is io n , p. 2 0 ; S e e g e r, S tru k tu rv erän d eru n g en  d es  R un d fu n k s in E u ro p a , p . 125; see fo r e x am p les  o f  
ap p lic a tio n s  in th e  U S A , Y odan, B ro a d ca stin g  in the In fo rm ation  A ge, 1994 , p . 124f.
M S ee  fo r  th e  d if fe re n t se rv ices that m ig h t b e  o ffe re d  v ia  te lev is ion  B ooz, A lle n  &  H am ilton , Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p. 
37; S c h ra p e , D ig ita le s  F ern seh en , p . 3 5 ,3 7 ;  se c  fo r  a  m arket fo rc a s t fo r te lesh o p p in g , ib id ., p . 111 ; in th e  U S A  
in te rac tiv e  te le v is io n  is the fastes t g ro w th  a re a  o f  th e  a d v ertis in g  in d u stry , th o u g h  in a  ra th e r  p rim itiv e  a p p lic a tio n , 
see  Y o d a n , B ro a d ca s tin g  in the In fo rm atio n  A g e , 1994, p. 127.
w H o lz n ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M ul rimedi a -Z e ita l te r, p . 17.
“  Y odan , B ro a d c a s tin g  in th e  In fo rm ation  A ge, p . 124; Schrape, D ig ita les  F e rn se h en , p. 114f; B o o z , A lle n  &  
H a m ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim ed ia , p. 8 0 .
17

However, the services which can be already offered or are close to being delivered are 
pay-per-channel, and pay-per-view, where the viewer only pays either for a single channel 
or for a special program, and video-on-demand.67 With video-on-demand one has to 
distinguish two forms, near and true- video-on-demand. Near-video-on-demand means 
that digital movies are delivered repeatedly on different channels so that the user has the 
ability to start the movie at 15-minute intervals.68 With true-video-on demand the ordered 
movie will be delivered from a local server which is connected to a central video library 
server and the viewer can start and stop the movie at any time.69 If a permanent return 
channel is installed the viewer can use it like a video recorder, winding forwards and 
backwards, slow motion etc.70 True-video on demand is still in the experimental stage. 
This service is technically very complicated and very demanding regarding the capacities 
of networks and servers.71 True-video-on-demand in a way shows the dilemma of the new 
services. A higher added value of a new service is usually connected to its level of 
interactivity which depends on a functioning return channel. To introduce the latter, high
67 See  fo r v id eo -o n -d e m a n d  revenue fo rcasi for the  U S A , F e tte rm an , M u ltim ed ia  and  the Phone C o m p an y , in: 
M u ltim ed ia : G a tew a y  to  the N ext M illen n iu m , ed ited  by  A sto n /S ch w arz , C am b rid g e , M ass ., 1994, p . 104.
** See  A s to n /S c h w a rz  (eds.), M u ltim ed ia : G a tew ay  to  the N ext M illen n iu m , C am b rid g e , M ass ., 1994, p . 2 7 4 ; 
K re sse /H e in z , R und fu n k d y n am ik  a m  M orgen  d e s  d ig ita len  Z e ita lte rs , A fP , 3 /1995 , p. 575 ; see  fo r n e ar-v id eo -o n - 
d e m a n d  a lread y  o ffe re d  in the U S A , W este rk am p , D ig ita les S a te llite n fe m se h en  in  den U S A , p . 11.
m S ee  fo r th e  d e m a n d s  o n  a  m edia se rv e r , F e tte rm an , M u ltim ed ia  a n d  the P h o n e  C om pany , p . 9 7 ; see  a lso  B o o z , 
A llen  &  H a m ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim ed ia , p . 8 5 , w h ich  co n sid ers  th e  the m u lti m ed ia  se rver a s  g re a te s t p ro b le m  for 
the re a liz a tio n  o f  in te rac tiv e /m u ltim e d ia  ap p lic a tio n s .
70 S ch rap e , D ig ita les  F e rn seh en , p. 36 ; A s to n /S c h w a rz  (ed s.) . M u ltim ed ia : G a tew a y  to the N ex t M ille n n iu m , p. 278 ; 
V ideoS erver - G ru n d b a u ste in  fü r V id e o  on D e m an d , in: K abel u n d  S a te llit, F ern seh en  2 0 0 0  g lo b a l, d ig ita l, 
in te rak tiv , M ü n c h e n , 1994, p . 7; H o lzn ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M ultim e d ia -Z e ita lter, p . 17.
71 B ooz, A lle n  &  H am ilto n , Z ukunft M u ltim ed ia , p . 155; H olznage!, P ro b lem e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  
M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 17; see fo r p ilo t p ro jec ts  K reile /V eler, U m se tzu n g  d e r  ak tuellen  G e se tzg e b u n g  u n d  
D ereg u lie ru n g s V orhaben d e r EU, in: Z U M . 10 /1995 , p. 697 S ch au ta fe l 1.
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investments are necessary for the upscaling of the networks, which is risky considering the
uncertain demand.71 2
c) Better Picture and Sound Quality
The better picture and sound quality, digital technology can provide compared to the 
analogue transmission is an aspect of the introduction of digital television almost forgotten 
about with the discussion of the multiplication and channels and new services. In the past 
there has been a big discussion about HDTV (High Definition Television) in Europe, in 
particular with the failure of introducing the MAC standard, which had only been partly 
digital. Instead the implementation of the 16:9 format was pushed ahead.73 745However, the 
improvement of the picture quality seems not to be an added value which really captures 
the interest of the European television viewers.74 75This is different in the US, where in 
particular cable television is notorious for poor picture and sound quality. There it is said 
that the picture quality presents the main marketing argument for digital television and 
most of the research directed at the advance of television is aimed at refining the display.73 
Contrary to that in Europe the interest in digital television focuses mainly on the diversity 
of channels and new services. This fact is important for the future development of digital 
television because of the trade off necessary between picture quality and number of
71 Sec  S c h ra p e , D ig ita le s  F ernsehen, p . 103, th e re  the  costs for d e v e lo p in g  a  co u n try w id e  n e tw o rk  fo r in e rta c tiv e
te lev is io n  are  e s tim a te d  a t 374 b illio n  U S$ fo r  th e  U S A  and a ro u n d  150 b illio n  U S$ for G e rm an y .
73 See  fo r th e  a b an d o n m en t o f  an alo g u e  H D T V  b y  the E uropean C o m m u n ity  N egropon te , B e in g  D ig ita l, N e w  Y ork, 
1995, p . 4 0 ; see fo r  the  effo rts in im p le m e n tin g  the  16:9 fo rm at S eeg er, S tru k tu rv erän d eru n g en  des R u n d fu n k s  in 
E u ro p a, p . 1 14f.
74 S eeger, S tru k tu rv e rä n d e ru n g e n  d es  R u n d fu n k s  in  E uropa, p. 116.
75 N e g ro p o n te , B e in g  D ig ita l, p. 37; D a ten h ig h w a y , in : K abel un d  S a te llit, p . 10; th e  Federal C o m m u n ic a tio n  
C o m m iss io n  (F C C ), th e  m ain  reg u la to ry  b o d y  fo r m ed ia  and  c o m m u n ic a tio n  in th e  U SA  re q u ire s  the te le v is io n  
sta tions to  m o v e  to  a  d ig ita l tran sm iss io n  sc h e m e , th e  h igh  d e f in itio n  te le v is io n  (H D T V ) a n d  a  16:9 fo rm a t w ith  a 
co m p le te  c o m p lia n c e  requ irem en t b y  2015 ; see  fo r  that,Y adon , B ro a d c a s tin g  in  the In fo rm atio n  A g e . p . 135 an d  
N e g ro p o n te , B e in g  D ig ita l, p. 52.
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channels with the digital compression technology. With the compression technology 
different levels of picture quality can be defined, however, the higher the picture quality 
the more transmission capacity is needed and the fewer channels can be delivered. For one 
program in high definition quality 16 programs in low definition quality can be delivered.76
III. The Set-top-box and Other Elements of the 
Digital Television Distribution System
In the following chapter I will introduce the three main elements of the new distribution 
system for digital television, which are bound to create problems for competition. Next to 
the main technical device for the introduction of digital television, the set-top-box, I will 
refer to the new electronic program guides, also called navigation systems and the 
marketing technique of packaging channels.
7. The Set-top-box
The key device for the introduction of digital television at least for the starting years will 
be the set-top-box. However, its significance might even go beyond that. Experts predict 
that a sophisticated set-top-box has the potential to become the center of the multimedia 
world, as the connecting link between the different equipment, personal computer, 
television, video recorder, telephone, fax etc. and applications.77 It is likely to become the 
technological gateway to an array of enhanced services that will be provided by 
entertainment exhibitors, information service providers, and transactional service
™ S ch rap e , D ig ita le s  F e rn seh en , p. 14; se e  a lso  F la ta u , A k tiv itä ten  d e r  E u ro p ä isc h en  U nion a u f  d e m  G e b ie t d e r
M ed ien , p . 7 76 .
77 Westerkamp, Digitales-Satcllitenfemsehen in den USA. p. 14.
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providers.78 Control over the set-top-box is seen as crucial for obtaining a dominant 
position in the digital television market right now and in a possible even much greater 
multimedia market in the future. For this reason the set-top-box has become the subject of 
intense cross-industry interest, in the USA as well as in Europe.79 A range of legal 
problems surrounds this device, mainly concerning the impediment of free competition and 
the tendency to concentration between the different line of business units. Because of its 
central position for the introduction of digital television it is regarded as a bottleneck for 
the access to the new market, which allows for competition restraints by the market 
players who control it. Its linkage position between the distributors and the networks also 
provides incitements to integrate. To offer a better understanding of the relevant 
problems, I will first outline the different functions of the set-top-box. Closely connected 
with the set-top-box and its functions are the topics of the navigation system and 
packaging. The former helps the viewer to search through and select from the multitude of 
new channels, while the packaging is the probable way how the channels will be offered to 
the consumers. The issues will be illustrated by a practical example when the Media 
Service GmbH decision by the European Commission will be analyzed, where it prohibited
78 See N e g ro p o n te , B e in g  D ig ita l, p. 4 5 ;  H ege, O ffe n e  W ege in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p. 15; F e tte rm an , M u ltim e d ia  
and th e  P h o n e  C o m p a n y , p. 100.
79 For E u ro p e  see th e  w id e ly  p u b lish ed  ba ttle  o v e r  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  a  s in g le  standard  se t-to p -b o x  o r  tw o  d iffe re n t 
sys tem s o n  the G e rm a n  m arket b e tw e e n  the M u ltim e d ia  B e tr ie b sg ese llsc h a ft (M B B G ) and  th e  K irch  G ro u p , 
Focus, “M o d e ll T ep p ich h a n d e l” , 8 /1 9 9 6 , p. 16 4 ff;  T h e  E co n o m ist, “ L ion  in  w in te r” , M arch  9 th  1996, p . 7 3 ;  D er 
S p iegel, “  E in  B e fre iu n g ssch lag ” , 11/1996 , p . 122 ff.; fo r  the c o n f lic t o n  th e  F ren ch  m arket o v e r  tw o  d if fe re n t  
sy s tem s in tro d u c e d  b y  C an a lS a te llite  and  Télévision par satellite (T P S ) se e  L e M onde, 27  A v ril  1996, p . 2 4 ; fo r  an 
o v e rv iew  o f  se t- to p -b o x  standard  se ttin g , jo in t  v e n tu re s  m ark e tin g  and  p r ic in g  in  the U SA , F e tte rm an , M u ltim e d ia  
and  th e  P h o n e  C o m p a n y , pp . 98-99 .
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a concentrative joint venture aimed at providing technical and administrative services to 
organize digital pay television.80
a) The Functions
The set-top-box will combine different important functions for the provision of digital 
television. For the operator of the set-top-box they might offer different possibilities of 
manipulating and dominating the digital television market. This leads to a couple of legal 
problems like the incitement to integrate vertically which will be described afterwards.
aa) The Conversion o f  Digital Signals
The main function of the set-top-box in the starting phase of digital television will be to 
convert the transmitted digital signals into analogue ones which can be received and 
displayed by the traditional analogue television sets in the homes.81 For the beginning it is 
expected that the set-top-boxes will be leased out by independent distribution companies 
or by the operators of digital programs themselves.82 According to the predictions by 
some experts, in the long run, only television sets capable of receiving digital programs 
will be available.83 As a further development, is foreseen the convergence of the television 
set and the personal computer in one device. Engineers agree overwhelmingly that the 
differences between the television and the computer will be limited to peripherals and to 
the room of the house in which it is found.84 The different forms of using the equipment *1
1,11 M S G  M e d ia  S e rv ice  (C om m . D ec. 9 4 /9 2 2 /E C ), O J 1994 N o L  3 6 4 /1 .
111 R eport to  th e  S w ed ish  M in ister o f  C u ltu re  a n d  th e  H ead  o f  M in istry : F rom  M assm ed ia  to M u ltim e d ia  - 
D ig ita liza tio n  o f  S w ed ish  T e lev is io n , p. 20 ; P ie p er, M ed ien rech t im  S p an n u n g sfe ld  von "B ro a d ca s tin g  u n d  
M u ltim ed ia" , in: Z U M , 8/9 /1995 , p. 558 ; E b e rle , N eue Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  und V e rfassu n g srech t, p . 252 .
w S ch rap e , D ig ita les  F e rn seh en , p. 23 .
10 H o lzn ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p. 21 .
M N e g ro p o n te , B e in g  D ig ita l, p. 46.
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between the so called couch viewer, the then former television viewer, and the desk
viewer, the then former personal computer user, will call for two different sets, one for the 
living- and one for the working room.85 The modem open architecture television will be 
the personal computer, independent form the way it will be used.86 These scenarios seems 
to contradict other views which see the set-top-box as future central link between the 
various multimedia devices in the developing European multimedia world.87 However, 
there are other functions of the set-top-box described below, which might provide for a 
future existence of the device even after the conversion function for the digital signals 
need not be performed anymore by an additional device.88 In any case as long as there are 
mainly traditional analogue television sets used in the private homes the function of 
converting the digital signals fulfilled by the set-top-box will be essential for the 
transmission of all digital programs. This is true independent of the method of 
transmission, via satellite, cable or terrestrial.
bb) The V^scrambling/Conditional Access Function
The unscrambling/decrypting and conditional access function of the set-top-box are 
connected with each other and are the essential technical infrastructure to operate pay-
85 Sec fo r th e  c o n v e rg e n ce  d iscussion  o f  te lev is io n  an d  personal c o m p u te r  a n d  th e  d ifference o f  c o u ch  and  d e sk  
v iew ers, E b erle , M e d ie n  und  M e d ien re ch t im  U m b ru c h , p. 7 9 1 ; S c h ra p e , D ig ita le s  F em seh en , p. 37; sc e p tic a l 
reg ard in g  th e  c o n v erg e n ce  B ooz, A llen  &  H a m ilto n , Z ukunft M u ltim ed ia , p . 8 4 ; see the c o n v erg e n ce  b e c o m in g  
reality  a lre ad y  the n e w  pro jec t o f  T h o m so n  C o n su m e r  E lec tro n ics , In terna tiona l H erald T rib u n e , “A  re v o lu tio n  is 
co m in g  so o n  to  a  T V  n e a r y o u " , 17 M ay  1996, p . 1, 8.
86 N eg ro p o n te , B eing  D ig ita l, p. 47 ; se e s  the  d e v e lo p m e n t still as o p e n -en d e d , B o o z , A llen &  H am ilto n , Z u k u n ft  
M u ltim ed ia , pp. 8 4 -8 5 ; d isag ree ing  w ith  the v iew  o f  N eg ro p o n te , W es te rk am p , D igitales S ate  Hi ten fe m se h e n  in 
den  U S A , p. 16.
87 W este rk am p , D ig ita les  S a te lliten fem seh en  in d e n  U S A , p. 14.
** N eg ro p o n te , B eing D ig ita l, p. 47, ex p ec ts  the se t-to p -b o x  to  d e v e lo p  in to  a c red it-ca rd -s ize  in se r t  th a t tu rn s  th e  then  
d o m in a tin g  p erso n al c o m p u te r in to  a n  e le c tro n ic  ga tew ay  for c a b le , te lep h o n e  and  sa tellite ; th is  is  a lso  su g g e s te d  
as p o ss ib le  o u tco m e  by  W este rk am p , D ig ita les  S a te llite n fe m se h en  in  den  U S A , p . 15.
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television. There are not a peculiarity of digital television. However» due to the foremost 
expected demand for special interest programs in the form of pay-television with the 
introduction of digital television these functions play an essential role. In addition the 
decryption of the programs and the conditional access system as a whole, like the billing of 
the subscribers become less expensive and more sophisticated with the introduction of 
digital technology.90 Since the viewer at home does not want to have to pile up a 
multitude of decoders, the decoder function for converting the digital signals and the 
decryption and conditional access functions should be performed by one box.91 Pay- 
television programs are invariable encrypted. The conditional access system ensures that 
only authorized viewers, i.e. subscribers to the particular encrypted channel can receive 
the channel. The system consists essentially of a decoder for the decryption of the 
encrypted television signals - this has to be distinguished from the above described 
function to convert the digital signals - , a subscriber management system (MSS), a 
subscriber authorization system (SAS) and an encryption system. The decoder decrypts 
the television picture, which is encrypted when the television signal is transmitted. 
Together with the television signal a data stream has to be transmitted, containing 
information on the channels or packages of channels subscribed to and on the entitlement 
of the subscriber to receive the programs. One can distinguish open and closed systems. 
Within a closed system usually only broadcasting companies who have signed an 
agreement with the owner or operator of the system are allowed to encrypt in this
M S ee  above  fo r  the m a rk e t forcasts, H .2.a).
9,1 See  H ege, O ffe n e  W eg e  in die d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p . 4 6 .
91 H o lzn ag c l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R un d fu n k reg u lieru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 2 1 ; E b erle , M edien  u n d  M e d ien re ch t 
im  U m b ru ch , p. 7 97 .
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system.91 2 The use of closed systems forces consumers to purchase or hire a special 
decoder to receive television channels encrypted in this system. And if a household wants 
to receive television channels which are encrypted in another system they have to buy an 
additional decoder. An open system also called common interface approach means on the 
contrary that decoders are available from many sources.93 There the consumer can receive 
television channels in different open systems by using different smartcards. The smartcard 
is inserted into the decoder to scan through the datastream that comes along with the 
television signal to find out if its identity is present. When the smart card finds it unique 
key the decoder decrypts the television signal and passes it on to the television set.94 Most 
encryption systems in Europe provided up to today are closed ones. In the United 
Kingdom BSkyB uses a proprietary system called Videocrypt which is also used by 
Multichoice in over 30 European countries. Canal Plus in France and in Spain, Premiere in 
Germany and Austria and Teleclub in Switzerland use a closed system called 
Syster/Nagravision.95 As mentioned above, next to the decoder base and access to an 
encryption system a subscriber management system (SMS) and a subscriber authorization 
system (SAS) are essential parts of a conditional access system. The subscriber 
management system (SMS) is a computer system which serves to manage the subscriber
91 N ord ic  S a te llite  D is trib u tio n , (C om m . D ec . 9 6 /1 7 7 /E C ), O J 1995 N o  L  5 3 /2 0 , p . 2 2 ; E berle. N e u e
Ü b e rtra g u n g ste ch n ik e n  und V e rfassu n g srech t, p . 2 5 2 .
93 S ee  fo r a  s im p le  tec h n ica l descrip tion  o f  the c o m m o n  in terface . D ig ita l V id e o  B ro ad castin g , p re ss  re le ase , G e n ev a , 
9 th  M arch  1995, p . 4 .
94 S ee  fo r o p e n  and  c lo se d  system s R e p o rt to  the S w e d ish  M in ister o f  C u ltu re  a n d  th e  H ead o f  M in is try : F rom  
M a ssm e d ia  to  M u ltim e d ia  - D ig ita liza tio n  o f  S w e d ish  T elev is io n , p . 2 0 ; N e g ro p o n te , B eing D ig ita l, p. 46; 
P e rsp e c tiv es , une  is su e  technolog ique: le  pay  p e r  v iew ? , in: D o ssiers  de  l 'A u d io v isu e l, N o 60 , M a rs /A v ril 1995 , p. 
44 ; H o lz n ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 21 ; E berle , N e u e  
Ü b e r tra g u n g ste ch n ik e n  und V erfassu n g srech t, p . 2 5 2 .
95 P e rsp e c tiv es , une  is su e  technolog ique: le  pay  p e r  v ie w ? , p. 44 ; E n se r , M S G  M e d ia  S erv ice  H a lted : C o m p etitio n  
P o licy  on th e  In fo b ah n , in: E n te rta in m en t L aw  R e v ie w , 2 /1995 , p . 6 2 ; N o rd ic  S a te llite  D is tr ib u tio n . (C o m m . D ec .
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base, the billing and collection of subscriptions.* 96 The SMS contains vital information 
about the customers especially important for a pay-television broadcaster or a cable 
operator. This makes the control over it a very delicate issue.97 The SAS is software 
designed to open or close the authorization of the individual subscriber to receive pay- 
television channels.
cc) The Programming o f the Return Channel
A function which the set-top-box is supposed to fulfill for the interactive future of the
digital television is providing the software for the return channel. This is crucial for the
ordering of films via video-on-demand, the selection of single programs within pay-per
view, the demand of information or the purchase of goods via teleshopping .98 In the USA
the set-top-box used for the digital satellite television includes a standard telephone
interface. Subscribers can order movies, shop interactively or request information when
the box automatically dials a toll-free 1-800 telephone number.99 As already described
above, for full scale interactivity providing, text, voice and video the installation of a two
100way broadband network or the upgrading of existing telecom networks is necessary.
9 6 /1 7 7 /E C ), O J 1995 N o  L  53/20, p . 2 2 ; see in  p a rtic u la r  for F ran ce , M eise , S te in ig e r  W eg z u r  D a ten a u to b a h n . p. 
441
96 K opp, M e d ien re ch t u n d  neue techn ische  E n tw ick lu n g en  - R eak tio n en  und P e rsp ek tiv en , p. 3 8 9 ; H o lzn ag e l, 
P ro b lem e d e r  R un d fu n k reg u lieru n g  im  M ulti m e d ia -Z eitalter, p. 2 1 ; E berle , M ed ien  und M e d ien re ch t im  U m b ru c h , 
p. 797 .
97 N ord ic  S a te llite  D is trib u tio n , (C om m . D ec. 9 6 /1 7 7 /E C ), O J 1995 N o  L  5 3 /20 , p . 22 .
n  E berle , M e d ien  un d  M ed ien rech t im U m bruch , p . 7 9 7 ; B ooz, A llen  &  H am ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p. 8 4 ; K opp , 
M ed ien rech t und n e u e  techn ische  E n tw ick lu n g en  - R eak tionen  un d  P e rsp e k tiv e n , p. 389.
99 Y odan , B ro a d ca stin g  in  the  Inform ation  A ge, p . 129; see  for the p o ss ib ility  o f  v id eo -o n  d em an d  v ia  te le p h o n e , 
S ch rap e , D ig ita le s  F e rn se h en , p . 37.
til0 See  for th e  O rla n d o  p ro jec t, a state o f  the  art, fu lly  in te rac tive  sy s tem  ap p ly in g  a synchronous t ra n s fe r  m ode  (A T M ) 
tech n o lo g y , o p e ra ted  b y  a partnersh ip  be tw een  U S  W es t and T im e W arn e r a s  p ilo t p ro ject, Y o d an , B ro a d ca stin g  in  
the  In fo rm atio n  A g e , p , 125; see for the  O rla n d o  p ro jec t and also  fo r  G erm an  p ilo t p ro jec ts W ö ssn e r, In te rak tiv es  
F ernsehen ; E in e  n eu e  D im ension  der U n te rh a ltu n g , p . 23f.
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The set-top-box is expected to provide the programming for the return channel 
independent of the level of interactivity. However, this statement is based on the 
assumption that the set-top-box will survive as an independent device in the multimedia 
age.101
b) The Problems
I now provide an abstract description of the legal problems surrounding the use of the set­
top-box with its different functions outlined above. These combine potential impediments 
of competition as well as risks for the pluralism of opinions due to incentives contained in 
the system to concentrate, in particular vertically. Later on, in the analysis of the Media 
Service GmbH decision and the Nordic Satellite Distribution decision by the European 
Commission, some of the problems will be taken up again and it will be demonstrated how 
they emerged in real cases.
aa) The Gatekeeper Role
As already mentioned above the set-top-box will obtain the role of a gatekeeper, first for 
the distribution of digital programs later, if the predictions come true, for the whole range 
of interactive multimedia applications at home.102 All the above described functions, in 
particular the conversion of the digital television signals and the encrypting and conditional 
access are supposed to be contained in one box. This is essential to make the whole 
system attractive for the consumer who does not want to buy a range of different boxes.103
Sec d isc u ss io n  ab o v e  I I I . l  .a)aa) ab o u t th e  fu tu re  scen ario s reg ard in g  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  the se t- to p -b o x ; sc e p tica l 
ab o u t w h e th e r  fo r fu ll-sca le  in te rac tiv ity  still th e  se t-to p -b o x  w ill b e  u se d , W es te rk am p . D ig ita les  
S a te llite n fe m se h en  in  d e n  U S A , p, 15.
102 See above, H l.l .a )b b ) .
1,13 S ee  H ege, O ffe n e  W eg e  in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p p . 38-39; E berle , N e u e  Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  u n d  
V e rfassu n g sre c h t, p . 2 5 1 .
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However, this gives the operator of the system, either the hardware producer of the set­
top-box or a software producer, an immense influence on the distribution of the digital 
programs. This is at least true when he chooses a closed proprietary system, which is done 
by most of the providers in Europe.104 By controlling the decoder the same company then 
also controls the administrative and technical services for the provision of digital 
television.105 The system in this case fortifies itself, since by offering the administrative and 
technical services himself the set-top-box operator also forecloses the market for 
independent companies which might want to offer these services.106 For a successful 
marketing of the set-top-box it is widely considered necessary to introduce one common 
system for all digital programs. To induce the consumers to invest in the purchase of a set­
top-box or pay the leasing rate they should be able to receive with their set-top-box all 
transmitted digital programs.107 This is also why standardization is such an important issue 
for the success of the set-top-box and digital television altogether.108 This aim poses 
difficulties with the above described closed systems. There the availability of programs 
offered by companies that are not linked with the owner or operator of the set-top-box
104 See above  I I I .l .a )b b ) .
105 S ee  D cv o tech  C o n se il/A n a ly sy s, R a p p o rt final p o u r  D G  X III d e  la  C o m m iss io n  E uropéenne: B e so in s  p o u r le 
D é v e lo p p e m e n t d ’u n  E n v iro n n em en t M u ltim é d ia  fo n d é  su r  les In fra s tru c tu res  d e  T é léco m m u n ica tio n s e t  les 
R éseaux  d e  T é lé v is io n  p a r  C âb le . J a n v ie r  199S, p . 2 02 .
Kl6 S ee  G re en , P re se rv in g  P lura lity  in a  D ig ita l W o rld , in: T h e  C ro ss M e d ia  R ev o lu tio n , edited  b y  
C o n g d o n /G reen /G rah am /R o b in so n , L o n d o n , 19 9 5 , p . 30 ; E berle, N e u e  Ü bertrag u n g stech n ik en  un d  
V erfassu n g srech t, p. 2 5 2 .
1(17 K opp , M e d ie n re c h t u n d  neue tec h n isch e  E n tw ic k lu n g en  - R eak tio n en  u n d  P e rsp ek tiv en , p. 3 8 9 ; see  fo r th e  
p rob lem  in g e n e ra l a n d  fo r  the s itu a tio n  in  G B  w ith  B S kyB  in p a rticu la r , G ra h a m , E xchange R a te s  and  
G a tek eep e rs , in: T h e  C ro ss  M edia  R ev o lu tio n , e d ite d  b y  C o n g d o n /G reen /G rah am /R o b in so n , L o n d o n , 1995, p . 4 4 ; 
see  the d isc u ss io n  in  G erm an y  as w ell a s  in F ra n c e  w h ere  tw o  d if fe re n t  sy s te m s a re  abou t to  b e  in tro d u c ed  a n d  
because  o f  th is  the e co n o m ic  success o f  the  w h o le  n a tio n a l d ig ita l te le v is io n  in d u stry  is  pu t in to  q u e stio n , D e r 
Sp iegel, “  E in  B efre iu n g ssch lag ” , 11 /1996 , p. 1 2 2 ff; Focus, “M o d e ll T ep p ich h a n d e l” , 8 /1996 , p . I6 4 ff ;  L e  M o n d e , 
27  A vril 1996 , p. 24 .
I1#t See  G ra h am , E x ch an g e  R ates and G a tek eep e r, p . 4 4 -4 5 ; see for c o m p e titio n  a n d  stan d ard iza tio n  b e lo w  V .3 .;  see  
fo r the  eco n o m ic  re aso n in g  B ooz, A llen  &  H am ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim e d ia , p . 84 .
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depends on a contract concluded between them and the latter. The owner of the system 
will be in the position to dictate the terms when he is willing to enter into an agreement at 
all. Independent not integrated program suppliers and broadcasting companies, especially 
smaller ones who cannot afford to set up their own system have to be protected from 
being discriminated against by the set-top-box and conditional access provider. 
Discrimination against certain broadcast companies and program suppliers would also 
limit the choice of the viewer in selecting these program, since they would be only 
accessible via another system connected with additional costs or not at all. If certain 
content providers are limited in their access to the distribution system this has negative 
effects on media pluralism. Code of conducts obliging the decoder system providers to 
treat all broadcast companies and service providers equally are suggested as solutions for 
this situation.109 The question remains how effective the introduction of such a code would 
be, regarding the possibility to circumvent it and the burdens in proving its violation. The 
hailed solution for all access problems to the distribution of the digital programs is widely 
seen in the common interface approach.110 As described already above this approach 
presents an open system, where the decoder is not aligned with a certain encryption *1
I m  T h e  D ig ita l V id eo  B ro ad castin g  C ro u p  has d ra fte d  a  c o d e  o f  co n d u ct, see T h e  N ew  A ge o f  T e lev is io n : D V B , p. 30; 
the E u ro p ean  C o m m u n ity  has adop ted  a D irec tiv e  o n  the Use o f  S tan d ard s fo r th e  T ran sm iss io n  o f  T elev is io n  
S ignals c o n ta in in g  p ro v is io n s  o n  the trea tm en t o f  b ro ad casters  by c o n d itio n a l a cc ess  p rov iders , se e  b e lo w  V I IA b ) ;  
see  for the  n e e d  fo r c o m m erc ia l ag reem en ts  b e tw ee n  broadcaster a n d  c o n d itio n a l access p ro v id er a n d  the 
d iscussion  o f  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c ts  Schoof/W atson  B ro w n , Inform ation  H ighw ays an d  M ed ia  Po licies in  the  E u ro p ean  
U nion , p. 3 3 5 ; H o lz n ag e l, P rob lem e d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 22; R e p o rt to the 
Sw ed ish  M in is te r  o f  C u ltu re  and  the H ead  o f  M in is try : F rom  M assm ed ia  to M u ltim e d ia  - D ig ita liz a tio n  o f  S w ed ish  
1 T e lev is io n , p . 20 ; E b erle , N eue Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  und V erfassu n g srech t, p . 2 5 2 ; N ordic  S a te llite  
D is trib u tio n , (C o m m . D ec . 9 6 /177 /E C ), O J 1995 N o  L  53 /20 , p. 22  (2 2 ); E nser, M S G  M ed ia  S e rv ic e  H alted : 
C o m p etitio n  Po licy  o n  the  Infobahn, p . 62 .
111 S ee  fo r the w ay  the o p e n  system  func tions above, II I .l .a )b b ) ; see fo r  the  lack  o f  c o n se n u s  w ith in  th e  E u ro p ean  
D ig ita l V id eo  B ro ad castin g  G roup (D V B ) S ch o o f/W atso n  B row n, In fo rm atio n  H ig h w ay s and  M e d ia  Po lic ies in  the 
E uropean  U n io n , p. 3 3 5  a n d  there fo o tn o te  37; se e  fo r  p lans to  m ake the  in c lu s io n  o f  a com m on  in te rface  
m anadato ry  in  d ig ita l d ecoders , E u ro p ean  B ro ad castin g  U nion , L egal C o m m ittee , In form ation  d o c u m e n t N o  9  
(95 ), p. 2 .; se e  a lso  b e lo w  V II.4 .d).
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system, but works with smartcards. The smartcards provide the set-top-box with the 
intelligence to recognize the television signals it has to decrypt. However, possibilities for 
the impediment of competition and discrimination against competitors still remain. There 
probably will not be a single smart card for every channel, since this would be very 
inconvenient for the viewer considering there will be up to 500 channels available.UI 
Instead packages of programs will be offered together on one smartcard. These might turn 
out to be the channels and programs offered together within the different closed or 
proprietary systems before. Independent and smaller channels and multimedia service 
providers who happen not to be on one of these important smartcards, but have their own 
much less attractive card might have little chance to survive in the market. However, 
although problems remain, the open system would obviously be a great improvement 
compared with a situation of different incompatible set-top-boxes. This makes a big 
difference whether the viewer has to buy a new set-top-box to receive a certain program 
or get up and put a different smart card into his decoder.
bb) The Position o f  the System Operator
The crucial gatekeeper role of the set-top-box justifies a closer look at the position of the 
owner or operator of the set-top-box. The system operator will be either the hardware 
manufacturer or the software producer of the decryption, conditional access and return 
channel programs. Above already some of the possibilities have been described for the 
owner of the conditional access system to discriminate against broadcast companies and 
program suppliers. These are considerably greater when operating a closed system. 1
111 T o  m ake the ap p lica tio n  co nven ien t to  th e  c o n su m er is regarded  to  b e  o n e  o f  the  keys fo r an  e co n o m ic  success o f  
the  d ig ita l te lev is io n , see  B ooz , A llen  &  H am ilto n , Z u k u n ft M u ltim ed ia , p. 18.
3 0
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However, the system operator will only discriminate against the content providers if he has 
a motive to do that. If the system operator is an independent company his interest will be 
to offer through his systems as many programs as possible to make it attractive for the 
viewers. However, the situation differs when either he achieves a dominant market 
position that allows him to act independently of small broadcast companies or program 
suppliers or he is linked to a large content provider.112 The development in Europe has 
shown that primarily content providers engage in setting up decoder systems for digital 
television, mostly joined by other companies often up- or downstream active in the line of 
business.113 These companies first of all have a great interest in pushing forward digital 
television as logical extension of their activities in traditional television. Secondly most of 
them have experience with the decoders and conditional access services for already 
existing non digital pay-television. The majority of these already operating systems are 
closed ones.114 These circumstances make it clear that there is a very high risk of 
discriminating conduct and anti-competitive behavior by the providers of the set-top-box 
and the administrative and technical services necessary for digital television. It is also not 
very probable at least for the near future, that independent providers for these services will 
enter the market as long as mainly closed systems are used. It can be expected even that if 
the system operators are forced by legislation to introduce a common interface there will
113 G raham , E x ch an g e  R a te s  and  G a tek e ep e rs , p. 4 4 ; H o lzn ag e l, P ro b lem e  d e r R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -  
Z e ita lte r, p . 2 2 .
113 S ee  H ege, O ffe n e  W e g e  in  d ie  d ig ita te  Z u k u n ft, p . 15; see  fo r F ran ce  th e  te le v is io n  ch an n e l C a n a l P lus, fo r 
G erm any  th e  m ed ia  c o m p a n y  B erte lsm an n  A G  a n d  th e  m ovie  and sp o r t  licen ces p ro v id er K irch  G ro u p , fo r th e  
U n ited  K in g d o m  the te le v is io n  g roup  B S k y B .
114 In F rance  C a n a l P lus th e  o rg an izer o f  th e  first d ig ita l te lev is ion  p ro g ram s is a  p a y -te lev isio n  c h an n e l u sing  a  c lo s e d  
c o n d itio n a l access sy s te m ; in  G erm any  th e  B erte lsm an n  A G  has a  s to ck h o ld  in  P rem iere , the G e rm a n  pay- 
te lev ision  c h an n e l u s in g  a  c lo sed  sy s tem ; the p o ten tia l o rgan izer o f  d ig ita l te le v is io n  in  the U n ited  K ingdom  
B SkyB  has sa te llite  p ay -te lev is io n  ch an n e ls  u sing  a  c lo sed  system  se e  fo r the  co m p e titio n  risks th ere  G rah am , 
E x ch an g e  R ates and  G a tek e ep e rs , p. 44 .
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remain the risk of them trying to impede competition because of their clear interests in
favoring their programs over the ones of their competitors.115
cc) The Incentive to Integrate
A great risk for the development of the digital television market are the incentives it 
obviously carries with it for market players to integrate. Both horizontal and vertical 
mergers and joint ventures can be observed in almost every case where the digital 
television enterprise is started.116 While it can be considered as a natural behavior of 
companies to join forces in order to afford a greater investment, to achieve an competitive 
advantage or to control and foreclose markets, the introduction of digital television in 
connection with the new devices and technology applied shows here special features. The 
set-top-box and the administrative and technical services contained in it offers special 
incitements for companies to integrate in particular vertically. Concerning broadcasting 
there has always been the possibility for network providers, broadcast companies and 
program suppliers to merge.117 One of the reasons given for the newly arisen interest is the 
ongoing and partly already completed privatization and liberalization of the 
telecommunication sector which also includes cable and satellite as the future transmission
ns T o  m ake a  c o m m o n  in te rfac e  m an d a to ry  is seen  b y  m an y  as the o b v io u s  so lu tio n , how ever, n e ith e r  in  the E C  (n o t 
included  in  th e  D ire c tiv e  o n  the U se o f  S tan d ard s  fo r  th e  T ran sm iss io n  o f  T e lev is io n  Signals) n o r  in  G B  (a c c o rd in g  
to  the g o v e rn m e n t’s  p ro p o sa l o n  M ed ia  O w n ersh ip , C M  2872 . M e d ia  O w n ersh ip : th e  G o v ern m en t’s p ro p o sa ls , 
L o n d o n  H M S O , 1995) d o  th ere  e x is t c o n c re te  p la n s  to  im p lem en t su c h  s tan d ard s , se e  for this G ra h am , E x ch a n g e  
R ates and  G a tek e ep e rs , p . 4 5 ; see  a lso  b e lo w  V II.4 .d ); se e  fo r the rem a in in g  r isk s  w ith  a  c o m m o n  in te rface  
approach a b o v e  III. I .b )aa).
116 S ee  fo r th e  ten d e n cy  in  g e n e ra l b ecau se  o f  the c o n v erg e n ce  p ro cessu ses, G reen , P reserv in g  P lu ra lity  in a  D ig ita l 
W orld , p. 3 4 ; se e  a b o v e  fo r  the a llian ces  in  F ran ce , G erm an y  and S ca n d in a v ia  b e tw ee n  d iffe ren t ch an n e ls , 
te leco m m u n ica tio n  c o m p a n ies  and  p ro g ram  su p p lie rs .
117 See  for v e rtica l in te g ra tio n  regard ing  c ab le  te le v is io n  and  “m u st-ca rry "  ru les to  g u a ran tee  eq u a l a ccess  to th e  
d is trib u tio n  n e tw o rk s , S choof/W atson  B ro w n , In fo rm atio n  H ighw ays and  M e d ia  Po lic ies in  the E u ro p ean  U n io n , p . 
335 ; see for v e rtica l in teg ra tio n  co n ce rn in g  cab le  o p e ra to rs  and  p ro g ram m ers in  the  US cab le  te lev is io n  in d u stry , 
W aterm an , V ertica l In teg ra tio n  and P ro g ra m  A ccess in  the  C able  T e lev is io n  In d u stry , in: F ed .C o m m . L aw  Jo u rn a l ,  
V ol. 47 , 1994, p. 5 11 , 5 3 4 .
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media for digital television.118 These more general competition issues will be dealt with 
further below. However, the introduction of digital television with the technical 
infrastructure it demands offers special reasons for the tendency to integrate vertically.119 
This is due to the special gatekeeper function of the set-top-box. As described above this 
will present the bottleneck in the distribution process of digital television. Here the 
network providers meet with the broadcast companies and program suppliers. However, 
the link in the middle, the operator of the set-top-box and the decoder and conditional 
access system had or in many cases still has to be established. This is a new function in the 
distribution process of television programs which had not existed until the introduction of 
digital television in that form including navigation systems and packaging mentioned 
below, though as described above conditional access systems have been used for non 
digital pay television already.120 To fill this vacuum, which also needed or needs a 
considerable investment, it is the obvious thing for the companies interested in building up 
a distribution chain to join forces. By this they can share the costs and the risks and profit 
from their different expertise. However, a cooperation like this easily turns out to 
encompass the whole line of business concerning the production and distribution of digital
ll* S ee  H o lz n ag e l. P ro b lè m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M ulti m ed ia -Z e ita l ter, p . 19, he gives as an  ex am p le  o f  
a ris in g  p ro b lem s th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  sa te llite  p ro g ra m s v ia  the A s tra -sy s te m , w h e re  the sa tellite  p ro v id e r  S E S  w as 
accu sed  o f  g ra n tin g  p riv ile g es  to  m ed ia  c o m p a n ies  w ith  g rea t m ark e t p o w e r in  re se rv in g  tran sp o n d er p laces , w h ile  
ignoring  o th e r  b ro a d c a s t co m p an ies; se e  a lso  E n g e l, M u ltim ed ia  u n d  d a s  d e u tsch e  V erfassu n g srech t, in: 
P ersp ek tiv en  d e r  In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft. e d ited  b y  H o ffm an n -R iem /V estin g , B ad en  B aden, 19 9 5 , p . 170, w h o  
ju s t  m en tio n s  the  ten d e n cy  o f  ne tw orks a n d  p ro g a m  su p p liers  to  in te rg ra te  v e rtica lly  g iv ing  as re aso n s  eco n o m ies  
o f  sca le  g a in s  and  m a rk e t co n tro l; h o w e v er, he  d o e s  n o t  rea lly  g ive  a  re aso n  fo r  th is  sudden  d ev e lo p m en t, a lth o u g h  
one  can  g u e ss  from  th e  c o n te x t th a t h e  a lso  re fe rs  to  th e  lib e ra liza tio n  o f  th e  n e tw o rk s .
119 See  H ege, O ffe n e  W eg e  in  d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p . 2 9 ; see  fo r v e rtica l in te g ra tio n  an d  in p a rticu la r th e  free  a cc ess  
p rob lem s w h en  b e tw o rk  prov iders are in v o lv ed , D e v o tec h  C onse il/A n a ly sy s, R ap p o rt final p o u r D G  X III d e  la 
C o m m iss io n  E u ro p éen n e : B eso ins p o u r le  D év e lo p p em en t d*un E n v iro n n e m en t M u ltim éd ia  fo n d é  su r  les 
In fra s tru c tu res  d e  T é léc o m m u n ic a tio n s  e t  les R éseau x  d e  T élév is io n  p a r  C âb le , p . 202.
m  See  for an a n a ly is  o f  the  changes in the  d is tr ib u tio n  p rocess o f  te le v is io n  p ro g ram s th rough  the in tro d u c tio n  o f  
d ig ita l te le v is io n , H o lz n ag e l. P rob lèm e d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 21 ; s e e  on  th e  
d is trib u tio n  p ro c e ss  a ls o  H eg e , O ffene  W eg e  in  d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p p . 52-55.
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television, which then poses a threat to free competition because of the tendency to favor 
the aligned companies and discriminate against outsiders. Here the much discussed 
question arises, to what extent one should accept this vertical integration, in order not to 
endanger the creation of a distribution network. Many favor a more tolerant approach at 
the beginning of a new market, however this might permit the emergence of structures 
which cannot be removed later on.121 Others recommend as a remedy, to strengthen the 
competition among the networks, cable, satellite, terrestrial and in the future perhaps the 
telecom networks. It has to be made sure that there is more than one way for a program 
maker to gain access to the viewer.122 However, it is questionable whether the networks 
are really intersubstitutable in their use and if there exist always the interest and the 
financial resources to build alternative networks if they are not already there.123
2. The Navigation-System
In the age of digital television, with the arrival of hundreds of channels, new forms of 
presenting programs become essential to give the consumer some orientation in his 
selection process. For this electronic program guides are being developed mainly by 
software producers but also by others like computer companies and television channels.124
121 S ee  fo r the d isc u ss io n  S ch o o f/W atso n  B row n , In fo rm a tio n  H ighw ays and M ed ia  Po lic ies in the E u ro p ean  U n io n , p. 
335 ; H o lzn ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k re g u lien m g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 19; H offm an n -R iem , M u ltim ed ia - 
P o litik  vo r n e u e n  H erau sfo rd eru n g en ? , in : R u n d fu n k  un d  F em seh en , 2 /1 9 9 5 , p . 137; see  fo r the d isc u ss io n  in  
G erm an y , K ü b le r, K o n zen tra tio n sk o n tro lle  d es b u n d e sw e ite n  R u n d fu n k s, in ; D ie  S ich eru n g  d e r  M e in u n g sfre ih e it, 
e d ite d  by  D ie  L an d esm ed ien an s ta lten , 1995, p. 2 8 7 ,3 2 5 .
122 G reen , P re se rv in g  P lu ra lity  in  th e  D ig ita l W o rld , p . 34 .
123 S ee  for the e ffo rts  to  in tro d u c e  c o m p e tin g  ne tw o rk s in  the  US cab le  te lev is ion  in d u stry , E sser, Z u g a n g  zu r 
B re ilb a n d k o m m u n ik a tio n  - d ie  U SA  als B e isp ie l z u k ü n ftig e r  E n tw ick lungen  in E u ro p a , in; K o m m u n ik a tio n  o h n e  
M o n o p o le  II, e d ite d  b y  M estm äcker, B ad en -B ad en , 1995, p. 438.
124 S e e  fo r the a c tiv ities  o f  c o m p an ies like  M ic ro so ft, A p p le  and  L otus D ev e lo p m en t, G a n z  e in fach  -  w arum  d ie  
B en u tzero b e rfläch en  so  w ich tig  sind , in: K abel u n d  S a te llit, F ern seh en  2 0 0 0  g lo b a l, d ig ita l, in te rak tiv , M ü n c h e n , 
1994, p. 21 ; s e e  fo r th e  p la n s  fo r an  e lec tro n ic  p ro g ram  g u ide  by the G e rm a n  p a y -te le  v ision  c h an n e l P rem ie re , 
F la tau , A k tiv itä ten  d e r  E u ro p äisch en  U n io n  a u f d e m  G e b ie t d e r  M ed ien , p . 7 79 .
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It is expected that predominantly companies with strong links to broadcasting companies 
and program suppliers will emerge as providers of navigation-systems.123 *25
a) The New Program Presentation
In the future the channels available on digital television will be presented in a way known 
from the graphical user interfaces used in computer programs like Windows for example, 
however, it is supposed to be even more user friendly.126 On a screen the whole variety of 
channels will be presented and the viewer will be able to move around with a cursor 
through his remote control and click on the different channels to learn more about the 
offered programs. It will not be necessary any longer to know the specific numbers of the 
different channels, since they will be presented in a clear way on the screen.127 Next to 
providing information about the whole range of programs offered the electronic program 
guide will then help the viewer in finding and selecting the program he likes. There will be 
pre-selected program compilations to facilitate the choice for the viewer. The electronic 
program guide will also offer the possibility of searching programs according to special 
areas of interest, like news, sports or movies with special themes. Additional information 
to programs might be offered, merchandise products to popular shows presented and 
recommendations given.128 A further step in user friendliness are intelligent system that
123 H o lzn ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p . 25 .
126 S e e  fo r a g en era ! ex p lan a tio n  o f  the n av ig a tio n  sy s te m s . H ege, O ffen e  W ege  in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p . 39 ; s e e  fo r
th e  em p h asis  p u t  on  u se r  friend liness . G a n z  e in fach  - w aru m  die  B e n u tz e ro b e rfläc h en  so  w ichtig  s in d , in: K ab e l
u n d  S a te llit, p . 21 ; see in  g e n e ra l fo r th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  u se r  in te rface  in  th e  d ig ita l w o rld  N eg ro p o n te . B e in g  
D ig ita l, p. 8 9 ff.
127 T h is  is how  a lre ad y  e x is tin g  sys tem s in  th e  U S A  w o rk  w h ich  a re  e x p e c te d  to b e  ap p lie d  in a  s im ilia r  fo rm  in  
E u ro p e ; see W este rk am p , D ig ita les S a te llite n -F e rn seh e n  in  den  U S A , p . 12.
128 E berle , Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  und V erfassu n g srech t, p . 252 ; H o lz n ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  
M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p . 24 .
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recall which programs the viewer has watched the most in a certain time and start their 
program presentation by offering them first.129
b)The Risk of Manipulation and Anti-Competitive Conduct
The particular significance of the new forms of program presentation lies in the fact that 
they will become essential for the program choice of the consumer. The first impression 
the viewer will be confronted with when he starts watching television will be the program 
presentation interface. For his choice an intelligent and tempting presentation might 
become more important than the program itself, at least it will be a crucial factor. Since 
the electronic television guide will present also already pre-selected program bouquets and 
programs compiled according to themes or special fields of interest, the focus will drift 
away from the particularity of the individual program or channel. An intelligent 
presentation might prompt the viewer to stay within a certain program bouquet or pre­
selected program compilation.130 This illustrates the fact that in the future the reception of 
a program by the consumer might be determined more by the way it is presented in the 
context of the whole program variety than according to the individual program 
characteristics like content and structure. Within this development lies a high potential for 
the manipulation of the viewers. An intelligent system will be able to identify the taste of 
the viewer by recalling earlier choices and arrange the program presentation 
accordingly.131 However, it might contain even greater problems for free competition and 
concentration. For a broadcast company and a program supplier it will become essential
129 W este rk am p . D ig ita le s  S a te llile n -F em seh e n  in  d en  U S A , p. 12.
130 E b erle . N eue Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  u nd  V e rfassu n g sre c h t, p . 252.
131 H olznage!, P ro b le m e  d e r  R un d fu n k reg u lieru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 24; se e  fo r the need to  p re v en t 
m an ip u la tio n  th ro u g h  regu la tion , H o ffm ann-R iem , M u ltim ed ia -P o litik  v o r  neuen  H e rau sfo rd eru n g e n ? , p, 137,
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how her or his programs will be presented in the navigation system. If they lack a good 
placement or ranking within the electronic program guide or are not included there at all, 
they are bound to suffer a very low reception rate, if they are able to survive at all 
economically. Like above with the set-top-box and its decoder and conditional access 
systems it also here becomes crucial who operates the navigation system. As already 
mentioned above, it is expected that the providers of navigation systems will be 
companies linked to broadcasters and program suppliers, probably part of one big media 
giant, as it can be seen already in many European countries with the printed television 
guides.132 This contains the high risk for anti-competitive conduct by the navigation 
system providers in applying the manipulation potential of the system to favor the 
companies to which they are linked.133 In this context a couple of questions arise 
concerning the provision of these navigation systems. Will there be different systems or 
only one common system? Will there be different providers? Who should be allowed to 
provide the systems? Will there be a right for broadcast companies or program suppliers to 
have their programs presented in the electronic television guide?134 It becomes clear that 
measures have to be taken to protect independent and small broadcast companies and 
program suppliers from being discriminated against by vertically integrated navigation 
system operators.135 One idea would be for example to license the systems like the
133 H o l2 nagel, P ro b le m e  d e r  R un d fu n k reg u lieru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 24.
133 S ee  for the g e n e ra l p ro b lem  and  the s itu a tio n  in G B  w ith  B SkyB  in p a rticu la r , G ra h am , E xchange  R a tes and 
G a tek e ep e rs , p . 4 4 ; a lso  fo r  the  risks o f  v e rtica l lin k s  in  th is  area E n g el, M u ltim e d ia  un d  das d e u ts c h e  
V e rfa ssu n g sre c h t, p. 169.
134 S ee  fo r som e o f  the q u e s tio n s , E berle, M e d ien  un d  M e d ien re ch t im U m b ru c h , p. 7 9 7 ; the  sam e a u th o r, N eue  
Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  u n d  V erfassungsrech t, p. 2 5 3 ; see  fo r som e a n sw e rs  to  th ese  questions, H e g e , O ffen e  W e g e  
in  d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p . 39.
135 H o lzn ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 24; E b e rle , N eue 
Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  u n d  V erfassu n g srech t, p. 2 5 3 .
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channels themselves.136 Next to the set-top-box the navigation system presents, with its 
crucial role for the program choice of the consumer, a second bottleneck for the 
distribution of digital television programs.137 Also here a high tendency for vertical 
integration and a move to concentration in general becomes apparent.
3. The Packaging
Originally a feature of cable television in the USA, the marketing of different programs in 
the form of packaging is expected to become a widely spread practice with the emergence 
of digital television and the multiplication of channels and programs. The topic is closely 
connected to the above discussed navigation systems, since the latter will be the medium 
to market the packages. However, this way of marketing the programs poses dangers for 
free competition and media pluralism in the way it limits the program choice of the 
viewers.
a) Packaging as a Marketing Instrument
Packaging was introduced by cable operators in the USA to market the programs and 
channels that were supposed to be distributed through their cable system.138 They arrange 
different packages out of the programs offered by the broadcast companies and program 
suppliers which then can be ordered by their subscribers. Usually the offer ranges from a 
basic package that only contains the most popular programs over a more special 
compilation which adds some special interest and theme channels, up to a premium
136 See  fo r  th e  p lan s  o f  the  m edia  c o n tro l  a g en cy  in  B erlin , R ecke, E s  g eh t a u c h  o h n e  M SG , in : ep d /K irc h e  u n d  
R u n d fu n k . N r. 3 1 .2 2 .  A pril 1995. p . 3.
137 S ee  a ls o  P lu ra lism  an d  M ed ia  C o n c en tra tio n  in  th e  In ternal M a rk e t  E u ro p e a n  B ro ad castin g  U n io n  R eply  to  
C o m m iss io n  Q u e stio n a ire  N o III, 12 A pril 1995, p . 8.
l3S See H e g e , O ffe n e  W ege  in  die d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p p , 40-41.
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package whose content can be selected by the viewer himself.139 The different packages 
are priced according to that climbing scale. So usually the basic package is affordable for 
most consumers, while the premium package enjoys more exclusivity. One of the reasons 
given why packaging has not been that widely practiced in Europe is, next to the lack of 
programs, the fact that in many countries the cable operators were or still are state owned 
companies mostly incorporated in the state telecommunication monopolies who were 
constrained in their marketing activities by universal service obligations.140 However, the 
situation will change with the privatization of the cable networks foreseen by the 
European Community.141 The packaging depends on a great enough variety of channels 
ready for distribution and the possibility of the distributor to combine them freely and to 
control their access. Since the multiplication is one of the main features of the introduction 
of digital television it is destined for being marketed in packages. The packaging plays an 
important role for the financing of the cable programs, since the licensing fees are
139 E sse r , Z u g an g  z u r  B re ilb an d k o m m u n ik a tio n  - d ie  U SA  als B e isp ie l fü r zu k ü n ftig e  E n tw ick lu n g en  in E u ro p a , p. 
4 1 2 .4 1 5 .
140 T h is  is  tru e  in p a rticu la r for G e rm an y  as la rg e s t cab le  te lev is io n  m ark e t in E urope, see E b c rle , N eue 
Ü b e rtra g u n g s te ch n ik  und V erfassu n g srech t, p . 251 ; see a lso  H eg e , O ffe n e  W eg e  in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p. 61; see 
fo r th e  u n iv ersa l se rv ice  o b lig a tio n s S ch e re r, F re q u e n zv e rw a ltu n g  z w isch en  B und und L än d e rn . F ran k fu rt/M ain , 
1987. p . 45 : in  the U K  the cab le  se c to r  has b e e n  open  for p riv a te  cab le  o p e ra to rs  for m ore th en  ten  y ears  s in c e  the 
C a b le  an d  B ro ad castin g  A ct o f  1984; h o w e v er, o n ly  4%  o f  th e  h o u se h o ld s  h ave  cable, w h ile  14%  re ce iv e  sa te llite  
te le v is io n , see D oyle . K abel- u nd  S a te lliten p ro g ram m e in G ro ß b ritan n ien ; in France since  th e  partly  p riv a tiza tio n  
o f  the  c ab le  n e tw o rk s  on c o m m u n ity  level in  1986 there has e x is te d  an o lig o p o l o f  three b ig  cab le  o p e ra to rs ; there  
are o n ly  8%  o f  th e  households ac tiv e ly  u s in g  cab le ; how ever, h e re  has e x is te d  a sort o f  p a ck a g in g  see M eise , 
S te in ig e r  W eg  zu r D aten au tobahn , p. 4 36 , 4 3 9 ; in Italy the c ab le  n e tw ork  is under state a u th o rity  w hich  reserves 
the r ig h t  to se t up  and operate  the  cab le  in s ta lla tio n s  on the n a tio n a l level o n  an exclusive b as is , A n d re tta /P ed d e , 
B ro a d c a s t R egu la tion  in Italy, in: E n te rta in m e n t L aw  R eview , 1/1995, p . 11.
141 C o m m iss io n  D irec tiv e  9 5 /5 1/EC  o f  18 O c to b e r  1995, OJ 1995 N o  L 2 5 6 /4 9  abotishs the re stric tio n s o n  the use o f 
c ab le  te lev is io n  ne tw orks for the  p ro v isio n  o f  a lready  libera lized  te leco m m u n icatio n  se rv ices; see  also  E ijk , D ie 
L ib e ra lis ie ru n g  d e r  K abelfem schne tze  in E u ro p a , in: IRIS 1995 , su p p le m e n t, pp. 17-19; see  fo r the e ffe c ts  o f  
d e re g u la tin g  the netw orks, E berle . M ed ien  u n d  M ed ien rech t im  U m b ru ch , p . 791; the E u ro p ean  U nion  h as agreed  
o n  a  to ta l lib e ra liza tio n  o f the te leco m  and  c ab le  netw orks by  Jan u a ry  1st 1998; see for the sta te  o f  the 
lib e ra liza tio n  p ro c ess  K re ilc /V ele r, U m se tzu n g  d e r  ak tuellen  G e se tz g e b u n g  und D e reg u lic ru n g sv o rh ab en  d e r EU, 
in: Z U M , 10 /1995 , p. 694.
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calculated according to the number of cable users.142 The packaging can be done not only 
by the cable network operator but also by the program suppliers, the provider of the 
technical and administrative services or a service company totally independent from the 
distribution chain.143 In the literature the packaging of programs has mainly been discussed 
for the transmission via cable and not via satellite, which will be the start up transmission 
medium for digital television in Europe.144 This is probably due to the fact that for the 
transmission via satellite the broadcast companies and program suppliers lease single 
transponders which then send the television signals and the satellite operators do not have 
the chance to combine the offered channels in the way they want. The situation is different 
if the packaging is already done by the program supplier, which is more the case in Europe 
than in the USA. Then the transmission medium does not make a difference, since it does 
not depend on the possibility for the network operator to offer the program via his 
network in packages.145 However, certainly when, as predicted, cable becomes the 
dominating transmission medium for digital television in the future, the packaging of the 
digital programs by the cable operators will be an important feature of their distribution 
and marketing.146
,4J H o lz n ag c l, P ro b le m e  dcr R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 23 .
143 Sec  H eg e , O ffc n c  W ege in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p. 41. who g iv e s  ihe e x am p le  o f  the US w h ere  the p a ck a g es  are 
no t b u ilt  by the  b ro ad casters , b u t b y  the c a b le  o r sa tellite  o p e ra to rs ; h o w e v er, it does not h a v e  to be lik e  that, see 
the M S G  d e c is io n  p ragraph  31.
144 Sec  H e g e , O ffc n e  W ege  in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p . 41 who a lso  m en tions pack ag in g  for sa te llite  p ro g ram s.
145 See  th e  co n ce p t fo r the M SG , w h ere  the p ro g ra m  organ izers th em se lv es  w ere  supposed  to  c a rry  o u t th e  pack ag in g , 
M S G  d e c is io n , parag rap h  29; see  H ege. O ffe n e  W ege in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p. 41 , w ho e x p ec ts  a n e w  d im en sio n  
in p a ck a g in g  fo r  d ig ita l te lev ision ; see the p la n s  o f  the K irch G ro u p  th a t w ill o ffe r its p ro g ram s in p ack ag es , K abcl 
un d  S a tc llit ,  9 . A p ril 1996, p. I.
O n e  o f  the re ao n s  fo r th is ex p ec ted  d e v e lo p m e n t is the return  c h an n e l n e ed e d  for in te rac tiv e  te lev is io n , w h ich  can  
m u ch  e a s ie r  be p ro v id ed  with c ab le , see a b o v e  II .l .c ) .
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b) The Concerns for Competition and Concentration
However, the offering of programs in the form of packages raises serious concerns for free 
competition and concentration on the future digital television market. First of all the 
packaging will limit the choice of the viewers. They will not be free any longer to select 
the single channels they prefer.147 The program the consumer wants to choose might only 
be offered within packages he is not willing to subscribe to either because the costs are too 
high or it contains other programs which do not interest him. Smaller program suppliers 
who are not allowed to join in a package with more important programmers might be 
confronted with considerable market entry barriers.148 If the programs of the most popular 
broadcast and programming companies are marketed together and the smaller ones are 
excluded from these packages it will exacerbate the unequal division of market power and 
endanger the existence of the smaller suppliers altogether.149 The risks for such a 
development are much higher in case there exists some kind of vertical link between the 
big program supplier and the network provider, here the cable operators. The packaging 
provides another example for how crucial and detrimental for free competition vertical 
integration in the distribution chain of digital television can be. To avoid the just described 
effects one needs regulation which ensures that the consumer will be able to choose freely 
between individual channels and packages. Another suggestion aims at “must-carry” rules 
which oblige the network operators to include the programs of smaller and less important
147 E b crle . N eue  Ü b e rtrag u n g stech n ik en  u n d  V erfassu n g srech t, p . 251 ; H o lz n ag e l, P rob lem e d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  
im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 2 2 ; H eg e , O ffe n e  W eg e  in  d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, 1995, p . 4 0 ff .; s e e  ib id ., p . 6 3 ,  w here  
H eg e  c o m p a res  th e  packag ing  o f  ch an n e ls  w ith  th e  p rac tice  o f  th e  so ftw a re  p rov ider M ic ro so ft to  o ffe r  p a ck a g es  o f  
so f tw a re  that a re  a im ed  at ex c lu d in g  p ro v id ers  o f  s in g le  p ro g ram s fro m  th e  m arket.
148 H o lz n ag e l, P ro b le m e  der R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 23 .
149 S ee  H e g e , O ffe n e  W eg e  in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p . 41.
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suppliers in the usually popular basic package.150 However, as already mentioned above, 
the highest risks for the impediment of competition and the free choice of the consumer 
will be contained in possible vertical links between the network operator and the important 
program suppliers. As long as the cable operators remain independent they will at least 
aim at providing the viewers as large and free a choice as possible of programs in order to 
increase their revenues. To guarantee the survival of small program providers, however, 
special regulatory protection measures still will be necessary.151
IV. The Media Service GmbH Decision and 
Related Aspects of the Nordic Satellite 
Distribution Decision
The above description of the legal implications connected with the introduction of digital 
television dealt with the subject in the abstract. However, there exists already a very 
important merger decision by the European Commission on the competition aspects of a 
concrete case. This decision is considered to be a cornerstone for the merger control and 
competition policy in the rapidly developing new media markets, and in particular the 
digital television market.152 This decision was followed recently by a related merger case 
concerning the pay television and satellite television market in Scandinavia, which is
150 H o ffm an n -R ic m , V on  der R u n d fu n k  zu r M u lti-M ed ien k o m m u n ik atio n , in: Jah rb u ch  T e lek o m m u n ik a tio n  und 
G e se llsch a ft, e d ite d  by  K u b icek /M ü lle r/N eu m an n /R au b o ld /R o ß n ag e l, H e id e lb e rg , 1995, p. 101, 108; E b e rle , N eue 
Ü b e rtra g u n g s te ch n ik e n  und V e rfa ssu n g sre c h t, p. 251 ; see fo r  “ m u st-ca rry ”  ru les  in the U S A  fo r  c ab le  te lev is io n . 
Sec . 3 ff. C a b le  T e lev is io n  C o n su m e r and  P ro te c tio n  and  C o m p etitio n  A c t o f  1 9 9 2 ,102d C o n g re ss  (2 d  S ess io n ), 
P .L . 1 0 2-862 . S e p tem b e r 1 4 ,1 9 9 2 ; they h a v e  no t been  abo lished  by the T e lec o m m u n ic a tio n s  A ct o f  1996 , see  for 
cab le  se rv ice s , T itle  III, Sec. 3 01 .
151 See  H e g e , O ffe n e  W ege in d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p. 42.
152 Ebenroth/Lange, Zukunftsmärktc in der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, in: EWS, 1/2/1995, p. 1; Wessely, Media 
Service GmbH: ein Fall für die europäische Fusionskontrolle, in: Medien und Recht, 6/1994, p. 219.

widely based on arguments developed already in the Media Service GmbH decision.153 
The analysis of the Media Service GmbH decision will focus on the relevant aspects 
concerning competition concerns connected with the introduction of digital television in 
Europe. Due to this, most of the general competition law aspects of the decision will only 
be dealt with very briefly. There are new plans for a joint venture which is supposed to 
replace the one forbidden in the Media Service GmbH decision. This is said to have been 
already informally approved by the European Commission.154 The differences between the 
two joint ventures will be analyzed to illustrate the dangers for free competition on the 
digital television market. Next to that new aspects brought up by the decision on a joint 
venture in the Scandinavian television market will be added.
1. The Facts and the Parties
The prohibited merger, the MSG Media Service Gesellschaft fur Abwicklung von Pay- 
television und verbundenen Diensten mbH  was proposed as a joint venture by 
Bertelsmann AG (Bertelsmann), Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (German Telecom) and 
Taurus Beteiligungs GmbH (Kirch). MSG was to provide the decoders, the conditional 
access services and subscriber management in relation to subscribers to pay-television 
services (next to pay-per-channel and pay-per view, later also for other new television 
services like video-on-demand, teleshopping, telebanking etc.), particular digital ones, in 
the German speaking markets. The joint venture was to offer these administrative and 
technical services to the new suppliers of pay-television in Germany expected to emerge
153 N o rd ic  S a te llite  D istribu tion , (C o m m . D ee, 9 6 /I7 7 /E C ), O J 1995 , N o  L  5 3 /2 0 , p. 22  (22).
154 F ra n k fu rte r  A llg em e in e  Z e itu n g , 10. M ai 1996, p. 25.
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with the arrival of digital television. In the joint venture each of the three parent groups 
was to hold one-third of the shares and to appoint one third of the board. Key strategic 
decisions required approval by all three partners.
Each of the three partners is a powerful player in the German media markets.135 
Bertelsmann is the common parent company of the leading German media group. It has 
activities in almost all areas of media, books, press, recording and including holdings in 
commercial television, with worldwide interests. Taurus is a holding company part of the 
Kirch Group. Kirch controls the largest catalogue of feature films and television programs 
for the German market and is also active in commercial television in Germany and has 
holdings in pay-television suppliers outside Germany. Together with Bertelsmann and the 
French pay-television provider Canal Plus the Kirch group controls Premiere, Germany’s 
only existing pay-television film channel. Telekom is the German public 
telecommunications operator active in all areas of telecommunication services. Next to 
still having the monopoly of the German telephone network it is also the owner and 
operator of nearly all the German cable-television networks.* 156
2. Som e G eneral Legal Aspects
For a better understanding of the decision in general and the conclusions for the digital 
television market in particular some of its more general legal aspects which might be of 
significance for future similar cases will be explained.
,iJ See  fo r  an  d e sc rip tio n  o f  the p a rtie s  M S G  M e d ia  Serv ice  (C o m m . D ec. 9 4 /9 2 2 /E Q , OJ 1994 No L  3 6 4 /1 , 
p a ra g ra p h s  5 -7 .
156 H ere  o n e  d is tin g u ish e s  be tw een  n e tw o rk  lev e ls ; o f  the 19 m illio n  cab le  h o u se h o ld s  only 4  m illio n  are  d irec tly  
c o n n e c te d  w ith  th e  G erm an  T e lec o m , w h ile  15 m illion  are p ro v id ed  w ith  c a b le  th rough  p riv a te  co m p an ies  w hich  
h av e  b e co m e  a c tiv e  on  the so  c a lle d  n e tw o rk  4  level, the one  c lo se s t to  th e  co n su m er; see  fo r  d e ta ils , F la tau , 
A k tiv itä te n  d e r  E u ro p äisch en  U n io n  a u f  d em  G e b ie t d e r M ed ien  -  h ie r im  b eso n d e ren  N e tz träg e rsc h a ft, p . 7 7 8 .
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a) The Applicability of the Merger Regulation
For the applicability of the European Community Merger Regulation instead of national 
competition law, the proposed merger has to have Community dimension according to 
Art. 1 (2) of the Merger Regulation.157 The second distinction which has to be made is 
with regard to the EC-Treaty competition provisions Art. 85, 86. A joint venture falls 
under the Merger Regulation and not under Art. 85 (1) EC-Treaty, which deals with 
agreements restricting competition, when it is concentrative according to Art. 3 (2) of the 
regulation.
The MSG was considered to be concentrative, since it would have operated as an 
autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis with each of the partners investing 
considerable sums.158 It was intended to be a full-function enterprise on the market and 
not merely have auxiliary functions for its parent companies. It also passed the second 
limb of the test for concentrative joint ventures contained in Art. 3 (2) of the regulation, 
since its establishment would not risk the coordination of competitive behavior between 
any of the parents or between the parents and the joint venture. The fact that Bertelsmann 
and Kirch were already cooperating in Premiere and MSG would not affect the situation. 
However, this statement proved in a way inconsistent with later findings that the 
establishment of the MSG would secure for Bertelsmann and Kirch a dominant position in 
the pay-television market, which strongly suggests a co-ordination of behavior between 17
117 C o u n c il R eg u la tio n  (E E C ) 4 0 6 4 /8 9  o f  21 D e ce m b er 1989 o n  the  con tro l o f  co n cen tra tio n s b e tw ee n  u n d e rta k in g s , 
O J 1 990  N o L  25 7 /1 4 .
IS< See  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraphs 1 Iff .
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MSG and its parents.159 Also in the other fields of business of the MSG the Commission 
did not find any risk for the coordination of competitive behavior.
Although the joint venture mainly concerned the German television market, according to 
the Commission the turnover thresholds, to give it a Community dimension contained in 
Art. 1 (2) of the regulation, were easily met.160 The aggregate worldwide turnover of 
Bertelsmann, Kirch and the German Telecom is more than 5 billion ECU. Each of the 
three undertakings achieves an aggregate Community-wide turnover of more than 250 
million ECU. And, as stated by the Commission, the undertakings concerned do not all 
realize more than two-thirds of their aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and 
the same Member State. With this decision it was emphasized again that the two-thirds 
turnover threshold in Art. 1 (2) of the regulation only takes effect when all undertakings 
realize more than two-thirds of their aggregate turnover within one Member State. This 
interpretation has been widely criticized by lawyers who support a wider application of 
national competition law.161
b) The Market Definitions
In the MSG decision the European Commission gives explicit definitions for the relevant 
product markets regarding pay- and digital television. It has done this before, however, 
never in such an elaborated way. Since these definitions are of general significance and 
have to be taken into account in future decisions, they will be presented here.
139 S ee  fo r  th is c r itic ism  E nser, M ed ia  S erv ice  H a lte d : C o m p e titio n  Po licy  o n  th e  In fobahn , p . 6 0  and  fo o tn o te  3.
,in S ee  M S G  d e c is io n  parag raph  18.
161 S e e  fo r  th e  c r it ic ism  E benro th /L ange, Z u k u n ftsm ä rk te  in d e r  e u ro p ä isc h e n  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p . 2  and  L an g e , 
R ä u m lic h e  M ark tab g ren zu n g  in d e r  e u ro p ä isc h en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , D iss ., K o n s ta n z  1994, p . 1 13ff.; se e  fo r  m ore  
b e lo w  V II.2 .b b )(2 ) .
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aa) The Different Relevant Product Markets
Concerning the organization of pay- or digital television the European Commission 
distinguished three markets in its MSG decision.
It analyzed a separate market for the provision of administrative and technical services to 
the suppliers of pay-television in general.162 These include the provision of the decoders, 
the providing of conditional access services, the subscriber management and the billing for 
the program providers. The functioning of conditional access systems has been explained 
above, as well as the role of the decoder to convert digital television signals into analogue 
ones. The defined market concerns the operating of the set-top-box which will include all 
the described functions. The European Commission stated that these services can be 
provided by the pay-television supplier itself,163 by the cable network operators164 or by 
totally independent specialized firms.165 In this market in Germany the European 
Commission found that MSG, in the proposed constellation, would be likely to hold a 
long-term monopoly because the mere setting up of it was likely to seal the market off 
from new competitors. In reaching this conclusion it was emphasized that the German 
Telecom has access to 13 million households through its broadband cable network, 
Bertelsmann has experience of managing 22 million book club customers worldwide and 
Bertelsmann and Kirch already have, through their ownership of the pay-television channel 
Premiere, a subscriber base from which to build for digital television. This was decided,
,<a S ee  M S G  d e c is io n  parag raphs 2 0 ff.
163 T h is  is  the c a se  w ith  C anal P lu s  in  F ran ce , P re m ie re  in G e rm a n y  and B S k y B  in G reat B rita in .
164 T h is  is  c o m m o n p lac e  in  the U S A .
1M T h is  w a s  m ade p o ss ib le  a fte r the  ag ree m e n t w ith in  the  D V B  o n  the p a ra lle l ex is ten ce  o f  se v e ra l access co n tro l 
so lu tio n s ; the D ire c tiv e  on  the U se  o f  S ta n d ard s  fo r the  T ran sm iss io n  o f  T e lev is io n  S ig n a ls  9 5 /4 7 /E C , O J 1995 N o 
L  2 8 1 /5 1  c la rif ie d  it.
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though at that point the market for this sort of services in Germany was just beginning to 
develop.166 Here the European Commission applied a dynamic market interpretation in 
assuming that such a market should develop quickly with the introduction of digital 
television.
As further relevant product market the separate market for pay-television was identified. 
This market was distinguished from commercial advertising financed television and from 
public television financed through fees and partly through advertising.167 Pay-television is 
characterized by the trade relationship only between the program supplier and the viewer 
as subscriber while in the case of advertising financed television, there is a trade 
relationship only between the program supplier and the advertising industry.168 However, 
next to this traditional distinction the European Commission also finds differences between 
pay-television programs and free-access, advertising financed programs in terms of 
content. It emphasizes that with the arrival of digital television a variety of new, payment 
financed special interest programs will be expected meeting the demand of specific target 
groups. This is due to the limits of further growth in the volume of television advertising 
which makes the advertising financed television market appear mature. In addition inter­
active services such as pay-per-view, near-video-on-demand, video-on-demand, home 
banking, home shopping and teleteaching will become possible. Here the European 
Commission raises the crucial question which of the future payment-financed
lw E n se r , M SG  M e d ia  Serv ice  H alted : C o m p e titio n  Policy  o n  th e  In fobahn , p . 60.
167 S e e  M S G  d e c is io n  parag raphs 32ff.
1M S e e  a lready  th e  analysis o f  th e  E u ro p ean  C om m iss ion  in p rev io u s m e rg e r  d ecisions, A B C /G e n e ra l d e s  E aux /C anal 
P lu s /  W .H . S m ith  T V  (C om m . D ec, o f  10 S ep tem b er 1991), O J 1991 N o  C  2 44 /5 , p a rag ra p h s  11-13, an d  
V O X /N e w s In te rn a tio n a l/B erte lsm an n  (C o m m . D ec. o f 21 D e ce m b er 1994), O J 1994 N o  C  3 3 3 /4 , p a rag ra p h  13.
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communications services for picture-receiving appliances are to be included in one and the 
same market. It considers a separate market definition for interactive services such as 
home shopping and home banking. However, it concludes that at least pay-television in 
the form of pay-per-channel, pay-per-view and near-video-on-demand constitutes a single 
market.169 Concerning this market the European Commission found that MSG was likely 
to give Bertelsmann and Kirch a lasting dominant position. This was justified with the 
. outstanding position of Kirch in the German television market as leading supplier of films 
and television programs, as well as with the combined access to sports programming rights 
of Kirch and Bertelsmann through affiliated companies. In addition the cross-ownership 
and cross-promotion benefits though Kirch’s ownership of 35 percent of the Axel Springer 
Verlag the largest newspaper publisher in Germany, also the leading publisher of television 
listing magazines at that point was emphasized. The fact that MSG was likely to achieve a 
monopoly for conditional access services would have reinforced the programmer’s strong 
market position.
The third market identified by the European Commission in the MSG decision is the 
market for cable television networks.170 With this assessment it rejected the submission of 
the parties which argued following the introduction of digitalization, there will be no 
longer a separate relevant market for cable television networks. The parties argued that 
there would no longer be any shortage of transmission capacities and that by now the 
transmission media would be considered as interchangeable by the consumers. For the
IM S e e  M S G  d e c is io n  p a rag raphs 7 4 ff.
,7n S e e  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraphs 3 9 ff.
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European Commission there exist considerable differences regarding the technical 
conditions and financing between the three means of transmission, terrestrial, satellite or 
cable. The characteristic of cable television is the presupposition of the maintenance of a 
cable network financed by the viewer through cable fees. Here one could question whether 
there is really a considerable difference in financing considering that in recent years the 
prices for satellite receivers have lowered considerably while the fees for cable television 
have remained the same and also the program variety is mostly greater via satellite.171 
However, the European Commission argues that many households with television in 
Germany face difficulties that the acquisition of satellite dishes is prohibited out of 
aesthetic reasons by the landlord172 and for many households in East Germany the choice 
between cable, satellite and terrestrial does not exist.173 Concerning the argument of the 
abolition of the scarcity of transmission capacity the Commission argues that the decisive 
factor for the existence of a relevant market is not whether an economic item is offered to 
customers in limited or sufficient numbers, but whether trade relationships exists based on 
payment exist in respect of the good or service.174 The German Telecom already 
controlled nearly all the cable networks in Germany. However, the Commission reasoned 
that if the present regulatory framework will be abandoned, cable companies would find it 
more difficult to enter the market with the German Telecom controlling the MSG.175
171 E b e n ro th /L a n g e , Z u k u n ftsm ärk te  in d e r e u ro p ä isc h en  F u sio n sk o n tro lle , p. 3.
m  S ee  B V e rfG , 10 .3 .1993 . N JW  1993, 1252f.; E C H R , 2 2 .5 .1 9 9 1 , N JW  1991 , 623ff.
173 S ee  M S G  d e c is io n  parag raph  4 1 ; see  a lso  E b en ro th /L an g e, Z u k u n ftsm ä rk te  in  d e r e u ro p ä isch en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , 
p . 3.
174 S ee  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraph  4 3 .
173 S ee  W esse ly , M e d ia  S erv ice  G m b H : e in  F a ll fü r die e u ro p ä isch e  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p. 2 1 9 ; see  the d isc u ss io n  in 
G e rm a n y  a b o u t th e  role o f  th e  G erm an  T e le c o m  as d o m in an t c ab le  o p e ra to r . S üddeutsche  Z e itu n g , “ W ir  sind  n ich t 
d e r  b ö se  M o n o p o lis t" , 29. M ai 1996, p. 2 2 .
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bb) The Relevant Geographic Market
Concerning the relevant geographic market the Commission found, for all of the three 
product markets defined, it to be restricted to Germany.176 The Commission argued that 
this was due to the lack of interchangeability of the programs offered in Germany with 
programs offered in other countries. According to the Commission language barriers and 
regulatory differences will continue to exist even in the digital pay-television age.177 In 
addition there are further differences in the conditions of competition observable between 
the Member States. In virtually every Member State one particular supplier has a dominant 
market position or indeed a monopoly in the analog pay-television market. The 
Commission also emphasized great differences in the market penetration with in Germany 
only 2% of the households subscribing to Premiere the pay-television channel, while in 
France and the United Kingdom the corresponding rates were 16% and 15%. This was 
due to differences in the attractiveness of the range of feature films shown on free access 
advertising financed television.178 In the assessment of the Commission the structure of the 
supply side is also not expected to change with the introduction of the digitalization. The 
leading pay-television suppliers of today will also play a leading role in digital television.
As far as the market for services is concerned, the Commission does not rule out the 
possibility that MSG will extend its service activities to other countries as well. However, 
since the services being offered by MSG are closely connected with the supply of pay- 
television, the Commission assumes that the market for these services too will in the
176 S e e  M S G  d e c is io n  parag raphs 4 5 -5 4 .
177 S ee  M S G  d e c is io n  parag raph  4 7 .
I7< S e e  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraph  4 8 .
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foreseeable future remain confined to Germany. This is also due to the dependence of the 
success of MSG on the existence of a well developed cable network in Germany, which 
will have, like the telephone network, a significant role as a return channel for future 
interactive services.179 Because of the significantly smaller degree of connection to cable in 
most of the other Member States there will not be any homogeneous conditions of 
competition between Germany and other Member States, in particular France and the 
United Kingdom, at least not for the foreseeable future. However, the Commission 
conceded the possibility of the emergence of a German language service market, including 
Austria.180
Concerning the market for operating cable television networks there is already a national 
German market resulting from German Telecom’s statutory monopoly on laying and 
operating cable networks in public roads. However, this might not be true anymore in the 
mid-term future with the abolition of the network monopoly also in Germany.181
cc) The Significance o f the Market Definitions
In its market analysis the Commission rightly takes into account the technological 
developments and the expected markets of the future. The case not only concerns a more 
or less limited television market for pay-television.182 Digital television is one of the future 
media which will, equipped with a return channel, provide interactive television services. It
179 T h is  b eco m es ev en  m ore re le v an t w ith th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  th e  ISD N  te c h n o lo g y  on the b a s is  o f  the g lass  fib re  
b ro a d b an d  c ab le  ne tw ork  a llo w in g  the d e v e lo p m e n t o f  a  tw o -w a y  d a ta  tran sm iss io n  ne tw ork .
180 S ee  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraph  53 .
IKI S ee  M S G  d e c is io n  parag raph  9 2 ; see a lso  H o lzn ag e l, P ro b lem e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, 
p. 19.
182 E b en ro th /L a n g e , Z u k u n ftsm ä rk te  in d e r e u ro p ä isc h en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p . 4 .
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provides the basic technology for further future markets.183 1845This was acknowledged by the 
Commission in its decision. Although the relevant geographic market in the decision was 
found to be confined to Germany, the technological development of the digital television 
has to be seen in an international context.184 185The digitalization of the television which is 
about to take place in all major European countries will revolutionize the attitude of the 
viewers to the medium.183 This setting gave the decision its outstanding significance. The 
market definitions will be crucial in assessing future upcoming media cases where the 
future development of television plays a role.186 In its decision the Commission not only 
analyses the status quo, but anticipates the future markets. The latter are very difficult to 
assess in the start up phase. However, if the Commission had applied a static interpretation 
it would have failed to grasp the potential of the future markets and their effects on the 
connected up- and downstream markets.187 To define the markets in such a newly 
developed and complex field is a difficult task. Digital television itself does not present a 
market on its own, since it is mainly a new form of transmission. However, its introduction 
creates an array of connected markets new ones and already existing ones. The market 
definitions have to be found step by step, though the MSG decision laid the ground work 
here. The Commission itself concedes the need for a flexible approach when it leaves the
1,3 See  a b o v e  II.2 .b ).
184 See E n se r , M S G  M ed ia  S erv ice  H alted : C o m p e titio n  Po licy  o n  th e  In fo b ah n , p . 61 ; E b en ro th /L an g e, 
Z u k u n ftsm a rk te  in  d e r  eu ro p ä isch en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p. 4 .
185 S ee  a b o v e  II.2 .b ).
m  See  b e lo w  N o rd ic  S atellite  D istrib u tio n , (C o m m . D ec. 9 6 /I7 7 /E C ), O J 1995  N o  L 53 /20 , p . 2 2  (22).
187 See  E b en ro th /L a n g e , Z ukunfts m ark te  in  d e r  e u ro p ä isch en  F u s io n sk o n iro lle , p . 4 .
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question open which of the future payment financed communication services will fall 
under the market definition of pay-television.188
3. The Conclusions Regarding Com petition in the D igital 
Television M arket
These conclusions will not follow the line of the decision in assessing each defined market 
separately and giving the reason for an impediment of competition by the proposed joint 
venture. Much more conclusions will be drawn in a more abstract way which will illustrate 
general structural and technological features of the introduction of digital television that 
pose problems for free competition. The MSG decision offers an ideal case for such an 
abstraction, since the constellation can be viewed as a prototype for the competition 
problems that surround the introduction of the digital television.
a) The Effects of Vertical Integration on the Markets
With the Bertelsmann AG, the Kirch Group and the German Telecom undertakings 
present on the different stages of the distribution chain of digital television programs came 
together in the proposed joint venture. As already mentioned above, the Kirch Group is 
the leading German supplier of films and television programming. Both Bertelsmann and
* 189Kirch have access to sports programming rights through stakes in other companies. 
Together they control Premiere, the only German pay-television channel at that time with 
a subscriber base they also can use for future digital pay-television. Both undertakings also 
have widespread activities in free-access commercial television, which gives them the *189
lM see  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraph  38.
189 K irch  c o n tro ls  IS P R , the leading agency  fo r  sp o r t b roadcast licen ses ; B e rte lsm an n  has a cc ess  to  a ttrac tiv e  spo rts 
rig h ts  an d  film  p ro d u c tio n  ac tiv ities  th rough  its  sub isd iary  U fa.
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possibility of making multiple use of film or sporting rights.190 They also benefit from 
cross-ownership and cross-promotion with Bertelsmann being the leading book club 
operator, which might provide an important potential distribution channel for pay- 
television channels and Kirch holding a 35% share in Axel Springer Verlag, the largest 
German newspaper publisher and leading publisher of television program magazines at 
that time. The German Telecom owns a broadband cable network, with at that time, more 
than 13 million connected households. It will be in charge of its digitalization. In addition 
it is, with a 16.6% holding in SES, the second largest shareholder in the main European 
satellite operator. With the cable network the Telekom possesses a customer base which 
might become very important for the operation of pay-television. Next to that it has 
experience in network management and the technical know-how for communication 
services.
This description of the parties shows that, combined they form the complete business line 
for the provision and distribution of television programs. The only missing link to organize 
digital television was a unit to provide the decoders and to offer the necessary 
administrative and technical services, like conditional access and subscriber management. 
The Commission found that the creation of the MSG would create durable dominant 
positions for the parties in all three above described markets. Next to the already dominant 
position held by the parties in their markets the main reason for the negative competition 
assessment by the Commission were the emerging vertical links between the up- and 
downstream markets. Concerning the market for the administrative and technical services
1W T o g e th e r  they  c o n tro l abou t 80%  o f  te lev is io n  ad vertis ing  re v en u e  in G erm an y  w ith ch an n e ls  like R T L , S A T 1 , 
P R O  7 , R T L  2 . V O X , D S F  and K ab elk an at.
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the Commission feared that already the mere setting up of the MSG was likely to seal the 
market off to new competitors and obtain a long term monopoly.191 In reaching the 
decision that competition will be inhibited the Commission emphasized the strong 
positions of the parties on the up- and downstream markets, with Telekom and its 
broadband cable network, the ownership of Bertelsmann and Kirch of the pay-television 
channel Premiere, and their preferential access to program software.192 Regarding the 
program resources of Bertelsmann and Kirch the Commission found a “suction effect” due 
to the fact that the service supplier will occupy a favored position who can provide the 
largest number of programs and the most attractive programs.193 This “suction effect” 
could be countered most easily by a cable operator taking over the services, however in 
Germany this function could only be performed by the Telekom, which is also part of the 
joint venture.
Regarding the pay-television market the Commission also found a durable dominant 
position for the parties created through the joint venture. This was also mainly justified 
with the effects of vertical integration which would have strengthened the already 
outstanding position of Bertelsmann and Kirch to an intolerable extent. The Commission 
argued that the fact that MSG was likely to achieve a dominant position on the market for 
technical and administrative services would reinforce the position of Bertelsmann and
191 See  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraph  55 .
192 See  M S G  d e c is io n  paragraph  7 0 ; th e re  a lso  e co n o m ies  o f  sca le  b en efits  a re  m en tioned ; see  a lso  E n se r, M S G
M e d ia  S e rv ice  H a lte d : C o m p etitio n  P o licy  o n  th e  In fobahn , p . 6 1 ; see a lso  W esse ly , M ed ia  S e rv ice  G m b H : e in  Fall 
fu r d ie  e u ro p ä isc h e  F u sio n sk o n tro lle , p. 2 1 9 .
193 See M edia Service decision paragraph 71.
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Kirch on the downstream market for pay-television.194 The market situation in the United 
Kingdom and in France are given as examples, where the new suppliers of television 
programs are effectively dependent on the BSkyB’s or Canal Plus’s infrastructure. It was 
also found that Bertelsmann and Kirch could use their influence on MSG to slant the 
market in their favor. This could have be done by charging artificially high prices through 
the MSG from competitors, by influencing the relative prominence given to competing 
channels in terms of channel allocation, electronic program guides and slots on smartcards 
and by securing informational advantages.195 The Commission also did not trust the 
German Telecom to distribute its reserves of digital capacities on an objective basis rather 
than in the interests of its related program suppliers. This could be done for example by 
citing technical constraints where a verification would pose great difficulties.196
For the cable network market the Commission found a strengthening of the dominant 
position of the Telekom due to the vertical link to Bertelsmann and Kirch as program 
suppliers. There would be a particular risk that private operators once the cable network 
market would be liberalized could not obtain the attractive programs of the leading pay- 
television suppliers Bertelsmann and Kirch which would be essential to provide attractive 
program packages.197
m  S ee  M e d ia  S e rv ice  d ecision  p a rag ra p h  74 ; se e  a lso  E nser, M S G  M ed ia  S e rv ice  H alted: C o m p e titio n  P o licy  on  the 
In fo b ah n , p. 61 .
193 S ee  M e d ia  S e rv ice  d ec is io n  p a rag ra p h s  8 7 ff.; se e  E b en ro th /L an g e , Z u k u n ftsm ä rk te  d e r  e u ro p ä isc h en  
F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p p . 5-6.
196 See  M e d ia  S e rv ice  decision  p a rag rap h  85.
IVT see M edia  Service decision paragraph 93.
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b) Open Access to the Infrastructure
The MSG decision deals not only with an impending foreclosure of markets, but with the 
problem of securing free access to the whole infrastructure for digital television. Next to 
this tendency to vertical integration this is another important feature of the introduction of 
digital television to the television market.198 In the MSG decision two levels of access to 
the infrastructure for the provision of digital television are concerned. The one is the 
access to the cable network and the other the access to the set-top-box and conditional 
access and subscriber management system. An interest to deny the access or to create 
obstacles against it usually only emerges if there exist vertical links with the up- and 
downstream markets as described above.199 The case is a particular good example to 
demonstrate possible access problems, since with the creation of the MSG the parties of 
the joint venture would have controlled the whole line of business regarding the 
distribution and the marketing of digital television programs.
aa) Access to German Telecom*s Cable Network
Next to the already existing strong position of the parties in the pay-television market it 
was in particular the question of free access of competitors to the infrastructure that led to 
the negative competition assessment by the Commission.200 On the one hand it was feared 
that the German Telecom might take its partner’s interests into account concerning the 
input of programs into the cable network. The German Telecom has it in its power to
198 See  a b o v e  fo r the  a b strac t problem  d e sc rip tio n  I IL l.b ) .
m  H ere  th e  p a rtie s  a rg u e d  that it co u ld  n o t be in  th e  in te re s t o f  M S G  to  ac t a g a in s t  o th e r  p a y -te le v is io n  su p p lie rs  as 
th is w o u ld  e n d a n g e r  the  econom ic su ccess ; th e  C o m m iss io n  q u e stio n e d  th is  a rg u m e n t, s ince  M S G  w o u ld  h a v e  h ad
a  m o n o p ly  p o sitio n  an yhow  and B e rte lsm an n  a n d  K irch  have a  p a rticu la r  in te re s t in  co n tro llin g  th e  p a y -te le v is io n  
m ark e t; s e e  M S G  d e c is io n  p arag raph  9 0 .
See M edia Service decision paragraphs 82ff.
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control the digital development of the hyperband in its broadband cable network. It has set 
itself rather vague criteria regarding the digitalization of its free channels which according 
to the findings of the Commission allows it to base the further development of the 
hyperband on the pay-television interests of its partners.201 To confirm this suspicion the 
Commission quoted difficulties encountered in feeding programs broadcast via Astra 
satellite into the German Telecom’s cable network, which were justified by citing technical 
constraints.202 The Commission concluded that the German Telecom by citing technical 
constraints is in a position to influence access to the cable network without in any 
provable way infringing the neutrality requirement.
bb) Access to the Set-top-box and the Services
However, the even greater access problem the Commission found regarding the decoder 
and for the provision of digital-pay-television necessary services provided by the MSG. 
Due to the foreseen lasting monopoly position of the MSG as an operator of a digital 
infrastructure for pay-television, all pay-television suppliers that might enter the market 
following digitalization would be forced to take the necessary services from an enterprise 
controlled by the already leading pay-television suppliers. Through their controlling 
influence on MSG, Bertelsmann and Kirch would be in a position to set the conditions and 
terms of MSG in a way that would be advantageous to their programs and 
disadvantageous to those of their competitors. The Commission found numerous ways for *30
2,1 S ec  M e d ia  S e rv ice  d e c is io n  parag rap h  86.
3 0  S ee  M e d ia  S e rv ice  d e c is io n  parag raph  85; see F la ta u , A ktiv itä ten  d e r  E u ro p ä isc h en  U nion  a u f  d e m  G e b ie t d e r  
M ed ien  u n d  ih re  A u sw irk u n g en  a u f  d ie  F ilm - u n d  F e m se h w irtsch a ft - h ie r  im  b eso n d e ren  N e tz träg e rsch aft, p . 7 7 7 ; 
see  a lso  E b en ro th /L a n g e , Z u k u n ftsm ark te  in d e r  e u ro p ä isch en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p. 5 ; see for th e  g en era l a cc ess  
p ro b lem s to  the  n e tw o rk s  H o lznage l, P rob lem e d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p . 19.
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Bertelsmann and Kirch to benefit from this influence in a way that would inhibit free 
competition.203 204* This includes charging artificially high prices from which they would 
benefit as shareholders of MSG. They also have the possibility of influencing via MSG the 
location of their competitor’s programs. As described above new navigation systems will 
be necessary to help the viewer locate individual programs in the “program jungle”.204 *As 
proposed by the parties the necessary on screen modulator would be included in the set­
top-box and operated by the provider of the device. This would enable the operator to 
place competing pay-television suppliers in positions in the program menu which reduce 
their attractiveness, because it would need many operating steps to get access to them. 
They decision also entered the discussion concerning the use of a common interface 
allowing any company to sell compatible smart cards for their own channel or a 
proprietary solution for the set-top-box.203 Regarding the latter the Commission found a 
possibility for Bertelsmann and Kirch to influence the marketing of competing programs, 
since if MSG would issue the smart cards itself the programs of competitors could be 
placed on less attractive smart cards. And it is not expected that the consumer will want to 
use a variety of different smart cards.206 The Commission clearly endorsed the common 
interface approach to be the better solution from a competition point of view for the 
conditional access problem, since it would “have a positive effect on the development of
202 Sec  M S G  d e c is io n  p a rag rap h s 84-89,
204 See  for a n  a b strac t p ro b lem  descrip tion  o f  the n a v ig a tio n  system s a b o v e  III .2 .b ),
aB See  the p ro b lem  d e sc rip tio n  above u n d e r  III, I .b ) .
21,6 Sec M SG  decision paragraph 88.
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free and unfettered competition”.207 However, it did not find an open interface of itself to 
be enough to ensure free competition.
cc) The Rejected Proposals by the Parties
In fact the parties proposed to use a common interface, also under certain conditions, like 
having to be approved by the DVB and not posing any piracy risks.208 Besides questioning 
the enforceability of this offer concerning the given conditions and reservations, the 
Commission decided that the common interface would not be sufficient after all to avoid 
the threat to competition posed by MSG. Due to its proposed shareholder structure the 
MSG would achieve a dominant market position even if a common interface with 
unlimited access were to be installed.209 This demonstrated that, for the Commission, the 
whole constellation of the joint venture already posed in itself a threat to competition and 
the open structure of the described future markets. The analysis was much more focused 
on the impact of the joint venture on future market structures than on aspects of anti­
competitive behavior and conduct by the involved parties.210 Besides proposing the 
installation of a common interface, the parties also offered self-assurances concerning the 
behavior of the MSG towards its customers and competitors. The sold or leased decoders 
supplied to receive MSG managed programs would never be subject to restrictions on 
their use to receive programs not handled by MSG. The information obtained related to 
other channels would not be handed by MSG to its parent companies. Further the parties *2
2,7 S e e  M S G  d e c is io n  p a rag rap h  95.
2*  S e e  fo r  th e  p ro p o sa ls  o f  th e  p arties . M S G  d e c is io n  paragraph  9 4 ff .
2B S e e  M S G  d e c is io n  p a rag raph  97 ; s e e  a lso  E n se r , M S G  M edia  S e rv ice  H alted : C o m p etitio n  P o lic y  o n  the In fo b ah n ,
p . 6 2 .
2m E b en ro th /L a n g e , Z u k u n ftsm ärk te  in  d e r  e u ro p ä isc h en  F u sio n sk o n tro lle , p . 6 .
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proposed that the electronic programming guide and navigation software would be set out 
in a neutral and non-discriminatory way, to be overseen by a neutral advisory body. And 
the parties committed themselves to a non discriminatory pricing policy.211 The content of 
these proposals largely reflected the code of conduct for the operators proposed by the 
Digital Video Broadcasting group (DVB), a private organization of media, 
telecommunication and hardware companies interested in the implementation of digital 
television.212 However, the Commission found that the proposals were only an offer to 
comply with the legal obligations of a vertically integrated dominant supplier, that it does 
not abuse its market power. And in addition it would be rather difficult to prove that the 
MSG was not behaving neutrally vis-à-vis program providers considering the various 
possibilities of hidden discrimination in practice.213 This confirms again that the 
Commission’s main objection against the proposed joint venture was the structural 
advantages the joint venture provides the parties with in the new emerging markets. For 
those imposed behavioral self-assurances do not present a real remedy.214 However, the 
terms of the offer give some guidance regarding fair and unfair activity in this field for 
future cases.215
211 See MSG decision paragraph 94.
2,2 See for the DVB above; see for the similiarity o f  offers and code o f  conduct, Enser, MSG Media Service Halted; 
Competition Policy on the Infobahn, p. 62
213 See MSG decision paragraph 98.
214 Ebenroth/Lange, Zukunftsmärkte der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, p. 7.
215 See Enser, MSG Media Service Halted: Competition Policy on the Infobahn, p. 62.
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c) The Technical Progress Defense
An argument brought forward by the parties in favor of their proposed undertakings was 
the fact that its creation would contribute to technical and economic progress. This 
criterion is referred to in Art. 2 (1) (b) of the Merger Regulation. It might be used also in 
future cases involving digital television to justify concentration as being necessary to 
obtain the benefits of new technology. The Commission did not accept this defense in its 
MSG decision. It conceded that by providing the necessary infrastructure MSG would 
play an important part in the successful spread of digital television and by this contribute 
to technical and economic progress. However, the defense argument is subject to the 
reservation that no obstacle is formed to competition. Since it was found that the 
proposed concentration will lead to a sealing off of the future market for technical and 
administrative services and in addition create durable dominant positions for the parties in 
the pay-television and cable network markets, definitely major obstacles to competition 
will be formed. With regard to the hindering of effective competition the Commission even 
went further and questioned whether one can still consider the establishment of a digital- 
infrastructure for pay-television by MSG as a positive contribution to the development of 
technical and economic progress. Potential suppliers of digital pay-television might abstain 
from entering the market the way they would have with a service supplier whose 
shareholder structure would ensure strict neutrality.216 This fact makes the proposed joint 
venture seem to be detrimental rather than beneficial for the successful spread of digital 
television. The negative assessment by the Commission also illustrates that it is not willing 
to accept that through the technical and economic progress defense industrial policy
2,6 See M S G  decision paragraph 101.
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arguments will be introduced against the merger control.217 It is particularly remarkable 
that this was decided in the media and television sector, since in the EC so much emphasis 
is put on the development of the information society and its technical and economic 
benefits.218 However, the argument might become relevant in a case where the 
constellation of the involved parties in the joint venture is not as clearly anti-competitive 
as in the MSG case.
4. The N ew  Attem pt: The M ultim edia-Betriebsgesellschaft
There are plans for a new joint venture with a similar aim like the MSG. The setting-up of 
such an undertaking, considering the necessary infrastructure investments is considered to 
be almost indispensable for the introduction of digital television in general by most of 
observers. Since therefore such an enterprise is also of interest for the digital television 
plans in other European countries, the concept of the new joint venture will be briefly 
discussed.219
a) The New Constellation
In the new joint venture which will be called Multimedia-Betriebsgesellschaft the 
constellation of the parties as well as the offered services will differ from the MSG. Also 
the co-operation agreed on by Bertelsmann AG, one of the core members of the MMBG 
and the Kirch Group that has left the MMBG to create its own digital platform has put the
217 See for this observation also Ebenroth/Lange, Zukunftsmärkte in der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, p. 8.
218 See for the importance given by the European Union to the Information Society, Europe and the Global 
Information Society, Report of the High-Level Group on the Information Society, Brussels, May 1994 (the 
"Bangemann Report").
219 The necessity o f such a joint venture is contested by Recke, Es geht auch ohne MSG, in: epd/Kirche und 
Rundfunk, Nr. 31, 22. April 1995, p. 3ff.
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w h o le  e n te r p r is e  in to  q u e s t io n .220 A l s o  C a n a l P lu s  h a s  e n d e d  its  s tra te g ic  a llia n ce  w ith  th e  
B e r te ls m a n n  A G  a n d  m ig h t le a v e  o r  h a v e  a lre a d y  le f t  th e  M M B G .221 H o w e v e r , th e  p r o je c t  
se e m s t o  c o n t i n u e ,  s in c e  t h e r e  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  a n y  c o n tr a r y  p re s s  re le a s e s  b y  th e  in v o lv e d  
p a rtie s . A l le g e d ly  th e  u n d e rta k in g  h a s  a lre a d y  o b ta in e d  c l e a r a n c e  fro m  b o th  th e  G e rm a n  
c a r te l  o f f ic e  a n d  th e E u r o p e a n  C o m m is s io n  a ss u rin g  th a t  th e re  w o u ld  n o t b e  an y  
c o m p e tit io n  c o n c e r n s  ju s tify in g  a  p ro h ib itio n .222 T h e  p a r tie s  a re  the G e rm a n  T e l e c o m  as  
b ig g e s t  s h a r e h o ld e r , B e r te ls m a n n , C L T ,  th e  F r e n c h  p a y -te le v is io n  ch a n n e l C a n a l P lu s , in 
c a s e  it h a s  n o t  le f t  in th e  m e a n t im e , a n d  th e  G e rm a n  te le v is io n  ch a n n e ls  R T L ,  A R D  an d  
Z D F . F i v e  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  s h a re s  a re  re s e r v e d  f o r  a  M M B G  Programm- und 
Diensteanbieter Beteiligungs GmbH , in w h ich  all in te re s te d  c o m p a n ie s  a re  f r e e  to  
p a r t ic ip a te . W ith  this n e w  s h a r e h o ld e r  s tru c tu re  th e  p ro b le m s  re g a rd in g  a  f o r e c lo s u r e  o f  
th e n e w  m a r k e ts  sh a ll  b e  r e m e d ie d . T h e  jo in t  v e n tu re  w ill m a r k e t  d ig ita l p a y -te le v is io n  an d  
o th e r  n e w  te le v is io n  an d  te le c o m m u n ic a t io n  s e r v i c e s ,  h o w e v e r  m a in ly  fo c u s  o n  th e  
p ro v is io n  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l  in f r a s tr u c tu r e . C o n c e rn in g  th e  o ffe re d  s e r v i c e s  th e  M M B G  
is sa id  t o  a b s ta in  fro m  o ffe r in g  th e  fu ll ra n g e  o f  a d m in is tra tiv e  an d  te c h n ic a l  s e r v ic e s  a s  it 
w a s  p la n n e d  f o r  th e  M S G . In s te a d  it in te n d s to  c r e a te  a  c o m m o n  d e c o d e r  b a s e s  a n d  to  
o ffe r  a  d ig ita l d e c o d in g  s y s t e m .223 A c c o r d in g  to  th e  in v o lv e d  p a rtie s  th e  M M B G  h a s  n o t  
d e c id e d  o n  a  s p e c if ic  d ig ita l d e c o d e r  s y s te m  y e t .  T h e  c o n d itio n a l  a c c e s s  s e r v ic e  a n d  th e
220 See  S ü d d e u tsc h e  Z eitu n g , “B erte lsm an n  v e rb ü n d e t sich  m it K irc h ” , 23 . Ju li  1996, p. I ; see a lso , D er S p ie g e l, 
“R e d en  und  S tre ite n ” , 31 /1996 , p. 71 .
221 S ee  fo r  th e  b re a k -u p  o f  the a llian c e  b e tw ee n  B erte lsm ann  A G  an d  C anal P lu s , S ü ddeu tsche  Z e itu n g , “ C a n a l P lus 
b e e n d e t s tra te g isc h e  A llianz  m it B e r te lsm a n n " , 1. A u g u st 1996 . p . 17.
222 S ee  F ra n k fu r te r  A llgem eine  Z e itu n g , “ K a rte lla m t erlaub t D e co d e rk o n so rtiu m " , 10. M ai 1996 . p . 25.
223 S ee  F ra n k fu r te r  A llgem eine  Z e itu n g , “ K a rte lla m t erlaub t D e c o d e rk o n so rtiu m ” , 10, M ai 1996 , p . 25; K ay se r, 
“ K a m p f  d e r  S ta n d a rd s  n ich t im  In te re sse  d e r  V erb raucher” , in : e p d / K irc h e  u n d  R u ndfunk , N r. 7 1 ,9 .  S e p te m b e r  
1995, p . 9 .
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s u b s c r ib e r  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m  w ill  b e  le ft t o  th e  p r o g r a m  p ro v id e rs  a n d  c h a n n e ls  
th e m s e lv e s . A l s o  th e  w a y  in w h ic h  t h e  d e c o d e r  w ill  be p r o v id e d  an d  f in a n c e d  w ill  n o t  b e  
b a se d  o n  a n  e x c l u s i v e  s y s te m .224
b) General Demands for Competition Neutrality
T h e  c o n f i n e m e n t  o f  th e  “ n e w  M S G ”  to  p ro v id e  th e  n e tw o rk  in f ra s tru c tu re  a n d  th e  d e c o d e r  
te c h n o lo g y  is  a ls o  w h a t is  a s k e d  f o r  b y  c r i t ic s  o f  th e o ld  M S G  in o r d e r  to  a v o id  an y  
o b s ta c l e s  c o n c e r n i n g  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a  c o m p e tit iv e  d ig ita l te le v is io n  m a r k e t .  T h e  
c o n d it io n a l  a c c e s s  a n d  s u b s c r ib e r  m a n a g e m e n t  s e r v ic e s  s h o u ld  b e  le ft t o  th e  o r g a n iz e r s  
/p r o v i d e r s  o f  d ig ita l  te le v is io n  p r o g r a m s  o r  in d e p e n d e n t s e r v i c e  c o m p a n ie s . C o n c e r n in g  
th e  s h a r e h o ld e r  c o n s te l la t io n  it  w a s  p r o p o s e d  to  d iv id e  th e  o w n e rs h ip  u p  in to  th r e e  b lo c k s ,  
o n e  b e in g  th e  G e rm a n  T e l e c o m  a s  n e tw o rk  p r o v id e r ,  o n e  h a rd w a r e  c o m p a n ie s  a s  
p r o d u c e r s  o f  th e  s e t - to p -b o x  a n d  a  p o o l o f  p r o g r a m  p ro v id e rs . T o  a v o id  an y  
m a n ip u la tio n s  a n d  m isu se  o f  m a r k e t  p o w e r  c e r ta in  ru le s  re g a r d in g  th e  v o t in g  r ig h ts  in th e  
s h a r e h o ld e r  m e e tin g s  sh o u ld  b e  i n t r o d u c e d , s o  n o  d e c is io n s  c a n  b e ta k e n  a g a in s t  v ital 
in te re s ts  o f  o n e  o f  th e  s h a re h o ld e r  b lo c k s . It is a ls o  p r o p o s e d  to  in tro d u c e  a  c o d e  o f  
c o n d u c t  f o r  th e  p a rtie s  in v o lv e d  o r  e v e n  an  o b lig a tio n  t o  c o n t r a c t  in o r d e r  t o  s e c u r e  the  
fre e  a c c e s s  t o  th e  d e c o d e r  s y s te m s .225 In  an y  c a s e  the m a in  a im  h a s t o  b e  to  k e e p  the  
d is tr ib u tio n  c h a n n e ls  fo r  d ig ita l  te le v is io n  o p e n  a n d  a t  th e  s a m e  tim e  to  a v o id  s c a r in g  a w a y  
th e  b ig  in v e s to r s  in  the n e w  t e c h n o lo g y  w h ich  u su a lly  h a v e  a  s tro n g  in te re s t  in  m a rk e t  
c o n tr o l .  *23
224 Sec  K a y se r , " K a m p f  der S tan d ard s n ich t im  In te re sse  d e r V erb rau ch e r" , p . 19; fu rther so u rces w ere  in te rv iew s  
w ith law y ers  o f  the  invo lved  co m p an ies an d  o ff ic ia ls  o f  the E U  C o m m iss io n .
223 See  fo r  the  n e ce ssa ry  changes fo r  a  “new  M S G "  K resse, P lu ra lism u s, M a rk t, K onzen tra tion : P o s itio n en , B erlin , 
1995, p p . 83 -8 4 .
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5. N ew  A spects o f the N ord ic  Satellite Distribution Decision
A more recent decision on a media merger by the European Commission the Nordic 
Satellite Distribution case226 dealt with competition questions quite similar to the MSG 
case.227 Although it does not concern directly the introduction of digital television, the 
case is concerned with the provision of the infrastructure for the provision of satellite, 
cable and pay-television, which will later on open up the possibility also to offer digital 
television.228 As in MSG the Nordic Satellite Distribution case also contains a move to 
vertical integration of different stages of the distribution chain of television programs. This 
analysis will focus on the aspects involving digital television. It does not claim to represent 
a complete analysis of the whole decision.
a) The Parties and the Markets
Involved in the joint venture were Tele Denmark, a Danish telecom operator, Norsk 
Telecom, a Norwegian telephone, cable and satellite company and Kinnevik a Swedish 
group of companies with diversified activities among them television, media and 
telecommunication. NT belongs to the state owned Telenor AS which offers telephone 
services in Norway, owns a large cable network in Norway and also controls satellite 
transponder capacities (Thor, Intelsat and TV-SAT). TD is the leading Danish telecom 
operator, 51 % state owned, which next to offering telephone services also owns a
226 N o rd ic  S a te llite  D istrib u tio n . (C o m m . D ec. 9 6 /1 7 7 /E C ), O J 1996  N o  L  5 3 /2 0 , p . 22 (22); se e  fo r  a b ie f  su m m ary  
and  a n a ly s is , W illiam s/D en n ess , S u m m ary  o f  the  M ost R ecent D e v e lo p m en ts , in: C om petition  Po licy  N e w sle tte r , 
V ol. 1, S u m m er 1995, pp. 30-31; se e  a lso  T w e n ty  fifth  R eport o n  C o m p e titio n  Policy, (1995), p o in t 1 3 3 . .
227 A n o th e r  very  re c e n t and  w idely  d iscu ssed  d e c is io n  R T L /V ero n ica /E n d em o l decision  o f  2 0  S e p te m b e r 1995  is o f  
m in o r in te re s t reg ard in g  the in tro d u c tio n  o f  d ig ita l te lev ision ; h o w ev er, i t  a ls o  d ea ls  w ith  v e r tic a l in te g ra tio n  here
b e tw ee n  a  te le v is io n  channe l, a  te lev is io n  a d v e rtis in g  agency  a n d  a  p ro g ram  produce; see R T L /V e ro n ica /E n d e m o l 
(C o m m . D ec. 9 6 /3 4 6 /E C ), O J 1996  N o  L  1 3 4 /2 ; see  fo r  a  su m m ary , in; W u W , 12/1995, p . 1004ff; see  a lso  
S c h m ittm a n n /d e  F rie s , B lick  n ach  B riisse l, in : A fP , 2 /1996 , p . 123; see  a ls o  T w en ty fifth  R e p o rt on  C o m p e titio n  
P o licy , (1 9 9 5 ), p o in t 134.
228 See, for the digital plans o f the parties, Nordic Satellite Distribution decision paragraphs 147-148.
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I1 national broadband distribution network currently used for the transmission of radio and
!
television signals. Concerning the media and telecommunication sector the Swedish 
t company Kinnevik is active in satellite television broadcasting of commercial channels and
f
pay-television channels, in the distribution of satellite television, in providing conditional 
access systems and radio broadcasting.229 The joint venture Nordic Satellite Distribution 
I was supposed to provide transponder capacities, to transmit and distribute satellite
television channels to cable television operators and direct-to-home households in the
t
I Nordic market.230 The European Commission identified three markets where the joint
!
venture would have obtained a dominant position. These were the markets for the 
provision of satellite transponder capacities and related services to broadcasters in 
| Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, the Danish market for cable television networks
and the market for pay-television and other encrypted television channels for the direct-to- 
home distribution in Northern Europe.231
b) Aspects Relating to the MSG Decision and the Introduction of Digital Television 
in Europe
Many references are made in the NSD decision to the MSG case, for example regarding 
the market definitions.232 Next to the main activities mentioned above the joint venture 
was also foreseen to promote and implement a digital transmission standard and a joint 
Nordic encryption system to be used for all transmission forms. The NSD would also have 
offered subscriber management systems and operated a subscriber access system. Another
229 S ee  N o rd ic  S a te llite  D istribu tion  d e c is io n  p a ra g ra p h s  4 -7 .
230 See  N o rd ic  S a te llite  D istribu tion  d ec isio n  p a ra g ra p h s  31 ff.
231 S ee  fo r  m o re  W illiam s/D en n ess , S u m m ary  o f  th e  M ost R ecen t D e v e lo p m en ts , p. 30.
232 See Nord ic Satellite Distribution decision paragraphs 57,62.
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activity would have been the creation of a program strategy based on a new package of 
television channels for the Nordic countries.233 Considering the market positions of the 
parties of the joint venture the NSD would have obtained a “gatekeeper function” similar 
to the MSG. The vertical concentration would have strengthened the positions of the 
parties on the down- and upstream markets as already observed in the MSG case.234 The 
linkage of dominant positions on different markets of the distribution chain of television 
programs also here leads the European Commission to prohibit the undertaking. It is 
remarkable that the market power of the parties is considerably below the one found in the 
MSG case.235 In particular regarding the cable network market the position of the German 
Telecom was far more dominant than the one of the parties in the NSD case. The strong 
position of the parties in the satellite sector, where the parties of the NSD hardly faced any 
serious competition for the Scandinavian market, was dominant.236 However, also 
Bertelsmann and Kirch as pay-television operators and program suppliers had far more 
market power and resources that the Swedish Kinnivek company.237 This might indicate 
that the European Commission considers the danger for unimpeded competition very high 
when such vertical structures are created and is ready to prohibit also joint ventures with 
less dominant positions in the linked markets. In the NSD also the economic and technical 
progress defense was put forward by the parties.238 This was discussed in more detail in
m  See N o rd ic  S a te llite  D istribu tion  d e c is io n  p a rag ra p h s  3 Iff.
234 S ee  fo r  th e  s im ila ritie s  w ith the M S G  d e c is io n . W illia m s/D en n e ss , S u m m ary  o f  th e  M ost R e ce n t D e v e lo p m en ts , p. 
31 ; se e  fo r  the v e r tic a l co n cen tra tio n  asp ect, ib id ., p . 30 .
235 S ee  th e  re v ie w  o f  th e  ju d g em e n t, in : W uW , 10 /1 9 9 5 , p. 815; se e  a lso  S c h m ittm a n n /d e  V ries , B lick  n ach  B ru sse l,
p . 125.
m  S ee  th e  rev iew  o f  th e  ju d g em en t, in : W uW , 10 /1995 , p . 815.
137 See  S c h m ittm a n n /d e  V ries, B lick  n ach  B ru sse l, p . 125.
234 See Nord ic Satellite Distribution decision paragraphs 145ff.
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the NSD decision than in MSG. The parties argued that with the introduction of the digital 
technology, they will use the joint venture to create an integrated infrastructure for the 
distribution of satellite television and other related services. They also mentioned the 
plans for the joint venture to implement, in the new digital environment, a joint Nordic 
encryption system which would mean that the individual television household would need 
only one decoder box.239 However, because of the dominant position of NSD as provider 
of television channels from the Nordic transponders the Commission found that most 
direct-to-home households and independent cable operator will be forced to use an 
encryption system offered by NSD. This contains all the manipulation and anti competitive 
behavior risks regarding the treatment of other not aligned broadcasters as discussed in the 
MSG case. The Commission acknowledged the benefits of the infrastructure proposed by 
the parties as being highly efficient and beneficial to the consumers. However, it still 
insisted on an open infrastructure accessible for all interested parties. And it finally showed 
its will to prevent widespread vertical integration in the media sector by stating that after 
all it does not view the vertical integration as being necessary for the creation of such an 
integrated infrastructure.240
V. General Competition Concerns
Above possible competition problems created through the introduction of digital television 
in Europe have been illustrated, first describing the new technological infrastructure and 
then with concrete media competition cases decided by the European Commission. In the
239 S ee  N o rd ic  S a te llite  D istrib u tio n  d e c is io n  p a rag ra p h  148.
340 See Nord ic Satellite Distribution decision paragraph 151.
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following chapter the problems will be subject to an abstract positioning/evaluation 
regarding general competition questions and put into context with well-known 
competition concerns from the past and related sectors.
1. Vertical Integration
The phenomenon of increased vertical integration connected with the introduction of 
digital technology to television can be seen as part of a major trend in the media industry. 
Besides that the technological development which causes convergence processes between 
different industries, like broadcasting and telecommunications and general technology and 
content also plays a crucial role for this increased tendency to vertically integrate. 
However, digital television still has its own peculiarities which might in particular 
contribute to this development and its negative consequences for competition in that field.
a) Effects on Competition through Vertical Integration in the Electronic Media 
Industry
After presenting a general analysis of the motives and effects of vertical integration in the 
television or broadcasting industry the example of the US cable television industry will be 
explained. Finally the findings will be put into context with the competition concerns 
connected to the introduction of digital television.
aa) Vertical Integration in the Television Industry in General
Integration and concentration is a wide spread and well known phenomenon in the media 
and in particular the broadcasting and television industry, if the sector is left to the private 
sector.241 Vertical integration is in Europe a more recent development if one defines it as
341 See , as e x a m p le , th e  U S w here b ro a d ca s tin g  h a s  b een  private s in c e  its o rig in s ; see fo r a  b rie f  su m m ary  o f  th e  
h is to rica l d e v e lo p m e n t, B arendt, B ro a d ca stin g  L aw , O xford , 1995 , p . 2 8 ff ; see  fo r  a  b rie f o v e rv ie w  o f  the v e rtica l 
in te g ra tio n  d e v e lo p m en ts , Kom , U S -am e rik a n isch e s  M ed iek o n zen tra tio n sb estim m u n g en , in: Z U M , 11 /1994 , p.
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integrating the different stages from producing, marketing and distributing television 
programs. This is at least true for links between network providers and program providers 
and broadcast companies.* 242 For broadcast networks one can distinguish between 
backwards and forwards vertical integration. The strategy of backwards vertical 
integration concerns the acquisition of control of program production activities. It proves 
to be profitable if there are economies from vertical integration or if the supply of network 
programs will have an exclusionary or cost raising effect on competitors.243 The strategy 
of forward vertical integration involves the acquisition of control of retail distribution 
outlets, such as broadcast stations, cable or broadcast satellite systems. This strategy also 
will be profitable, if the vertical integration provides cost savings, or if the control over the 
distribution systems will have an exclusionary or cost raising effect on competitors.244 In 
general it is said that vertical relationships may increase efficiency since they reduce the 
costs of conducting the transaction or allow up- and downstream producers to make more 
efficient production or distribution decisions. However, vertical integration may also
6 2 6ff.; in  E u ro p e  th e  te lev ision  c h an n e ls  and  th e  d istrib u tio n  n e tw o rk s  w ere  fo r  the  m ost part s in c e  the e x is te n c e  o f  
te lev is io n  sta te  c o n tro lled  and the d e v e lo p m e n t is  s till ca tch in g  u p ; see for G e rm an y , B arend t, B ro a d ca stin g  L aw , 
p. I9 ff .; fo r  F ran ce , p. I3 ff. and fo r the  U K , p. 1 Off.; see fo r Italy , A n d re tta /P ed d e , B roadcast R e g u la tio n  in  Ita ly , in: 
E n te r ta in m e n t L aw  R ev iew , 1/1995, p , 7 ff.; in  p a rtic u la r  the G e rm a n  and th e  Ita lian  te lev ision  m ark e t a re  a lre ad y  
h ig h ly  c o n c e n tra te d , a lthough  vertica l in te g ra tio n  is a  ra th e r n ew  p h en o m en o n ; see  fo r G erm an y , RiJper, F o rm a tio n  
d e u tsc h e r M e d ien m u ltis , in: Z U M , 3 /1994 , p . 125ff; see fo r Ita ly , R au en , R u n d fu n k p o litik , P a rte i-  und 
K o n z e m in te re sse n  - e in  ita lien isches Z u sa m m e n sp ie l, in: M edia  P e rsp e k tiv e n , 3 /1995 , p. 115ff.; see  for U K , 
R o b in so n , M a rk e t S h a re  as a  M easu re  fo r M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n , in : T h e  C ro ss  M e d ia  R ev o lu tio n , e d ited  b y  
C o n g d o n /G re en /G ra h am /R o b in so n , L o n d o n , 1 9 9 5 , p . 60ff.; see  fo r  F ran ce , P a jo n , M ain b asse  su r  les m ed ias en  
F ran ce , in : L e M o n d e  D ip lom atique , M ars 1995 , p . 24.
242 S e e  fo r  a  c o u n try  o v e rv ie w  O E C D , C o m p e titio n  P o licy  and a  C h a n g in g  B ro a d ca stin g  Industry , 1993, P aris, p . ■ 
193ff.
243 S ee  O w e n /W ild m a n , V id eo  E co n o m ics , C a m b rig e , M ass., 1992, p . 202 ; se e  a ls o  O E C D , C o m p e titio n  P o licy  a n d  a 
C h a n g in g  B ro a d ca s tin g  Industry, 1993 , Paris, p . 125ff.
244 S ee  O w e n /W ild m a n , V id eo  E conom ics , p. 2 0 3 ; se e  fo r  e x c lu sio n ary  p rac tices O E C D , C o m p e titio n  P o licy  a n d  a  
C h a n g in g  B ro a d ca stin g  Industry, p . 139ff.
72
it
result, in the right market circumstances, in decisions that cause disadvantages to rivals
and increase market power to a dangerous extent.245 
bb) The Example o f  the US Cable Television Industry
A well known example of vertical integration in the television industry, which could serve 
as a model for the trend in the emerging European digital television market, are the cable 
system operators in the USA integrating with the cable networks.246 Cable operators need 
a great supply of programming to attract and retain subscribers, while the cable networks 
need access to cable subscribers in order to compete. For the cable operator these 
ownership stakes guarantee the continued availability of programming. And for the cable 
networks, the ties with a cable system operator provides a secure base of subscribers “that 
can be held hostage to threats by competing integrated networks to deny access”.247 The 
ownership of program services by Multiple Cable System Operators (MSOs) raises 
considerable competition concerns. The MSOs might discriminate against competing 
program service providers by refusing carriage, by charging higher retail prices, by 
providing less favorable channel positions or by including obligations in their contracts for 
independent program providers not to compete with their affiliated ones.248 Another 
concerns is that the MSOs might refuse to offer the program services controlled by them 
to competing distribution outlets, like direct broadcast satellite (DBS), multichannel
245 O E C D , C o m p e titio n  Po licy  and a C h an g in g  B ro a d ca s tin g  In dustry , p . 125.
246 See  for e m p irica l d a ta , W aterm an, V ertica l In teg ra tio n  and  P ro g ram  A ccess in  th e  C ab le  T e le v is io n  In d u stry , in: 
F ed .C o m m .L aw  Jo u n a l, V ol. 4 7 ,1 9 9 4 , p. 5 1 5 ; se e  a lso  E sser, Z u g a n g  zu r B re itb a n d k o m m u n ik a tio n  - d ie  U S A  a ls  
B e isp ie l z u k ü n ftig e r  E n tw ick lungen  in  E u ro p a ; se e  q u o ted  as e x a m p le  fo r  fu tu re  d ev e lo p m en ts  in  E urope, 
H o lz n ag e l, P ro b le m e  d e r  R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 19; E n g e l, M u ltim e d ia  u n d  d a s  
d e u tsch e  V e rfa ssu n g s re c h t, p. 168, 170.
247 See  O w en /W ild m an , V id eo  E conom ics, p. 2 4 5 .
248 E sser, Z u g a n g  zu r B reitb an d k o m m u n ik atio n  -  d ie  U S A  a ls  B e isp ie l z u k ü n ftig e r  E n tw ick lu n g en  in  E uropa, p . 4 2 6 .
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multipoint distribution system broadcasting (MMDS) or satellite master antenna system 
(SMTV).249 In the USA the 12 largest Multiple Cable System Operators (MSOs) account 
for the overwhelming proportion of equity ownership in nationally distributed cable 
networks. Altogether the vertical integration between cable television networks and cable 
system which is usually realized by common corporate ownership ties between MSOs and 
Cable networks can be called extensive, with 56 of 106 nationally distributed 
programming services having vertical ties with MSOs in 1994.250 The reason for the 
increased vertical integration in the US cable television industry during the last twenty 
years was mainly seen in the deregulation of cable television with the Cable Act of 
1984.251 When the above described concerns became reality, Congress reacted with 1992 
Cable act,252 in which the FCC established regulations intended to encourage competition 
for established cable operators by ensuring that alternative multichannel video 
programming distributors have access to programming.253 Congress was in particular 
concerned to prevent the MSOs from preferring their own programs in a discriminating 
and anti-competitive way.254 The 1992 Cable Act also introduced ““must-carry”” rules for 
local broadcasting stations which came under strong criticism concerning their limits on *230
249 See  O w en /W ild m an , V ideo  E co n o m ics , p. 245 .
230 S ee  W aterm an , V ertica l Integration a n d  P ro g ram  A c c e ss  in the C a b le  T elev is io n  Industry , p. 5 1 5 ; se e  for th e  
fig u res 1994  C a b le  F irs t  R eport, su p ra  n o te  13, p a rag ra p h s  73 -74 , q u o ted  a fte r  ib id . p. 515.
251 S ee  E sser, Z u g an g  z u r  B re itb an d k o m m u n ik a tio n  -  d ie  U S A  als B e isp ie l z u k ü n ftig e r  E n tw ick lu n g en  in E u ro p a, p . 
4 2 4 , w ho  q u o te s  th e  F ederal C o m m u n ica tio n  C o m m iss io n , the m ain  te leco m m u n icatio n  and m ed ia  regu la to ry  
ag en c iy  in  th e  U S A ; se e  also  K orn, U S -a m e rik a n isc h e s  M ed ien k o n zem ra tio n srech t aus d e r  S ich t d e s  P rak tik e rs , p. 
6 27 .
232 T h e  C a b le  T e le v is io n  C onsum er P ro tec tio n  a n d  C o m p e titio n  A ct o f  1992, P u b . L  N o  1 0 2 -3 8 5 ,1 0 6  S la t. 1460 
(c o d if ied  in  sc a tte re d  sec tions 47 U .S .C . §§ 5 2 1 -6 1 1  (Supp . V  1993)).
233 W aterm an , V ertica l In teg ra tion  and P ro g ram  A c c e ss  in  th e  C able  T e lev is io n  In d u stry , p. 512 ; s e e  fo r  m ore d e ta ils  
o n  the 1992  C a b le  A c t, M arkey, C a b le  T e lev is io n  R egu la tion : P ro m o tin g  C o m p e titio n  in a  R a d ic a lly  C h an g in g  
W o rld , in : F e d .C o m m . L aw  Journal, V o l. 4 6 ,1 9 9 3 ,  p . I ff .
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the editorial freedom of the cable operators.255 However, in the USA vertical integration is 
a common phenomenon in the industry. It is viewed in general, and in particular 
concerning cable television, as being pro-competitive and promoting efficiency.256 That the 
motives and effects of exclusive dealing between cable operators and cable networks often 
promotes efficiency was expressly mentioned by the FCC in its 1990 Cable Report.257 
There exist also analysis which seriously doubt that vertically integrated cable operators 
engage more in anti-competitive behavior than nonintegrated ones.258 It is also mentioned 
that discriminating against competitors is costly and that the circumstances in which such a 
discrimination is profitable would be rare in the cable television industry.259 However, it is 
acknowledged by most observers that vertical integration can facilitate foreclosure 
attempts in the cable television industry, concerning program access and access to 
distribution outlets.260 And Congress saw the competition rules as insufficient to prevent 234*79
234 S ee  E sse r, Z u g an g  z u r  B re itb an d k o m m u n ik a tio n  - d ie  U S A  a ls  B e isp ie l z u k ü n ftig e r  E n tw ick lu n g en  in E u ro p a , p. 
4 3 4 .
239 M e stm äc k e r, Ü ber d en  E influß  vo n  Ö k o n o m ie  u n d  T ec h n ik  a u f  R e c h t und O rg an isa tio n  der T e lek o m m u n ik a tio n  
un d  d e r e le k tro n is c h e n  M edien , in : K o m m u n ik a tio n  o h n e  M o n o p o le  II, e d ited  b y  M estm äcker, 1995 , p. 4 0 ff .;
E sser, Z u g an g  zu r B reitb an d k o m m u n ik atio n  - d ie  U S A  a ls  B e isp ie l z u k ü n ftig e r  E n tw ick lu n g en  in  E uropa, p . 4 3 6 ; 
see  for th e  c r itic ism  concern ing  th e  f irs t  a m e n d m en t righ ts o f  th e  c a b le  o p e ra to rs , A ie llo , C o n g ress io n a l C a b le -  
v is ion : T u rn e r  B ro ad castin g  v. F C C , in : H arv ard  Jo u rn a l o f  L aw  a n d  T ech n o lo g y , V oi. 8 , 1994, p . 2 3 Iff.; V ic k , T he 
F irs t A m e n d m e n t L im ita tio n s on M e d ia  R e g u la tio n  in  the US a f te r  T u rn er B ro ad castin g  v. F C C , in : M ed ia  
L a w & P rac tic e .V o l. 16, N o  3 ,1 9 9 5 , p . 97ff.
336 E sse r , Z u g a n g  z u r  B re itb an d k o m m u n ik atio n  -  d ie  U S A  a ls  B e isp ie l z u k ü n ftig e r  E n tw ick lu n g en  in  E uropa, p . 4 4 5 ; 
O w en /W ild m an , V id e o  E conom ics, p . 245 ; W a te rm a n , V ertical In teg ra tio n  a n d  P ro g ram  A ccess in  the C ab le  
T e le v is io n  In d u stry , p . 520; see fo r  recen t d e v e lo p m e n ts  in  the U S A  reg ard in g  v ertica l m erg e rs , H aw k , R e c e n t 
A n titru s t D e v e lo p m en ts  in the U n ited  S ta tes, sp e e c h  de liv e red  a t th e  E u ro p ean  L aw y ers U n io n  an d  m ade in to  an  
a rtic le . M a y  5-6 , 1995 , p . 37 f„  he  s ta te s  that a f te r  y e a rs  o f  per se  leg a lity  th e  m a in  co ncern  o f  th e  ag en c ies is  th e  
le s se n in g  o f  co m p e titio n  in up- a n d  d o w n stre am  m ark e ts  th rough  fo rec lo su re  a n d  d isc rim in a tio n .
237 1990  F C C  C a b le  C o m p etitio n  R ep o rt, su p ra  n o te  3 , pa rag rap h s 116-117 .
231 S e e  W ate rm a n , V e rtic a l In tegra tion  an d  P ro g ra m  A c ce ss  in  the C a b le  T e le v is io n  Industry , p . 5 2 8 ; there he  
su m m a riz e s  h is an a ly sis .
239 S ee  O w en /W ild m an , V ideo  E conom ics, p . 2 4 5 -2 4 6 ; a  cab le  sys tem  w hich  re fu se s  to  c a n y  a p ro g ra m  se rv ice  m u st 
g iv e  u p  th e  a d d itio n a l subscribers the  p rog ram  w o u td  have  a ttrac ted , and  d e n y  its  o w n  p ro g ram  se rv ice  to  a  
c o m p e tin g  d is tr ib u tio n  sys tem  m eans to  lose th e  sa les .
260 S ee  W ate rm a n , V ertica l In tegration  an d  P ro g ram  A ccess in  the C a b le  T e lev is io n  Industry , p. 5 2 8 .
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the constraints and distortion of competition and foreclosure of the market due to the 
vertical concentration processes. Because of this it introduced the Cable Competition Act 
of 1992, which contained provisions to limit the possibility to favor associated companies 
and by this strengthen the competition and promote the diversity in the provided 
programs. However, this is contrary to the recent developments in liberalizing ownership 
restrictions regarding broadcasters and networks. The new Telecommunication Act of 
1996 allows a wide range of vertical and horizontal integration which makes the described 
rules seem to be just a isolated anti-vertical integration move limited to the special 
situation in the cable television industry.261
cc) Lessons fo r  the Introduction o f Digital Television
Compared with the competition concerns of the introduction of digital television the 
problems of the combination of content and network ownership are quite similar. 
However, the additional and specific problem of the distribution of the digital programs 
which is at the center of this analysis is the set-top-box with its decoder and conditional 
access and subscriber management functions. The cable ownership in most European 
countries has just started to be privatized, if there are any cable networks and most 
operators, in one way or the other, are still state controlled,262 although the problem in
261 S ee  fo r th e  c o n tra ry  d evelopm en t in  th e  cab le  a n d  in  the b ro a d ca stin g  in d u stry , K orn , U S -am erik an isch e  
M e d ien k o n z en tra tio n sb e stim m u n g e n  aus d e r  S ic h t  d e s  P rak tik e rs , pp . 6 2 6 -6 2 8 ; see  for cab le  o w n e rsh ip  
re s tr ic tio n s . G e lle r, O w n ersh ip  R eg u la to ry  P o lic ie s  in  th e  U .S. T e le c o m  S e c to r , in: C ardozo  A rts  &  E n te rta in m e n t 
L aw  R e v ie w , V o l. 13, 1995, pp. 7 3 9 -7 4 2 ; se e  fo r  th e  gen era l l ib e ra l ten d en cy  in  th e  leg isla tion  reg a rd in g  
o w n e rsh ip  and  v e rtica l and  horizon ta l in te g ra tio n . G e lle r, R eg u lie ru n g sk o n zep te  fu r d as F e rn se h en  im  n ä c h s te n  
Ja h rta u se n d , in: B e rte lsm an n  B riefe , H e rb s t/W in te r  1995, p . 5 7 ,5 9 ;  fo r the lib e ra lized  ru les o n  b ro a d c a s tin g  
o w n e rsh ip  in the U S -T e leco m m u n ica tio n s A c t 1996 , see  T itle  II, S e c . 202 ; fo r  the  access o f  te le p h o n e  c o m p a n ie s  to 
cab le  se rv ice s , see T itle  III, Sec, 3 0 2 ; fo r the v id e o  prog ram m ing  se rv ices p ro v id ed  by te lephone c o m p a n ies , see  
P a rt V ; fo r  a  b r ie f  an ly s is  o f  the U S -T e lec o m m u n ica tio n s  A ct 1996  see  K re ile , D as neue a m erik an isch e  
T e lek o m m u n ik a tio n s rec h t, in: Z U M , 3 /1996 , p p . 227*228.
262 M any  E u ro p ea n  c o u n tr ie s  have a  v e ry  low  c a b le  p enetra tion ; se e  D rie s /W o ld t, T h e  R ole o f  P u b lic  S e rv ice  
B ro ad castin g  in th e  In fo rm ation  so c ie ty , p. 27  A n n e x  B ; th e  b ig e x ce p tio n  c o n ce rn in g  the p riv a tiza tio n  o f  c a b le  is 
th e  U K , w h e re  th e  c a b le  industry  is  lib e ra lized  a lre a d y  since the in tro d u c tio n  o f  the C able and  B ro a d ca stin g  A c t o f
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countries with high cable penetration is already present.263 However, the fact which makes 
vertical integration so dangerous for free competition is if there is a monopoly gatekeeper 
at the end of the vertical chain. In the US cable industry, the cable system operators enjoy, 
for the most part, local monopolies.264 For the introduction of digital television this 
gatekeeper position might be taken by the set-top-box and administrative and technical 
service providers. Vertical integration might have to be considered unacceptable when the 
chain reaches up to this last distribution stage and the companies involved in addition also 
obtain a gatekeeper position. The comparison with the situation of the US cable television 
industry also might suggest that one should not forget about efficiency aspects regarding 
vertical integration which led to a much more lenient attitude in assessing the anti­
competitive effects. However, this would involve a discussion about the generally negative 
European attitude about considering more efficiency aspects. In general, in Europe, line of 
business restrictions in the telecommunications and media industry are not uncommon.265 
In the UK the TO's are not allowed to offer entertainment services under their
1984; h o w e v e r, i t  d o e s  no t have th e  g rea t im p o rta n c e  as in th e  U S A , s in c e  th e  p rog ram s a re  less  a ttrac tiv e  
c o m p a re d  to  th e  v e ry  po p u lar sa te llite  te lev is io n ; th e  d e v e lo p m en t is c a tc h in g  up , though; se e  D o y le , K a b e l-  un d  
S a te llite n p ro g ra m m e  in  G ro ß b ritan n ien , 9 /1 9 9 5 , pp . 449-450 .
363 See in  G e rm a n y  th e  recen tly  p riv a tized  G e rm an  T eleco m  and  th e  d isc u ss io n  to  transm it p ro g ram s o f  p ro g ram  
p ro v id e rs  w h ich  a re  n o t part o f  th e  d ig ita l te le v is io n  co n so rtiu m  M M B G , S ü d d eu tsch e  Z e itu n g , 29. M ai 1996, 
“W ir s in d  n ic h t d e r  b ö se  M o n o p o lis t’’, p. 2 2 ; se e  fo r  th e  aca d em ic  d isc u ss io n , H o lznagel, P ro b le m e  d e r  
R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia  - Z e ita lte r, p. 19; he p re d ic ts  the risk  o f  an ti-co m p e titiv e  co n d u c t a f te r  the  
p riv a tiza tio n  a n d  libera liza tion  o f  th e  G erm an  T e le c o m ; see fo r  p ro p o sa ls  o n  h o w  to deal w ith  th e  cab le  m o n o p o ly  
o f  th e  G e rm a n  T e le c o m  a fte r the p riv a tiza tio n , E n g e l, M u ltim e d ia  und  d a s  d e u tsc h e  V erfassu n g srech t, p . 167; he 
su g g e sts  tak in g  th e  cab le  netw ork  aw ay  from  th e  G erm an  T e le c o m  and  h a n d in g  it o v e r to  o n e  o r  a  c o u p le  o f  new ly  
fo u n d e d  c o m p a n ies .
264 " C a b le ’s local m o n o p o ly  p ipeline  m ultip les th e  p o w er o f  v e rtica l in te g ra tio n " , com pla in t p u t  fo rw ard  b y  
in d e p e n d e n t b ro a d ca s tin g  co m p an ies and p ro g ra m  prov iders in  th e  co n g ress io n a l hearing  fo r th e  1992 C a b le  A c t, 
q u o ted  a f te r  E sse r , Z u g an g  z u r B re itb a n d k o m m u n ik a tio n  - d ie  U S A  als B e isp ie l fü r z u k ü n ftig e  E n tw ic k lu n g en  in 
E u ro p ea , p . 4 2 5 ; se e  a lso  for the lo ca l m o n o p o lie s , H am m ond , R e g u la tin g  B ro ad b an d  C o m m u n ica tio n  N e tw o rk s , 
in: Y a le  JR eg ., V o i. 9 ,1 9 9 2 ,  p . 185.
265 See fo r  a n  o v e rv ie w  S ch o o f/W atso n  B row n. In fo rm atio n  H ig h w ay s and M e d ia  Po licies in th e  E uropean  U n io n , p. 
333ff.
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Telecommunications Act license.266 The same is true for Denmark. And in the Netherlands 
cable companies are not allowed to enter into the business of producing TV programs.267 
Accordingly it would not be revolutionary to introduce such restrictions for digital 
television, as for example prohibiting companies who own network facilities or broadcast 
companies from providing the set-top-box, the administrative and technical services or the 
navigation systems.
b) Processes of Convergence as Incentive to Vertically Integrate
Digital television is part of the digital revolution which is connected with convergence
processes. By many observers it is stated that the new convergence processes spurred 
through the new technological developments provide incentives for the companies 
involved in the related industries to integrate also horizontally, though mainly vertically. In 
the following section some of these convergence processes will be identified and explained 
and their effect on the tendency to integrate vertically will be analyzed. At the end the 
findings will be put in relation to the competition environment surrounding the 
introduction of digital television.
aa) Tite Discussed Convergence Processes
What are these convergence processes so much talked about in the recent literature? Is 
there one big convergence process including many smaller ones or are there a couple 
totally different ones? One of the much written about convergence processes is the one 
between content and technology or better transport of the content, also called “conduit-
26fi A c co rd in g  to the  D u o p o ly  R eview  o f  1991; se e  fo r m ore D oyle , K ab e l-u n d  S a te lliten p ro g ram m e in G ro ß b ritan n ien , 
p. 4 5 1 .
267 See fo r D en m ark  a n d  the N eth erlan d s , C o u d e rt B ro thers , An O v e rv iew  an d  A n a ly s is  o f  the L eg a l a n d  R e g u la to ry  
B arrie rs  to  the T a k e -o f f  o f  M u ltim ed ia  A p p lica tio n s , E C  study  (D e c e m b e r  1994).
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content convergence".268 Other observers see the convergence of media as allowing 
market actors to cross sector boundaries and making new services possible. They give as 
one example the possibility of integrating audiovisual communications and publishing with 
information and telecommunications.269 Another convergence process is found to take 
place generally between communication technologies, in particular between 
telecommunication and broadcasting.270 On the latter also the European Commission 
started a debate in part II of its Green Paper on infrastructure which contains a chapter 
entitled “Future evolution of the regulatory environment to meet the challenges of 
convergence”.271 The main driving force behind this development is said to be technical 
change, in particular the trend towards processing information in digital format. Technical 
change also transforms the traditional telephone system into an information highway, 
digitized broadband networks with the capacity for the faster transport of information and 
more power to process information transmitted over the network.272 Since the information 
will be digitized it becomes irrelevant whether computers communicate or speech, data, 
still or moving pictures are transmitted. The unity between a certain network connected to 
a certain transmitted signal as it used to exist, for example, different networks for
268 E n g e t, W ege z u r  B ew ältig u n g  d e r  K o n flik te  in  d e r  g lobalen  In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft, p. 188; see  fo r d e ta ils , 
S c h n u rr , C o n d u it-C o n ten t C o ncergence : Its C a u se s  and  E ffec ts , in: T he L aw  and  E conom ics o f  T ra n sb o rd e r 
T e lec o m m u n ic a tio n s , ed ited  by  M e stm äc k er, A  S ym posium , B ad en -B ad en , 1987, pp. 157-173.
269 S c h o o f/W a tso n , In form ation  H ig h w ay s a n d  M e d ia  Po licies in  the  E u ro p ean  U nion , p. 325, 3 3 1 .
270 See  O E C D , T e leco m m u n ica tio n  an d  B ro ad castin g : C o n v erg en ce  or C o llis io n , p . 93.
171 S ee  G re en  P a p e r  o n  the L ib era liza tio n  o f  T e lec o m m u n ic a tio n  In fras tru c tu re  and  C able  T e lev is io n  N e tw o rk s , Part II 
C o m  (9 4 ) 68 2  (2 5  Jan u a ry  1995).
272 E n g e l, W ege  z u r  B ew ältigung  d e r  K onflik te  in  d e r  g lobalen  In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft, p. 187; S c h o o f/W a tso n  
B ro w n , In fo rm atio n  H ighw ays a n d  M ed ia  P o lic ie s  in the E u ro p ean  U n ion , p . 325.
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telegraphy and telephone, becomes obsolete.273 2745In the USA and the UK cable operators 
are able to provide telephone services and US telephone companies insist on their first 
amendment rights to provide video services over their networks. Through the 
introduction of the new US Telecommunication Act of 1996 these possibilities have been 
acknowledged and investment in the other market has been permitted. In Europe only 
the cable operators have been allowed by European Community legislation to provide 
already liberalized telecommunication services, but not the other way around.273 4576 With the 
introduction of interactive broadcast services and the blurring of its technical differences 
with telecommunication services the differentiation in mass and individual communication 
no longer applies.277 Also the different services converge as well as the networks, services 
and the sets with each other.278 The convergence of the sets has been discussed already 
above with the predicted convergence of the television set and the personal computer. 
However, the most important convergence processes concerning the introduction of
273 M e stm ä c k e r, Ü b e r  d en  E influß  v o n  Ö k o n o m ie  u n d  T ech n ik  a u f  R ech t un d  O rgan isation  d e r  T e lek o m m u n ik a tio n  
u nd  d e r  e le k tro n isc h e n  M ed ien , p . 34 ; E ngel, W eg e  zur B e w ä ltig u n g  d e r  K o n flik te  in der g lo b a len  
In fo rm a tio n sg ese llsc h a ft, p . 187.
274 S ee  fo r  the the  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  cab le  sys tem  o p e ra to rs  in the te le p h o n e  b u sin e ss  U K , D oyle, K a b e l-  und 
S a te llite n p ro g ra m m e  in  G ro ßbritann ien , p . 4 5 0 ; see  fo r U S te le p h o n e  c o m p a n ies  trying to  e n te r  the v id eo  m ark e t, 
B re n n e r, T e le p h o n e  C om pany  E n try  in to  V id e o  Serv ices; A F irs t A m en d m en t A nalysis, in: N o tre  D am e  L aw  
R e v ie w , V ol. 6 7 , 1991 , p. 97ff.; se e  also  W ern e r, S o m eth in g ’s G o tta  G ive: A n titru s t C o n se q u e n ce s  o f  T e le p h o n e  
C o m p a n ie s  E n try  in to  C able T e lev is io n , in: F ed .C o m m . L aw  Jo u rn a l, V o l. 4 3 ,1 9 9 1 , p. 21 5 ff.
275 S ee  P a r t  V  o f  th e  U S  T e leco m m u n ica tio n  A c t o f  1996 w hich  d e a ls  with v id eo  p rogram m ing  se rv ices p ro v id e d  by 
te le p h o n e  c o m p a n ies .
276 S e e  th e  D ire c tiv e  95 /51  EC  o f  18 O c to b e r 1 9 9 5 ,0 1 1 9 9 5  N o  L  256 /49  th a t  c oncerns the a b o litio n  o f  th e  
re s tr ic tio n s  in th e  u se  o f  cab le  te lev is io n  n e tw o rk s  fo r  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  a lre a d y  liberalized  te le c o m m u n ic a tio n  
se rv ic e s ; see  a ls o  o n  th a t su b jec t P re isk e l/H ig h a m , L ib e ra liza tio n  o f  T e leco m m u n ica tio n s In fra s tru c tu re  a n d  C ab le  
T e le v is io n  N e tw o rk s , in: T e leco m m u n ica tio n s  P o licy , V ol. 19, p p . 38 1 -3 9 0 ; se e  a lso  W ittm an n , F re ig ab e  d e r  
K a b e ln e tz e  fü r  T e lek o m n u tzu n g , in : M ed ien  u n d  R ech t. 1 /1996 , p . 14.
277 S c h o o f/W a tso n , In fo rm atio n  H ig h w ay s an d  M e d ia  P o licies in  th e  E u ro p ean  U nion , p. 325; M e s tm äc k e r, Ü b e r  den  
E in flu ß  von Ö k o n o m ie  und T e c h n ik  au f R ech t u nd  O rg an isa tio n  d e r  T e lek o m m u n ik a tio n  u n d  d e r  e le k tro n isc h e n  
M e d ie n , p . 34 ; se e  in  p articu la r fo r  the  b lu rrin g  o f  the d iffe re n ce s  b e tw een  m ass and in d iv id u a l c o m m u n ic a tio n , 
H o ffm a n n -R ie m /V e s tin g , Ende d e r  M assen k o m m u n ik ad o n , in: M ed ia  P e rsp e k d v en , 8 /1994 , p . 383ff.
278 E n g e l, W ege  z u r  B ew ältig u n g  d e r  K onflik te  in  d e r  g lobalen  In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft, p. 188; h e  g ives as an 
e x a m p le  for the  co n v erg en ce  o f  n e tw o rk , se rv ice  and  set, the  te le fax  w h e re  the  serv ices are in teg ra ted  in  th e  set.
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digital television are the one between content and conduit and between telecommunication 
and broadcasting.
bb) The Incentive to Integrate
The convergence processes are said to spur integration among the different market 
players, and induce them to horizontal and in particular (as a rather new phenomenon of 
these processes) vertical integration. However, the argumentation for this point is in the 
most cases rather superficial. The statement is probably considered self explanatory.
The literature speaks of a parallel convergence process on corporate level which follows 
the convergence processes spurred by the technical development. This is due to new 
communication service providers and potential new market entrants who see the creation 
of potentially profitable new growth markets through the technical convergence, as in data 
broadcasting, personal mobile communications, interactive video based services, digital 
television and other hybrid services. They would combine with hardware manufactures 
who are ready to provide the network and terminal equipment to supply the new 
markets.279 However, the latter is not the main line of integration when looking at the 
introduction of digital television. A more interesting phenomenon for the introduction of 
digital television concerning the convergence processes, in particular between the 
telecommunication and electronic media, is the extension of monopoly positions to usually 
vertically related markets. These efforts can be observed in the example of privatized 
former state owned telecom operators, which try to profit from their former, and in most 
cases still existing monopolies to position themselves well in the future multimedia
279 O E C D , T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n  and B ro ad castin g : C on v erg en ce  o r C o llis io n , p . 93 .
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markets.280 The main argument for the connection of the convergence processes and 
vertical integration is however a different one. It is argued that the development towards 
convergence of telecommunication and broadcasting encourages increased integration 
among companies, since, with the entering of totally new markets there are also high 
investments and risks involved.281 The convergence processes create new markets which 
companies from the different sectors only dare to enter being integrated, preferably 
vertically. It is also argued that the convergence process of conduit and content provides 
arguments used in the media for vertical integration and so supports the existing 
tendency.282
c) Particularities of the Digital Television Sector
Although in the above sections I always tried to link the arguments about the vertical 
integration tendencies observed with the introduction of digital television, there still exist 
some peculiarities of digital television, which deserve special consideration. Regarding 
vertical integration, it is interesting to observe that digital television introduces this new 
stage of distribution of television programs, the set-top-box and the included services.283 
The problems with the access to networks when vertical links exist are quite common, and 
also apply for on-line services and conventional and non digital cable television. However,
2,0 See for this argument, Mestmäcker, Über den Einfluß von Ökonomie und Technik auf Recht und Organisation der 
Telekommunikation und der elektronischen Medien, p. 35, 38; he also mentions the automatic extension of 
monopoly positions to new technologies; this could be said o f the German Telecom which now also tries to 
dominate the distribution of digital television programs because of their strong position as cable operator and 
stockholder in satellite enterprises.
281 Schoof/Watson Brown, Information Highways and Media Policies in the European Union, p. 333.
282 Engel, M ultimedia und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht, p. 170.
283 See for the services above III.!.a), III.2., III.3.; sec for the new distribution stage, Holznagel, Probleme der 
Rundfunkregulierung im Multimedia»Zeita!ter, p. 21.
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the new dimension with the digital television is that with the provision of the set-top-box 
and the indispensable services suddenly all companies which are part of the digital 
television distribution chain come together and want to have an ownership stake, since its 
control is so crucial for the success of the marketing of the programs.284 This is the real 
competition concern of digital television which does not come up when one looks at the 
discussion over the competition problems created through vertical integration in the US 
cable television industry. Certainly also the general argument applies that with the 
introduction of this new technology and the new services offered, high investments and 
risks are involved which induce companies to concentrate. However, the special 
distribution structure which demands the setting-up of a new technically quite demanding 
distribution stage,285 where none of the involved companies really has experience, is an 
important additional factor to integrate in particular vertically, to use the different know­
how on the upstream and downstream markets. This is exemplified in the MSG decision 
where the parties wanted to use the know-how of the German Telecom concerning 
networks and network administration and the expertise and experience of Bertelsmann in 
managing more than 20 million book club customers worldwide and the knowledge of the 
Bertelsmann and Kirch owned pay-television channel Premiere regarding pay-television 
subscription management. Digital television offers, because of the additional special 
distribution infrastructure that had and still has to be created and the importance of this
2,4 See  a b o v e  I I I .l . ,  III.2 ., III.3.
21,5 T h is c o n c e rn s  th e  technology  o f  th e  se t-to p -b o x , n ex t to  the less co m p lica te d  conversion  fu n c tio n  the  so p h is tica ted  
su b sc rip tio n  m an ag m en t and con d itio n al a cc ess  sy s tem s and a lso  fo r  e x am p le  the  softw are  fo r  th e  n av ig a tio n - 
sys tem s.
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”new distribution level for control over the new markets, incentives to integrate that go
' beyond the general motives for vertical integration mentioned above.
(
1 2. Open Access
Open access is one of the most discussed terms in telecommunications. The following
i
I section, however, will concentrate not as much on the access to networks to distribute
television programs, as on the idea behind it and its application to the problem of the set­
top-box and its related services. The access to the ways of transmission naturally also 
poses difficulties for the introduction of digital television, since in the future its main way 
of transmission will be cable. However, this is not a problem specific for the introduction 
of digital television, although it appears to be more serious than in other fields, since there 
is this tendency of vertical integration which includes telecommunication companies and 
other network providers.
a) The Set-top-box and its Services as Essential Facility
First I will present the idea of essential facilities in a general way with some examples of 
its application. Following that, the set-top-box and its connected services will be put into 
context with that idea and doctrine.
aa) Essential Facilities and Bottlenecks
The notion of essential facilities usually refers to access to infrastructures, like airports or 
ports, networks like telecommunication and railroad networks, or other major distribution 
facilities like electricity networks or gas pipe systems. Already in 1912 the US Supreme 
Court decided in a railroad case that a dominant undertaking can be obliged to grant a
\)3
r
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competitor access to an essential facility.286 In European competition law the doctrine was 
for the first time expressly mentioned in the Three Ports decisions of 1992 and 1993, 
though hints could be found already before.287 289The European Commission found a 
violation of Art. 86 of the EC-Treaty if an undertaking that has a dominant position in the 
market because of the ownership of a facility or infrastructure, without access to which a 
competitor cannot offer his services and which uses the facility or infrastructure itself and 
denies other undertakings access to it or grants it only under discriminatory terms without 
reasonable justification.288 289Typical examples for essential facilities are also the gas- or the 
electricity industry where the tube or wire/cable system is under the ownership of one 
company which can decide which other providers may use its distribution system. If the 
owner of the distribution system at the same time also provider of the content that is 
supposed to be transported then the concerns for competition increase. The providers not 
linked to the network owner are in danger of being discriminated against.290 The essential 
facility doctrine deals with the question whether the monopolist under such circumstances
286 S ee  U n ite d  S ta te s  v . T erm inal R a ilro ad  A sso c ia tio n , 2 2 4  U S 3 8 3  (1 9 1 2 ); se e  fo r  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  th e  “ e sse n tia l 
fac ility  d o c tr in e "  in  th e  U S and a  c r itic a l a n a ly s is , A reeda , E sse n tia l F a c ilitie s ; A n  E p ithe t in  N e e d  o f  L im itin g  
P rin c ip le s , in: A n it tru s t  L aw  Jo u rn a l, V ol. 5 8 , 1990 , p. 8 4 Iff ;  se e  fo r  th is d e c is io n  p . 842.
287 S ee  fo r  th e  th ree  p o r t  decisions, S e a lin k  I, B u lle tin  o f  the EC , N o  6 ,1 9 9 2 ,  p a rag ra p h  1 .3 .3 0 = C o m m o n  M a rk e t L aw  
R ep o rts  2 5 5 ; S e a lin k  II, O J 1994 N o  L  15/8; P o r t  o f  R odby, O J 1994  N o  L  5 5 /5 2 ; see  fo r  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  the  
ju r is d ic t io n  D e se la e rs , D ie ‘E ssen tia l F a c ilitie s"  - D ok trin  im  L ic h t  d e s  M a g ill-U rte ils  des E u G H , in: E u Z W , 
16 /1 9 9 5 , p . 563 ; se e  a lso , Furse, T h e  ‘E ssen tia l Facilities*  D o c tr in e  in th e  C o m m u n ity  L aw , in : E u ro p ean  
C o m p e titio n  L a w  R ev iew , 8 /1995, p . 469ff.
288 S ee  S e a lin k  II, p a rag ra p h  66.
289 S ee  fo r  a n  e le c tr ic ity  u tility  case, O tte r  T a il P o w e r  C o . v . U n ited  S ta te s , 4 1 0  U S 3 6 6  (1 9 7 3 ); U S S C R  35 L . E d . 2d  
359 ; se e  fo r  a  c r itic a l an aly sis  o f  th e  access p ro b le m s in  th e  U S e le c tr ic  p o w e r  in d u stry  a n d  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  the  
essen tia l fac ility  d o c tr in e , Rau, O p e n  A ccess in  th e  P o w er In d u stry : C o m p e titio n . C o o p era tio n  an d  P o licy  
D ile m m a s , in: A n ti tru s t  L aw  Jo u rn a l, V ol. 6 4 ,1 9 9 6 ,  p. 2 78 ff.
290 S ee  fo r  a  c o m p a riso n  w ith  vertica l in teg ra tio n  in  e lec tro n ic  m ed ia , E ngel, M u ltim e d ia  und d a s  d e u tsch e  
V e rfa ssu n g s re c h t, p . 170; he also m en tions E C  leg isla tion , w h ich  in tro d u c ed  " m u s t-c a n y "  ru le s  fo r  g as- an d  
e le c tr ic ity  p ro v id ers  to  o ffe r their ne tw o rk s a ls o  to  no t a ligned  p ro v id e rs , O J 1991 N o  L  4 7 /3 7 ; see  a lso  fo r  th is  
c o m p a riso n , K o p p , M ed ien rech t un d  neue tec h n isch e  E n tw ick lu n g en  - R e ak tio n e n  und P e rp sp e k tiv e n , p . 3 9 0 .
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is allowed to refuse to deal. He is not allowed to exploit his monopoly position over the 
essential facility in an anti-competitive way. The leading case where the doctrine was 
applied by US courts to the telecommunication sector was MCI Communications v 
AT&T. There AT&T refused to connect the network of its new competitor in the 
telephone sector to its own network. MCI argued that the only way to compete with 
AT&T would be if there were a connection between the networks. The courts agreed with 
MCI and ordered an interconnection of the networks, since the refusal by AT&T would 
have presented a monopolization according to section 2 of the Sherman Act. The court of 
appeal summarized the essential facility doctrine as following:
“A monopolist’s refusal to deal under these circumstances is governed by the so- 
called essential facility doctrine. Such a refusal may be unlawful because a 
monopolist’s control of an essential facility (sometimes called a ‘bottleneck’) can 
extend monopoly power from one stage of production to another, and from one 
market into another. Thus, the antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling an 
essential facility the obligation to make the facility available on nondiscriminatory
**291terms.
The essential facility doctrine in the meantime has been applied to an array of other cases 
not limited anymore to the traditional cases cited above. In a more recent case by the 
European Commission and subsequently the European Court of Justice the application of 
the essential facility idea was discussed for a case dealing with the publishing of Television 291
291 M C I C o m m u n ic a tio n s  C orp . v. A T & T . 708 F .2 d  , p. 1 0 8 1 ,1 1 3 2  (7 th  C ir.1 9 8 3 ), cert, den ied . 4 6 4  U .S. 891 (19 8 3 ) 
m en tio n in g  O tte r  T a il  P ow er Co. v . U n ited  S ta te s , 4 1 0  U .S . 36 6  (1 9 7 3 ) and  U n ited  S tates v . T e rm in a l R a ilro a d  
A sso c ia tio n , 22 4  U .S . 383 (1912).
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guide and intellectual property rights.292 In that case three television broadcasting 
companies refused to license a TV Guide to reprint their respective advance weekly 
program listing. With their licensing policy the television companies restrained 
undertakings seeking to publish a weekly TV guide. As a result a viewer who wished to 
obtain advance weekly program information was forced to buy three separate guides 
published by the three companies respectively.293 The example illustrates how diverse the 
sectors are where the essential facility doctrine can be applied. The question of 
guaranteeing access under the essential facility doctrine arises when certain conditions are 
met: one undertaking has a monopoly over a facility which is essential for the activities of 
competitors; the competitors cannot duplicate the facility; and the monopolist refuses to 
deal or offers discriminatory terms.294 In the US there is a strong tendency to limit the 
doctrine’s application. It has been criticized on the grounds that courts and legal experts 
could not even agree on what the so-called essential facility really easy, and much less on 
what it encompasses. Also it was argued that it has the potential to frustrate rather than 
promote competitive behavior and economic efficiency.295
292 S ee  M a g ill  T V  G u id e /IT P , B BC &  R T E  ( C o m m . D ec. 89 /205) O J  1989 L 7 8 /4 3 ; E C J, C ases C -2 4 1 /9 1 P  an d  
242 /9  IP , o f  A pril 6  1995 , R TE  a n d  IT P  v . C o m m iss io n , (= M ag ill).
m  S ee  fo r  a  su m m a ry  an d  analysis o f  th e  d e c is io n , G re av e s , M agill e s t  a r iv i  ...R T E  an d  IT P  v  C o m m iss io n  o f  th e  
C o m m u n itie s , in: E u ro p ea n  C o m p etitio n  L aw  R e v ie w , 4 /1995 , p . 2 4 4 ff .; see  a lso  V an  B ae l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  
L aw  o f  th e  E u ro p ea n  C om m unity , th ird  ed itio n , B ices te r, 1994, p . 6 1 5 f ., h o w e v e r, w ith  m ore e m p h a s is  o n  the  
in te lle c tu e l p ro p e rty  righ ts .
m  See  F u rse , T h e  ‘E sse n tia l Facility* d o c trin e  in  C o m m u n ity  L aw , p p . 4 7 0 -4 7 1 ; see  fo r the c o n d itio n s  for a c la im  
b efo re  a  c o u r t in  th e  U S , M C I C o m m u n ica tio n s  C o rp . v. A T & T, 7 0 8  F. 2d , p . 1081, 1132-33 (7 th  C ir. 1983), cert, 
d en ied . 4 6 4  U .S . 891 (1 9 8 3 ).
295 See  fo r th e  c ritic ism  R au , O pen A ccess  in the P o w e r  Industry: C o m p e titio n , C o o p e ra tio n , and  P o licy  D ilem m as , p . 
2 8 3 , w ith  fu rth e r  re fe re n c e s  in p a rtic u la r  fo o tn o te  15.
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bb) The Set-top-box as Essential Facility
To what extent can the set-top-box be seen as an essential facility? It has already been 
mentioned above that the set-top-box will constitute a kind of bottleneck, since all digital 
programs have to pass through it.296 297However, the constellation with the set-top-box and 
the offered services is much more complex than in the typical essential facility examples 
described above. It is not one single element like the transport of content with networks 
which gives the set-top-box an essential facility status, but the combination of the different 
services and functions connected with the device. For example, the function of converting 
the digital television signals into analogue ones, which can be received by the traditional 
television sets, will only be of minor importance. Much more relevant are the conditional 
access services and the subscriber management functions. The same is true for the 
navigation systems which do not have necessarily to be linked to the provider of the set­
top-box and the other services; however, this is very probable. In particular the conditional 
access function can contribute to the bottleneck/essential facility character of the set-top- 
box, since if a proprietary conditional access system is used, its operator can control which 
services are receivable through the decoder boxes at the customers’ homes. To assess to 
what extent the set-top-box is an essential facility it is indispensable to know who provides 
which services, whether all of them are organized by the set-top-box provider or they are 
offered by independent undertakings. Links between the providers have to be analyzed 
very closely in that respect. The incentives for concentration described above naturally 2967
296 S ec  a b o v e  I1I.1 .b )a a ); see fo r m any  o th e r  a u th o rs , G rah am , E x ch a n g e  R ates an d  G atek eep e rs , p . 4 3 ;  E b erle , 
M ed ien  u n d  M e d ie n re c h t im  U m b ru ch , p. 797 .
297 See fo r co n d itio n a l access system s a s b o ttlen eck , S choof/W atson  B row n . In fo rm atio n  H ig h w ay s an d  M ed ia  
P o lic ie s  in  the E u ro p e a n  U nion , p . 3 3 5 .
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also are likely to support a concentrated service provider unit as seen above with the 
examples of MSG and Nordic Satellite Distribution. For the set-top-box the bottleneck 
problem has to be seen as a multi-layer constellation, since there are so many different 
constellations possible. There would not exist any risk of the emergence of a bottleneck if 
every function would be performed by one independent company. However, this is very 
unrealistic considering the economic and financial risks and interests involved.298 That the 
separation of the functions is a way to guarantee a competition neutral role of the set-top- 
box provider is shown by the plans for the new joint venture following the prohibited 
MSG, the MMBG. The provision of different incompatible set-top-box systems does not 
present a solution to the bottleneck problem, since it would probably not be affordable for 
the competitors, nor would it be appealing to the customers who want to be able to 
receive all available programs with one box.299
However, there is second level concerning bottleneck problems with the introduction of 
digital television, only in indirectly caused by the new technical developments. The set- 
top-box and the concentration tendencies and vertical integration activities surrounding its 
introduction also exacerbates the competition problems regarding the distribution 
networks, like cable or satellite. Suddenly the cable operators or satellite providers 
through ownership or other vertical links with the set-top-box system providers might be 
induced to discriminate against programs which are run on a different system. This is
298 H o lz n a g e l, P ro b le m e  d e r R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ila tte r, p . 19.
299 S ee  a b o v e  111.1 .b ); see  H o lzn ag e l, P ro b lem e  d e r  R un d fu n k reg u lieru n g  im  M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p . 22; E b e rle , 
M e d ien - u n d  M e d ien re ch t im  U m b ru ch , p. 7 9 7 ; se e  a lso  G raham . E x ch an g e  R a te s  a n d  G a tek e ep e rs , p. 4 4 .
**’ S ee  a s  a n  e x am p le  th e  d iscussion  in  G e rm an y  o n  w h e th er the G e rm a n  T e le c o m  w ill tran sm it th e  d ig ita l p ro g ram s 
o f  K irch  w h o  d id  n o t jo in  the M B B G , w hich  is  a n  undertak ing  p lan n in g  to  p ro v id e  se t-to p -b o x  sy s tem s and  d e co d e r 
tec h n o lo g y  and  in  w h ich  the G erm an  T e leco m  h a s  a  m ajo r o w n ersh ip  s ta k e ; se e  S üd d eu tsch e  Z e itu n g , “ W ir s ind  
n ich t d e r  b ö se  M o n o p o lis t” , 29. M a i 1996, p . 2 2 .
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the well-known essential facility situation with a network provider refusing to deal with a 
competing content provider, although the construction here is more complex.301
b) Open Access v. “Must-Carry” Rules Regarding the Digital Television 
Infrastructure
In discussing open access v. “must-carry” rules for the digital infrastructure the above 
found two different levels of access problems have to be taken into account. The first level 
is the well known access to the networks like cable and satellite and the second level, 
specific for the introduction of digital television, is the access to the set-top-box 
infrastructure. Ideas exist to extend the regulatory principles of the telecommunications 
sector regarding open access, like the rules applicable under the Open Network Provision 
framework, to the networks in the broadcasting sector, which have been excluded so far 
from such rules.302 Concerning cable television the “must-carry” approach has evolved in 
order to provide broadcast service providers’ access to the cable networks. A regulatory 
approach specifies which broadcasters must be included under “must-carry” rules.303 A 
restricted “must-carry” approach should be sufficient. However, it must be secured that 
the access is also granted in nondiscriminatory fair terms also considering the single terms 
of the agreements.304 Declaring the networks to be common carriers seems to be
3(11 S ee  H o lz n a g e l, P ro b le m e  d e r R u n d fu n k reg u lie ru n g  im  M u ld m ed ia -Z e i(alter, p . 19; he also  g iv es  th e  e x am p le  o f  
p ro b lem s w ith  sa te llite  providers, h o w e v er he d o e s  n o t really  c o n n e c t the p ro b lem  to  the in tro d u c tio n  o f  d ig ita l 
te lev is io n  a n d  the n e w  concen tra tion  in ce n tiv e s , b u t m ain ly  g ives a s  an  e x p la n a tio n  the u p co m in g  p riv a tiza tio n  and 
lib e ra liza tio n  o f  th e  te leco m m u n icatio n  sec to r, w h ic h  w ould  bear th e  risk  o f  p riv a te  operato rs e x p lo itin g  th e ir  
g a te k e e p e r  p o sitio n s .
302 S ee  S c h o o f/W a tso n  B row n , In form ation  H ig h w ay s and  M edia P o lic ie s  in the  E u ro p ean  U nion , p p . 3 34-335 ; se e  
C o u n c il D ire c tiv e  90 /3 8 7 /E E C , O J 1990  N o L  192/1 ff. (O pen  N e tw o rk  P ro v is io n ); see also  H o ffm an n -R ie m , 
M u ltim e d ia p o litik  v o r  neuen  H erau sfo rd eru n g en , p . 134,
3(0 S ee  as th e  b e s t k n o w n  exam ple the  " m u s t-c a n y ”  ru le s  in the US c a b le  te le v is io n  industry , E sse r, Z u g an g  z u r 
B re itb a n d k o m m u n ik a tio n  • die U S A  als B e isp ie l fü r zukünftige  E n tw ic k lu n g en  in  E uropa, p . 4 3 6 ff;  see fo r 
C a n ad a , § 9  C ab le  T e lev is io n  R egu la tions o f  1986, pub lished  in: G ra n t/K ee le y sid e /R a c ic o t, 1994*95, C a n ad ian  
B ro a d ca st a n d  C ab le  R egulatory  H a n d b o o k , 1994 , p. I55f.
304 S ee  H o ffm a n n -R ie m , M uldm ed ia-P o litik  vo r n e u e n  H erau sfo d eru n g en , p. 134.
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unrealistic considering the predicted differentiation of the networks.* 303 *The best solution 
would be competition among the networks. However, mostly they are not inter- 
substitutable and regarding the cable and satellite penetration of many European countries 
any competition of networks is still far away in time.306
Regarding the access to set-top-box infrastructure one could view open access as being 
the common interface solution and “must-carry” as being a proprietary system with a code 
of conduct. The advantages and disadvantages of both have been widely discussed 
above.307 From a competition standpoint the common interface solution which would 
mean open access was seen as being far superior. Technically its general introduction does 
not pose any difficulties.308 Mainly the interests of companies which already use a 
proprietary system and do not want to give away their competitive advantage speak 
against it.309 However, here this technical solution provides a much easier and clear cut 
solution than could be found for the network access problem.
3. Com petition and Standard Setting
An aspect which has not been discussed yet, which, however, is of great importance for 
competition, is the role of standards. The setting of standards has far-reaching implications 
for the competition conditions in a market for products or services. Within the
305 S ee  fo r th is  o p in io n  H o lznagel, P ro b le m e  der R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lte r, p . 19; see  fo r  th e  
d iffe re n tia tio n  o f  ne tw o rk s, N oam , B ey o n d  lib e ra liza tio n  II: T h e  Im p en d in g  D o o m  o f  C om m on  C a rria g e , in: 
T e lec o m m u n ic a tio n s  P o licy , V ol. 18, 1994, p . 4 3 5 ff .
3(16 S ee  fo r  a  g ra p h ic a l ove rv iew , P itze r, D ig ita les  F e m se h en , p . 9 ; p a y  a tten tio n  in  p a rticu la r to  F ra n c e , P o rtu g a l, 
S p a in , I ta ly  and  G re e c e .
303 S ee  a b o v e  l l l . l .b ) .
**  S e e  fo r  m a n y  G ra h am , E xchange R a te s  and G a tek e ep e rs , pp. 4 5 -4 6 .
3,19 S ee , fo r  e x a m p le . C an a l P lus in F ra n c e  and in  S p a in  and  B SkyB  in  the  U K .
91
í.i
I
i
introduction of digital television, standards play a crucial role. These standards include 
those for the digital television signals, the compression technique, the conversion 
technique and the conditional access system. In the following section, after a brief general 
introduction to the economics of standard setting I will analyze the role of standards 
within the introduction of digital television.
a) The Economics of Standard Setting and the View of Competition Law 
In the high technology and information technology areas the two most important
standards are quality and safety standards and interface standards. The latter are of
primary interest for the telecommunications and information industry. They specify
whether and how one type of product or service will be able to fit or communicate with
other products or services (for example television transmission standards or computer
operating system interfaces with applications programs).310 There is a general consensus
that standards provide a variety of pro-competitive benefits. The form of the
standardization benefits varies across markets and industries. The standardization and
compatibility benefits connected with high-technology industries are found when network
or consumption externalities are associated with a product. Usually a variety of
technologies exist that can be employed to accomplish a similar objective and the value of
a technology to each user increases with the size of the user base. Then each user of a
standard confers benefits on other users of the standard with the decision to use the
standard by which he becomes the source of a “positive externality” in connection with *64
31(1 A n to n /Y a o , S tan d ard -S ettin g  C o n so rtia . A n titru s t, a n d  H ig h -T ech n o lo g y  In d u stries , in: A n titru s t L aw  Jo u rn a l, V ol.
6 4 . 1995 , p . 247 .
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joint use of technologies referred to as “network externalities”.311 312 The relationship 
' between the users is regarded as an interdependent network caused by their reliance on a
' common set of standards. The usual presumption that competition among self-interested
[
i economic agents has to promote market-wide efficiency in consumption and production
may not be true if an activity involves externalities.312 31There exist various sources for the 
! network externalities. The users may benefit from system wide economies that emerge
1 independently of any activities of the users. This might be due to the fact that many
1 products which are components of a systems of products or services are coordinated by
the adherence to one common technological standard. This is true for example for video- 
recorders and tapes and personal computers and software and would apply in our case to
i
the set-top-box and available digital television programs. Both producers/providers and
i
i customers may profit from system economies through lowered production costs. A larger
i user base also promotes economies of scale effects. With economies of scale the per unit
i
' costs of production decline as the volume of production increases. Benefits of experience
i
i may occur which may improve the quality of products and services. These are usually
benefits conferred on later users by earlier users of a new technology; however, earlier
j
1 users might also benefit. The number of users in a network also increases benefits which
might arise out of communication among the users.
311 S ee  fo r  th e  eco n o m ic  background . K a tz /S h a p iro . S y stem s C o m p etitio n  and N e tw o rk  E ffects, in : Jo u rn a l o f  
E co n o m ic  P e rsp ectiv es , V ol. 8 ,1 9 9 4 ,  p. 93 ff.
312 S ee  fo r th e  s ta n d ard isa tio n  and  n e tw o rk  ex te rn a litie s  in general, O w en /W ild m an , V ideo E co n o m ics , p . 26 4 ff.
313 S ee  fo r fu rth e r  e x am p les  o f  benefits , A n to n /Y ao , S tandard -S etting  C o n so rtia , A n titru s t, and  H ig h -T ec h n o lo g y  
In d u str ie s , p . 249, he g ives as ex am p le  am ong  o th e rs  the te leco m m u n icatio n  m ark e t regard ing  te lep h o n es  th e  
e x te rn a lly  is due  to  th e  fact that c o m m u n ica tio n  is m ore valuable  a s  the n e tw o rk  increases; see  a lso  
O w en /W i Id m an. V id e o  E conom ics, p. 264ff.
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Competition law acknowledges the possible benefits of standardization. Besides its 
function of improving a sector by rationalizing the production, it is also credited with 
benefiting the consumer by improving the interchangeability of the products in question.314 *
The European Commission does not oppose standardization agreements as long as 
competition between the parties to the agreement or access to the agreement by other 
producers is not excluded.313 In US competition law the benefits of standards are also 
appreciated and the vast majority of standard-setting activities in particular taking place in 
the high technology industry are seen as posing only slight anti-competitive concerns, 
though continuous vigilance is considered to be needed. The substance of a standard has 
the potential to produce a number of anti-competitive effects. A standard may 
disadvantage some subgroup of existing competitors by raising costs or excluding the 
technology of rivals without any technical rationale. Standards may also be used to 
exclude current rivals or to raise entry barriers.314 *16
b) Standard Setting and Competition within the Introduction of Digital Television 
The above cited benefits of standardization, in particular in the high technology and
communication and information industry, also apply to the introduction of digital
television. The theory of network externalities promises also here benefits for the producer
and service provider as well as the consumer. A common standard and subsequently a
common and compatible system are supposed to provide less expensive set-top-boxes,
314 S e e  fo r th is  o p in io n  V an  B ael/B ellis , C o m p e titio n  L aw  o f  the E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ity , p. 5 2 ! ,  w h e re  as an e x a m p le  
o f  an  e x e m p tio n  th e  c ase  T ran so cean  M arin e  P a in t  A ssoc ia tion , O J  1967 N o  L  163 /10  is c ited .
3,5 S e e  V an  B a e l/B e llis , C om petition  L a w  o f  the E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ity , p. 5 21 .
316 S e e  A n to n /Y a o , S tan d ard -S ettin g  C o n so rtia , A n titru s t, and H ig h -T ech n o lo g y  In d u stries , p, 2 4 8 ,2 5 0 ;  see fo r  m ore  
o n  th e  U S  a n titru s t a ttitu d e  tow ards tech n ica l s tan d ard -se ttin g , B ro w n , T e c h n o lo g y  Jo in t V e n tu res  to  Set S ta n d a rd s  
o r  D efin e  in te rfa c e s , A n titru s t L aw  Jo u rn a l, V o l. 6 1 ,1 9 9 3 , p . 9 2 I ff .
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lower subscription fees and a greater variety of programs for the consumer, while they 
would give the producers and the service providers economy of scales, system economies 
and would enable them to offer the audience more attractive programs which would be an 
important factor in turning the introduction of digital television into a success.317 Great 
efforts have been made by the Digital Video Broadcasting Group (DVB), a private 
organization of companies interested in the implementation of digital video broadcasting 
to come up with standards for the distribution of digital television programs.318 It 
succeeded for the most part. For the conditional access system there does not exist a 
standard yet, though the standardization process is under way.319
However, the conditional access system is, as already seen above, the crucial part of the 
digital television distribution chain. 320 Besides losing the described benefits and risking the 
overall success of the introduction of digital television, there loom great dangers for free 
competition on the digital television market if a common standard will not be used. 
Ultimately there will be either one dominant set-top-box system provider with potential 
monopoly in his hands or several providers of incompatible ones. Both situations are 
undesirable socially and economically. Several smaller providers would fragment the 
market and might lead to what economists call “a low equilibrium market” where choice
317 S ee  fo r  th e  a d v an tag e s  and  th e  n e ce ss ity  o f  c o m m o n  standards. R ep o rt to  th e  S w ed ish  M in is te r o f  C u ltu re  an d  the  
H ead  o f  M in is try : F ro m  M assm ed ia  to  M u ltim e d ia  - D ig ita lization  o f  S w ed ish  T elev is io n , p. 9 ; se e  G rah am , 
E x ch an g e  R a tes a n d  G a tek eep ers , p . 4 6 ; see P ie p er, M edienrech t im  S p an n u n g sfe ld  von B ro a d ca stin g  und 
M u ltim e d ia , p. 5 5 8 ; F la tau , A k tiv itä te n  der E u ro p ä isc h en  U nion a u f  dem  G e b ie t  d e r  M edien , p . 7 7 9 ; N ie w ia rra , 
F o lg e ru n g en  aus d e n  A k tiv itä ten  d e r  E u ro p ä isch en  U nion  fu r d ie  p riv a te  F e rn seh w irtsch a ft, p. 7 6 1 .
3,s S ee  fo r  d e ta i ls  re g a rd in g  the  s ta n d a rd s  a lread y  s e t .  th e  D V B  and th e  c o o rd in a tio n  w ith  th e  E u ro p ea n  C o m m iss io n , 
be low , V II.4.C ).
319 See  E B U  L eg a l C o m m itte e , In fo rm atio n  d o c u m e n t N o  9  (95), I D e ce m b er 1995 , p . 2,
310 See above under III. I .b)aa),bb).
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will be reduced, costs raised, the demands lowered and investment reduced.321 Even if the 
standard by the DVB arrives it is questionable if it will be used, since the operator of 
conditional access system want to keep their old system which for the most part is 
proprietary and not even using a common interface.322 The often raised argument against a 
common standard, that it delays investment, contradicts the network externalities 
described above. It is also argued that pressure will exist on suppliers to collaborate and 
they finally will come up with common standards. However, this is not certain as the 
example of IBM and Apple in the personal computer sector demonstrated. Also the 
struggle going on in Germany between two media giants providing two different systems 
shows a common standard does not have to emerge naturally.323 And even if the pressure 
will exist it might come too late and the individual consumer will already face monopoly 
suppliers or a fragmentation will have taken place which would be costly and lengthy to 
reverse.324 Because of this many observers favor the introduction of a mandatory common 
standard for a conditional access system.325
VI. Implications for the Concentration Debate
The debate about concentration in the media, in particular in broadcasting seems to go on 
continuously and to repeat itself in most European countries. The questions discussed are
321 S ee  G ra h a m , E x ch a n g e  R ates an d  G a te k e e p e rs , p . 4 4 .
322 See a s  e x a m p le s  in  F rance  C an a l P lu s  and  in  U K  B SkyB  w ith  th e ir  p ro p rie ta to ry  system s.
323 See F ra n k fu r te r  A llg em e in e  Z e itu n g , “ D ig ita les  F e m se h en ” , 2 . Ju li  1996, su p p le m e n t T e c h n ik  u n d  M o to r, pp. 1-2; 
th e  d if fe re n c e s  a re  m u ch  g rea te r th a n  e x p ec te d , s in c e  e v en  u sin g  sm a rtc a rd s  o n e  co u ld  on ly  se e  th e  p ro g ram , b u t 
n o t u se  a ll the fu n c tio n s  o f  the se t-to p -b o x ; to  sh o w  a  program  fro m  one  g ro u p  o n  the d e co d e r o f  the o th e r  g ro u p  
w o u ld  b e  like “ L o ad in g  the d a ta  o f  w in d o w s P C  o n  a  m acin tosh”  an  in te rn a l p a p e r  says.
324 See G ra h a m , E x ch a n g e  R ates a n d  G a te k e e p e rs , p . 47 .
323 Ib id ., p . 45 .
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the level of ownership one undertaking should be allowed to have in the media, to what 
extent media cross ownership should be permitted, how one should define pluralism, 
which are the right models to measure media influence. On which governance level, 
regional, national or European the problems should be tackled is also the subject of wide 
spread discussion. The aim of the following section will not be to describe this debate in 
all its details and with its differentiated peculiarities found in the different Member States.
Rather the focus will be the new implications for the debate that the arrival of digital 
television brings about, in particular through the multiplicity of channels. For this also the 
state of the discussion in the USA will be highlighted. The presentation of the general 
concentration debate in the Member States and at European Community level will be 
rather brief and mainly introductory.
1, introduction to the G eneral Concentration Debate
In the following section I give a brief introduction to the general concentration debate.
Some of the underlying principles of regulating broadcasting and television will be 
explained, like pluralism, and the main regulatory approaches outlined. Also a brief 
overview of the media concentration discussion at the European Community level will be 
presented.
a) The General Debate
The debate mainly deals with the question to what extent and what kind of regulation is 
necessary and sufficient to secure a plurality of opinions and a wide degree of information 
in the media. The different concepts of regulations include ownership rules in all variations 
like restrictions on multiple ownership in the same medium, restrictions on multirr a^ir u
èt
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ownership, restrictions of ownership because of the type of activities of the potential 
licensee, transparency provisions, special competition provisions or licensing rules.326 Two 
crucial points of the concentration debate are the justification for the different treatment of 
the electronic media compared to other media regarding the level of regulation, the 
general concept of pluralism and the role of the state in upholding the principle of 
pluralism in the electronic media.
aa) The Special Treatment o f Electronic Media
The much stricter regulatory framework (not only regarding concentration but also 
licensing and content) imposed on the electronic media compared to the more or less free 
press market is justified with a number of rationales whose validity has become more and 
more criticized in the recent years.327 This controversy can be also viewed under the 
pretext of a free market versus a state approach.328 There is much less tendency to leave 
the electronic media to the play of market forces. A history of the different treatment of 
the two media can be observed both in Europe and in the USA. The most quoted 
arguments used to defend the extensive regulation of the electronic media are the 
pervasivness of the medium and the scarcity rationale. The pervasivness of the media
336 S ee  fo r  a  b r ie f  su m m ary  o f  the  su rv ey  o f  n a tio n a l law s m ade in  the  E u ro p ean  C o m m iss io n ’s G reen  P a p e r, 
P lu ra lism  and  M e d ia  C o ncen tra tion  in the  In te rn a l M arket: A n  A ssessm en t o f  the  N eed  fo r  C o m m u n ity  A c tio n , 
C o m  (9 2 ) 4 8 0  fin a l, pp. 2-53; see  H itchens, M e d ia  O w n ersh ip  a n d  C on tro l: A  E uropean  A p p ro a ch , ¡n: M o d e rn  Law  
R e v ie w , V o l. 5 7 , 1994, p. 590 ; see  also  B rü h a n n , P lu ra lism u s u n d  M ed ien k o n zen tra tio n  im  B in n e n m a rk t, in:
Z U M , 1 2 /1 9 9 3 , p . 601.
527 S e e  fo r  c r itic ism  in  G erm any  E n g e t, M u ltim e d ia  un d  d as d e u ts c h e  V erfassu n g srech t, p. 16 0 ff .;  B u llin g e r, 
S tru k tu rw a n d e l v o n  P resse  und  R u n d fu n k , in : N JW , 8 /1984 , p p . 385 -3 9 0 ; S c h o lz , Z u k u n ft v o n  R u n d fu n k  und 
F e rn se h en : F re ih e it  d e r  N ach frag e  o d e r re g le m e n tie r te s  A n g e b o t, in: A fP , 1 /1995 , p. 359; se e  fo r  the U S A , Pow e. 
A m e ric a n  B ro a d ca s tin g  and the F irs t  A m e n d m e n t, B erkeley , C a lifo rn ia , 1987 ; see  a lso  L iv e ly , M o d ern  M e d ia  and 
the F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t: R ed isco v e rin g  F re e d o m  o f  th e  P ress , in : W a sh in g to n  L a w  R eview , V o l. 6 7 ,1 9 9 2 , p . 623 ; 
H a m m o n d , R e g u la tin g  B ro ad b an d  C o m m u n ica tio n  N etw orks, in : T h e  Y a le  Jo u rn a l on  R e g u la tio n , V o l. 9 , 1992, 
pp . 2 2 2 -2 2 3 .
531 S e e  f o r  th a t F iss , W hy  the S ta te? , in : H a rv ard  L aw  R ev iew , V o l. 1 0 0 ,1 9 8 7 , p , 7 8 Iff.
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argument refers to the special character of the media as a justification for the strict 
regulation. According to this theory the electronic media have more influence on public 
opinion than do, for example, the press.329 According to the US Supreme Court the 
broadcasting media intrude into the home and are “uniquely persuasive“.330 Because of the 
power of television and its unique influence on the public opinion the free market for 
television would, unlike the range of press and magazine titles provided by the print 
media, not produce the same variety of programs. This makes stricter regulation necessary 
in order to guarantee pluralism and program variety.331 The other predominantly used 
argument is the scarcity rationale. According to this argument the frequencies for 
broadcasting are said to be very limited. Not everyone can acquire a license to broadcast 
or air their views, therefore the government may regulate the access and the content of 
broadcast programs. Connected with that is the argument of the high investments 
necessary to start up a broadcasting channel or any other outlet of electronic media, which 
held the numbers of outlets down compared to the number of newspapers and 
magazines.332 It is obvious that this argument has come under serious attack with the new 
technological developments that are said to abolish the spectrum scarcity, in particular the 
digitalization of television.
329 S ee  fo r  the w h o le  a rg u m en t B aren d t, B ro a d ca stin g  Law , pp, 6 -7 .
33,1 S ee  F C C  v. P a c if ico  Foundation , 4 3 8  U .S. 7 3 6  (1 9 7 8 ); a lso  se e  the  G erm an  C onstitu tional C o u r t  in th e  L eb ach  
c a se , B V erfG E  3 5 , 202 .
331 S ee  G e rm a n  C o n stitu tio n a l C ourt, B V erfG E  5 7 ,3 2 2 -3 2 3 ; see  a ls o  B rugger, F re ih e it d e r M e in u n g  und  
O rg a n isa tio n  d e r M ein u g sfre ih e it. E ine lib e ra le  K onzep tion  d e r  g e is tig en  F re ih e it d es A rtic le  5 A bs. 1 u n d  2 G G , 
in : E u G R Z , 1987, p . 2 3 0 .
332 S ee  fo r  the  sca rc ity  ra tionale  in g en era l B a ren d t, B ro ad castin g  L aw , pp . 4 -6 ; see fo r the U S A , R ed  L io n  
B ro a d c a sd n g  C o . v . FC C , 395 U .S . 3 6 7 ,3 8 8 ,  1967; see  for E u ro p e  the G erm an  C o n stitu tio n al C ourt, B V e rfG E  12, 
2 0 5 ,2 6 3 ;  Ita lian  C o n stitu tio n al C o u rt, D ec is io n  5 9 /1960  G iur, c o s t. 7 5 9 ; se e  fo r the eco n o m ic  c o n s id e ra tio n s , 
G e rm a n  C o n s titu tio n a l C ourt, B V erfG E  1 2 ,2 0 5 ,2 6 1  (first te le v is io n  ju d g m e n t) ;  3 1 ,3 1 4 , 3 2 6  (seco n d  te le v is io n  
ju d g m e n t) ;  73 , 1 1 8 ,1 5 4  (th ird  te lev is io n  ju d g m e n t) .
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bb) The Concept o f Pluralism
The other essential element of the debate is the concept of pluralism in general and the 
role of the state in securing pluralism of opinions within the electronic media. This is not 
the place to elaborate on the dogmatic founding and origins of this principle mostly 
developed by constitutional courts. However, some definitions and descriptions of the 
concept will be given to illustrate on what ideas the concentration debate is based. The 
concept of pluralism wants to ensure a plurality of sources of information and opinion and 
a plurality of editorial control over them. There are a numbers of dimensions to the term 
pluralism, which include political and commercial influence, audience access to a range of 
products and services, and diversity of content.333 Pluralism as a constitutional principle 
means the duty of the state to create a regulatory framework that prevents one-sidedness 
in the media, ensures they are free of state influence and guarantees the greatest plurality 
of opinions possible.334 The principle of pluralism also includes restrictions of the freedom 
of speech and expression of individuals to secure a plurality of opinions for the public 
which encompasses ownership rules to prevent concentration in the media.333
b) A Common European Approach to Concentration and Regulation
An interesting question in the context of the concentration debate and of regulations to
secure pluralism concerns the existence of a common European approach. Can such a
333 S e e  R o b in so n , M a rk e t Share a s  M easu re  o f  M ed ia  C o n cen tra tio n , pp. 5 0 -5 1 .
334 S ee  fo r  th a t d e f in itio n  and  fo r  m o re  c o n ce rn in g  th e  co n stitu tio n a l b ack ro u n d  in  G erm any , F ra n c e  and  Ita ly , 
S c h n e lle n b e rg , P lu ra lism us: Zu e in e m  m ed ien rech tlich en  L e itm o tiv  in  D e u tsc h la n d , F ran k re ich  und  I ta lie n , in: 
A ö R , 1994 , p p . 4 2 7 -4 4 9 .
333 S e e  B rü h a n n , P lu ra lism u s  und  M ed ien k o n z en tra tio n  im  B in n en m a rk t, in : Z U M , 12/1993, p . 6 0 0 ; th is  id e a  is  in  
lin e  w ith  the v ie w  o f  th e  E u ro p ean  C o m m iss io n  expressed  in  i ts  G reen  P a p e r  o n  P lu ra lism  a n d  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  the 
E u ro p e a n  C o m m iss io n  and o f  th e  E u ro p ean  C o u rt fo r H um an R ig h ts ; se e  fo r  th e  la tte r the d e c is io n  G ro p p e ra  R ad io  
A G  v . S w itz e r la n d , S e r. A , N o 173; (1990) 12 E H H R .
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general common approach be identified in contrast for example to the American attitude 
towards regulating the media? This European approach might exist and play an important 
part in the debate independently or in spite of the new technological developments like the 
digitalization of the media. The starting point for finding such a common denominator may 
be the principle of pluralism. This concept is wide-spread in European countries, and not 
limited to countries with a constitutional court.336 Closely connected with the pluralism 
principle is the idea of giving an objective dimension to the right of freedom of 
broadcasting and to regard it as an instrumental freedom. This includes the duty of the 
state to protect broadcasting in so far as its exercise promotes the goals of free speech, 
namely an informed society and a lively discussion of a variety of views. The 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression requires the enactment of legislation to 
safeguard free speech in the context of broadcasting in order to prevent it being dominated 
by the state or by any commercial group.337 Although the interpretation is most strongly 
supported by the German constitutional court, France, Italy, and Spain also have a similar 
understanding of freedom of speech.338 Even the UK, though without a manifestation on
336 S ee  fo r  the  q u ite  si m iliar in te rp re ta tio n  o f  the  p rin c ip le  in G e rm an y , F ra n c e  an d  Italy , w ith  s lig h t d iffe re n c e s  in  the 
d o g m atic s  o f  co n stitu tio n a l law , S c h e lle n b erg , P lu ra lism us: Z u  e inem  m ed ien rech tlich en  L e itm o tiv  in D e u tsc h la n d , 
F ra n k re ic h  un d  I ta lien , pp. 4 2 7 -4 4 9 ; see  fo r th e  U K  R ob inson , M ark et S h a re  a s  a  M easure o f  M ed ia  C o n c en tra tio n , 
pp . 5 0 -5 1 , w h o  q u o tes  p lu ra lism  a s  being  th e  fundam en ta l a im  o f  both th e  B roadcasting  A c t o f  1990 a n d  th e  W hite  
P a p e r o f  the  G o v e rn m en t, C m  2 8 7 2 . M ed ia  O w n ersh ip : the G o v e rn m e n t’s P roposals , (L o n d o n  H M S O ) 1995, 
w h ich  h av e  b e c o m e  w ith som e c h an g e s  the  B ro ad castin g  A ct 1996; see fo r  the  changes the  D ep artm en t o f  N ational 
H e rita g e , T h e  B ro ad castin g  A c t 1996, A  g u id e  to  the p ro v isio n s o f  the A c t a n d  M ain  C h an g es s ince  P u b lica tio n , 
D N H  2 2 0 /9 6 , 2 5  Ju ly  1996.
337 Its c le a re s t  e x p re ss io n  is the in te rp re ta tio n  fo u n d  in  the  case  la w  o f  the G e rm a n  C o n stitu tio n a l C ourt, se e  
B V e rfG E , 5 7 , 2 9 5 , 320 ; 7 3 ,1 1 8 ,  152; see  fo r  th e  con stitu tio n a l b ack g ro u n d  o f  the  co n ce n tra tio n  d eb a te  in  
G e rm a n y , D ö rr, K o n zen tra tio n sten d en zen  im  B ere ich  d es R u n d fu n k s un d  ih re  R ech tsp ro b lem e , in: Z U M , 1/1993,
p. 11.
331 See  H o lz n a g e l, P ro b lem e  der R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g , p. 18; see  a lso  S c h e lle n b e rg , P lu ra lism us: Z u  e in em  
m ed ie n re c h tlic h e n  L eitm otiv  in D eu tsch lan d , F rankreich  u nd  I ta lien , p . 18 ; see  a lso  for Ita ly , R u n d fu n k p o litik . 
P a rte i-  un d  K o n zem in te re ssen  - e in  ita lie n isch e s  Z u sam m en sp ie l, p. 117; s e e  fo r  France. B a re n d t, B ro a d c a s tin g  
L aw , p. 13ff.
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the constitutional level, shares a similar approach in regulating broadcast.339 This approach 
is identified as quite different from the way freedom of broadcasting is treated in the USA, 
where it is mainly regarded as an immunity from government intervention. The European 
approach, by introducing this second dimension, seeing the freedom of broadcasting as a 
set of institutional rather than individual rights, provides for additional arguments for 
regulation which in the USA do not exist.340 This difference becomes crucial for the 
concentration and regulation debate if the traditional rationales for regulation come under 
attack as it is happening with the arrival of digital technology and other developments.
c) The Relationship with Competition Law
Another much discussed point of the concentration debate which might be important 
analysis of the implications of the digitalization of television is the role of competition law. 
The crucial question asked in that context is to what extent competition law is adequate to 
maintain pluralism.341 There exists a general agreement that a convergence of the 
objectives of maintaining pluralism and maintaining competition can be identified, or at 
least that they are complementary. However, considerable limitations have to be 
acknowledged. The limiting factor in relying on general competition law to protect 
pluralism will be that some market behavior which raise issues for pluralism will not be
339 S e e  B a re n d t, B ro a d ca stin g  L aw , p . 34 .
340 S ee  fo r  a  c o m p a riso n  o f  the E u ropean  ap p ro ach  and  the U S -A m erican  v iew -p o in t, B arend t, B ro ad castin g  L aw , p. 
34.
141 See  fo r  th is q u e s tio n  the E uropean  C o m m iss io n 's  G reen  P a p e r o n  P lu ra lism  an d  M edia C o n c en tra tio n , p p . 82-83 ; 
see  fo r  a n  a sse ssm e n t o f that H itch en s, M e d ia  O w nersh ip  an d  C o n tro l: A  E u ro p ean  A p p ro ach , p . 593 ; se e  a lso  
E u ro p ea n  C o m m iss io n , C o m m unication  fro m  the  C om m iss ion  to  the  C o u n c il and  P a rliam en t o n  A u d io v isu a l 
P o lic y , 21 F e b ru a ry  1990, C o m  (9 0 ) 78  f in a l, p. 21 w here the C o m m iss io n  d o u b ted  the su ffie n cy  o f  c o m p e titio n  
law  to  d e a l a lo n e  w ith  m edia c o n ce n tra tio n ; fo r  an  analysis w h e th e r  the E u ro p ea n  C o m p etitio n  L aw  is a d e q u a te  to 
m a in ta in  p lu ra lism  in  the C o m m o n  M arket, se e  W agner, K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M e d ien -B in n en m a rk t d e r  E G , 
in: A fP , 1 /1992, p . I ff .
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regarded as impeding competition. Pluralism and competition are different criteria and the 
protection of pluralism often needs tighter control than the protection of competition. 
Competition law aims at preventing economic dominance and while this might prevent 
certain media concentration tendencies, it does not guarantee pluralism in itself.342 Another 
problem in just applying competition law to a media case might be the issue of what 
constitutes the market. In the case of a multimedia merger the companies might be a 
newspaper publisher and a television channel. If the market is defined as the television 
market and not as a common media market, no competition question would arise, but the 
merger could raise serious concerns for pluralism. This might even be true for a one media 
market when the markets, for example, are defined according to the technical nature of 
services (e.g. in a merger between a terrestrial television operator and pay-television 
channel).343 Competition law in the end cannot be sufficient on its own because of the 
peculiar characteristics of media products and services which always will escape the 
market definitions of competition law.344 However, it is also acknowledged that in fields 
where no specific safeguards for media pluralism exist, like with cross ownership or with 
vertical integration including bottlenecks or technical gateways, effective application of 
competition rules is very beneficial to media pluralism.345
342 S e e  S c h o o f/W a tso n  B row n, In fo rm ation  H ig h w a y s  a n d  M e d ia  Po lic ies in  th e  E uropean  U n io n , p . 3 3 8 ; P lu ra lism  
an d  M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n  in th e  In tern a l M a rk e t, EB U  R eply  to  C o m m iss io n  Q u estio n n a ire  N o  III, 12 A p ril 199S, 
p. 3 .
M3 S ee  fo r  the e x am p les  H itchens, M e d ia  O w n ersh ip  and  C on tro l: A  E u ro p ea n  A p p ro ach , p. 5 9 3 ; see a lso  fo r  the  
p ro b le m s w ith  m ark e t d efin itio n s , P a rlasca , M e d ien k o n z en tra tio n  und  M ed ien v e rfle c h tu n g , in : W uW , 3 /1 9 9 4 , p. 
219 .
344 S ee  R o b in so n , M a rk e t Share  as a  M easu re  o f  M ed ia  C o n cen tra tio n , p . 5 4 ,
345 P lu ra lism  an d  M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n  in the  In te rn a l M arket, E B U  R eply  to  C o m m iss io n  Q u e s tio n n a ire  N o  III, p . 4.
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d) The Concentration Debate at the European Community Level
On a broad scale the public discussion on media concentration at the European
Community level was started by the Commission with the publication of its Green Paper
on pluralism and media concentration within the internal market. However, the initiative
for the Green Paper stemmed from a resolution by the European Parliament of 15
February 1990, in which it had requested the Commission to “put forward proposals for
establishing a special legislative framework on media mergers and takeovers”.346 The
Parliament made itself heard again with a second resolution passed on 16 September 1992
entitled “Resolution on media concentration and diversity of opinions.”347 There it pointed
out the danger of the emergence of powerful European media giants which may start to
divide the European media market up among each other.348 In both cases the European
Parliament was concerned with the needs to protect the freedom of expression and to
encourage pluralism and a diversity of opinions.
The approach of the European Commission is interesting and illustrating for an assessment 
of the Green Paper and the media concentration policy and debate on the European 
Community level in general. Although the Green Paper arose out of Parliamentary concern 
about the need to safeguard pluralism, the European Commission assessed the need for 
action in the context of its task of completion of the internal market. It acknowledged the 
fundamental importance of the protection of pluralism, and despite this task not falling
346 S ee  O J  1990 N o  C  68 /137 , p. 138.
347 S ee  O J  1992 N o  C  284/44 .
341 S e e  a ls o  D örr, K o n zen tra tio n sten d en zen  im  B ereich  des R u n d fu n k s  un d  ih re  R ech tsp ro b lem e , p. 14.
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expressly within its portfolio, it was in itself a Community objective.349 Because of this, the 
main issue of the study became the question whether regulation of ownership and control 
of the media interferes with the internal market and not what regulatory framework would 
be desirable to ensure pluralism. It is also significant that the Green Paper was written in 
DG XV which deals with the internal market and not by DG XI which is in charge of 
media and audiovisual policies. The study was criticized on the grounds that the need to 
balance the real aim of completing the internal market with the needs of pluralism, limited 
the study’s scope. According to this critical view this intrinsic conflict has contributed to 
and compounded the failure of the Green Paper to look at the complexities of media 
ownership and control and the scope for regulation broadly and creatively.350 This is of 
particular significance, because the starting point for the regulation of media concentration 
at Community level has stayed the same up until the later discussed proposal for a Media 
Concentration Directive. The economic study which was undertaken for the Green Paper 
found strong tendencies for concentration in the television sector with cross border 
activities being still rather low, but predicted to develop in the near future.351 The Member 
States introduce national concentration rules to counter this concentration tendencies
349 G re e n  P ap e r o n  P lu ra lism  and  M e d ia  C o n c e n tra tio n , pp . 59-61  ; see  a lso  B riih an n , P lu r a l i s m «  und 
M e d ie n k o n z e n tra tio n  im  B in n en m ark t, p. 601 ; see  fo r th is a p p ro ac h  a n d  th e  d iffe ren t a tti tu d e  o f  the E u ro p e a n  
P a r lia m e n t, w h ic h  supports th e  id e a  o f  a  E u ro p ea n  m ed ia  c o n ce n tra tio n  c o n tro l with the m a in  a im  o f  se c u rin g  
p lu ra lism  K resse , P lu ra lis m « , M ark t, K o n zen tra tio n : P o s itio n en , B e rlin , 1995 , p. 88, se e  a ls o  there  fo r  th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  th e  co m petence  o f  th e  E u ro p ean  U n io n , p . 89ff.
150 See  fo r  th is c r itc ism  in p a rticu la r H itch en s, M e d ia  O w n ersh ip  an d  C o n tro l: A  E uropean  A p p ro a ch , p . 601 ; th is 
te n s io n  is n o t seen  as such by v . W allen b e rg , D as G riinbuch  d e r  E G -K o m m issio n  zu P lu r a l i s m «  und  
M e d ien k o n z en tra tio n  im  B in n en m ark t, in : W u W , 11/1993, p p . 910 -9 1 1 ; a lso  no t by  B riihann , P lu r a l i s m «  und  
M e d ien k o n z en tra tio n  im  B in n en m ark t, p . 6 0 1 .
3Sl B o o z , A llen  &  H am ilto n , S tudy  o n  P lu ra lism  a n d  C o n cen tra tio n  in  the  M e d ia  -  E conom ic E v a lu a tio n , F ina l 
R e p o rt, 6  F e b ru a ry  1992, (the E co n o m ic  S tu d y ), p. 15.
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which contains the risk of creating obstacles for the internal market.352 The Green Paper 
concluded that there might be a need for action at Community level to ensure the proper 
functioning of the single market given these potential obstacles.353 In this context the 
Green Paper states further that action on Community level would be the only way to 
proceed for a removal of these obstacles, since voluntary harmonization of national laws 
could not sufficiently achieve this.354 The Commission put forward three options for 
discussion. Option one was that no specific action should be taken at Community level.355 
The second option proposed co-operative action to ensure greater transparency of media 
ownership and control.356 Option three suggested eliminating differences between national 
restrictions on media ownership rules, which could be achieved either by a harmonizing 
directive or by means of a Council regulation.357 Among the interviewed media 
associations and companies the first and the third proposal aroused the biggest interest.358 
However most of the answers were predictable because of self interests and the study did 
not really develop a clear picture of the general attitude.359 An argument put forward very 
strongly by numerous media organization was the need for greater flexibility on a 
European regulatory level, since the European audio-visual industry encounters great
333 See  th e  G re en  P a p e r  on  P lu ra lism  and  M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n , p . 98 ; see  fo r  an  analy is o f  th a t part, v. W allen b e rg , 
D as G riin b u ch  d e r  E G -K om m ission  zu  P lu ra lism u s un d  M e d ien k o n z en tra tio n  im  B in n en m ark t, in: W u W , 11/1993, 
p . 9 1 5 .
333 S e e  th e  G re en  P a p e r  on  P lu ra lism  an d  M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n , p . 99.
334 Ib id . p . 103
333 Ib id . p p . 1 1 3 -1 1 4
336 Ib id . p p . 1 1 5 -1 1 6
337 Ib id . p . 117
33> S ee  C lu b  d e  B ru x e lle s , M ed ia  in E urope  to w a rd s  th e  M ille n n iu m , B o o k  1: R egu la tions a n d  P o lic ie s , B ru x e lle s , 
1994, p p . 4 5 -4 6 .;  see  B riihann, P lu ra lism u s u n d  M ed ien k o n zen tra tio n  im  B in n en m ark t, p . 6 0 1 . 37
337 See  fo r  a su m m a ry  o f  the responses, H itch en s, M ed ia  O w n ersh ip  and  C o n tro l: A  E uropean  A p p ro ach , p p . 595-599 .
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external competition from the American and Japanese industries. The same point is made 
by media companies within their own countries who want to be allowed to grow large 
enough to compete effectively with major integrated rivals from other Member States.360 3612
On the 5 October 1994 the Commission approved a communication on the action to be 
taken following consultations over the Green Paper.361 362As a result of the consultation, the 
Commission found that a Community level initiative might be necessary, but wished to 
carry out a second phase of work and consultation, before coming to a final decision. This 
second phase of consultation took place in 1995, being based on a questionnaire and two 
studies. Its results tended to be open or positive to a Community initiative. The finding 
indicated a general consensus over the need to reform the existing patchwork of 
ownership rules across Europe and fairly wide support for co-ordination of European 
Community media ownership policy.363 This encouraged the Commissioner for the Internal 
Market to launch a project calling for a directive from the Council on access to media 
ownership.364 The content of the proposal which is the result of the discussion process 
around the Green Paper and the follow up communication will be analyzed below.
360 S e e  D o y le , T h e  C ro ss  M edia  O w n ersh ip  D e b a te , p . 39 .
361 F o llo w -u p  to  th e  c o n su lta tio n  p ro c ess  re la ting  to  th e  G reen  P a p e r  o n  “P lu ra lism  an d  M ed ia  C o n c e n tra tio n  in  the  
In tern a l M ark e t an  A ssessm en t fo r C o m m u n ity  A c tio n " , C o m m u n ica tio n  fro m  th e  C o m m iss io n  to  the C o u n c il and  
th e  E u ro p e a n  P a rlia m en t, C om  (9 4 ) , 353.
362 “F e a sa b ility  o f  u s in g  A ud ience  M e a su res  to  a sse ss  P lu ra lism ” , N o v e m b e r 19 9 4 , and  “ A u d ien ce  m e a su re m e n t in 
the E C " , S e p te m b e r  9 3  by  the G A H  group a n d  ‘T ra n sp a re n c y  in  M e d ia  C o n tro l" , N o vem ber 1994  by th e  E u ro p ea n  
In s titu t f o r  the M e d ia .
363 See  D o y le , T h e  C ro ss  M ed ia  O w n ersh ip  D eb a te , p . 39.
364 See  fo r  a  b r ie f  su m m a ry  o f  the d ev e lo p m en ts  o n  the  E U  level re g a rd in g  m ed ia  co n cen tra tio n , K resse , P lu ra lism u s , 
M ark t, K o n z en tra tio n : P ositionen , p . 85ff,; se e  a lso  C lu b  de B ru x e lle s , M e d ia  in E urope to w a rd s  the  M ille n n iu m , 
B ook  1: R e g u la tio n s  an d  Po licies, p . 40ff.
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2. N ew  Im plications
After having outlined the background of the concentration debate in the previous section, 
I will now examine the implications of the digitalization of the electronic media on this 
debate. Firstly I analyze which of the changes in the electronic media caused by 
digitalization might have an impact on pluralism and media concentration. Secondly I 
investigate if these effects might lead to a change in perception of the traditional rationales 
for regulating the electronic media. Finally I look at remaining risks for pluralism and a 
possible need for regulation on the European Community level.
a) The Impact of Digitalization
The digitalization of television can be said to have two main features concerning the way 
television will change which have become an issue in the media concentration debate. The 
first, discussed above, is the digital compression technology.365 This new technique will 
allow broadcasters to transmit up to eight times as many channels with the same spectrum 
capacity as today. Due to this a multiplication of channels is predicted for the future, 
financed mainly though fees. The form of television as it has been generally perceived is 
said to be likely change fundamentally.366 The emergence of a multitude of special-interest 
channels is expected and these expectations have already been partly verified by the plans 
of the companies who are about to enter or have already entered the digital television 
market.367 Bouquets' of themed services are predicted to play an important role in the
M Sec fo r  an  e x p la n a tio n  o f  the techno logy  II. 1 .b).
366 See fo r  a  c r itica l assessm en t, H o ffm an n -R tem /V estin g , E nde d e r  M assen k o m m u n ik a tio n ? , p , 3 8 2 ff; see  a ls o  S tipp , 
W elch e  F o lgen  h a t  d ie  d ig ita le  R evo lu tion  Tür d ie  F e m se h n u tz u n g , in: M e d ia  Perspek tiven , 8 /1 9 9 4 , p . 3 9 2 ff .;  see 
a lso  S e e g e r, S tru k tu rv erän d eru n g en  des R u n d fu n k s  in E u ro p e  d u rc h  tech n isch en  W andel, p . 103ff.
367 S ee  fo r  m any  in the  academ ic  lite ratu re , E b e rle , N eue Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  un d  V erfassu n g srech t, p . 2 5 0 ; 
K resse /H e in ze , R u n d u n k d y n am ik  am  M o rg en  d es d ig ita len  Z e ita lte rs , p. 5 7 4 ; H olznagel, P ro b le m e  der
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marketing of multichannel digital broadcasting and are already offered by the pioneers of 
digital television.* 368 Besides the new diversity of much more specialized channels, 
interactivity is supposed to become the main feature of the digital television world in the 
long term future.369 Multiplexing, which will very soon allow the provision of near video 
on demand services, will place viewers in a position to start watching the same movie 
every 15 minutes. The notion of the evolution of television into an electronic kiosk, where 
the viewer or consumer can choose among multitude of programs and service whenever 
he wants to is wide spread.370 This idea supports the view of an approximation of 
television to the press market. Summing up the changes introduced to television through 
the digitalization which seem to be relevant for the concentration debate one can state a 
development to more segmentation and individualization of the offered programs and 
services.371 Although a general agreement on this tendency exists the degree and impact of 
this development are quite controversial.372 This can be also seen as the dividing line 
between the proponents of a more liberalized approach to television regulation and 
supporters of the traditional strict regulatory line.
R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  im  M u ltim ed ia -Z e ita lle r, p. 17; see  fo r th e  e co n o m ic  b ackground , S eu fe rt, W irtsc h a ftlic h e  
A sp e k te  d es V ie lk a n a lfe m seh e n s , p. 133ff.
368 S ee  S c h o o f/W a tso n  B row n, In fo rm ation  H ig h w a y s and  M ed ia  P o lic ie s  in  the  E uropean U n io n , p . 338; se e  fo r the 
b o u q u e ts  o ffe re d  by  C an a lS a te llitc  the su b s id ia ry  o f  C anal P lu s, L e M o n d e , 27  A vril 1996, p . 24 ; see  fo r  th e  
p a ck a g in g  in g e n e ra l above III.3.
369 S ee  a b o v e  for in te rac tiv ity , m u ltip lex ing  a n d  n ear v ideo  on d e m a n d  II.2 .b),
370 S ee  fo r  th a t n o tio n  fo r m any au th o rs , S eeg er, S tru k tu rv erä n d eru n g e n  d es  R u n d fu n k s  in E u ro p a , p. 119ff.; se e  a lso  
E b e rle , N eu e  Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  und V e rfassu n g sre c h t, p . 2 5 0 .
371 S ee  a lre a d y  in 19 8 4 , B ullinger, S tru k tu rw a n d e l von  P resse  u n d  R u n d fu n k , R ech tlich e  Fo lge  W irkungen d e r  
e le k tro n is c h e n  M e d ien , p. 387.; th is  a n a ly sis  w a s  taken  up  a g a in  by  E n g el, M u ltim ed ia  und  d a s  d e u tsc h e  
V e rfa s su n g s re c h t, p . 162; fo r seg m en ta tio n  an d  in d iv id u a lisa tio n  see  a lso  S c h o lz , Z ukunft v o n  R u n d fu n k  u n d  
F e rn se h en : F re ih e it  d e r  N achfrage  o d e r re g le m e n tie r te s  A n g e b o t? , p. 3 58 .
372 S ee  fo r  a  sc e p tic a l v iew  con cern in g  the in d iv id u a lisa tio n  and  se g m en ta tio n  o f  the o ffered  p ro g ram s by th e  fu tu re  
te le v is io n , H o ffm an n -R icm /V estin g , Ende d e r  M a ssen k o m m u n ik a tio n ? , p . 3 8 2 ff; see a lso  S tip p , W elch e  F o lg e n  hat 
d ie  d ig ita le  R e v o lu tio n  für die F e m se h n u tz u n g , p. 392ff.
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b) The Diminishing of Traditional Regulatory Rationales
The changes described above shed new light on the traditional rationales for the strict 
regulation of broadcasting. The two main principles outlined in the section before, 
justifying the special treatment of the electronic media, are the scarcity rationale and the 
pervasiveness argument. The scarcity rationale clearly becomes questionable because of 
the use of the digital compression technologies which increases the capacity of the 
electromagnetic spectrum up to the eightfold. Although dependent on the picture quality 
desired, which influences the number of channels transmittable, this increase in capacity 
weakens the scarcity argument.373 Many believe that this should signal the end or at least a 
considerable retreat of government involvement in broadcasting regulation. It is argued 
that regulation will become unnecessary. With the advent of hundreds of channels 
delivering all kinds of programs, information and services there will be less need to ensure 
balanced and fair access to viewers. The monopoly power of existing networks will be 
destroyed by the advent of new television stations.374 The securing of pluralism and the 
multitude of opinions can be left from now on to the market and the economic law, in 
particular competition law. With the multiplicity of channels, an approximation to the 
press market is seen, and a similar regulatory treatment of the electronic media advocated. 
The digitalization of electronic media diminishes the reasons for the special protection of 
the communication-related goods. According to this views the freedom of speech has to 
be interpreted in a unitary way for both media in the future, as a so-called freedom of
373 See for the relationship of picture quality and number of channels, H.2.c).
374 See Green, Preserving Plurality in a Digital World, p. 27; see also SchoofAVatson Brown, Information Highways 
and M edia Policies in the European Union, p. 337, who call for a  close review of the regulations based on the 
scarcity rationale.
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communication right.375 To strengthen their argument its proponents refer to the 
unstoppable convergence processes of different forms of media and of technology and 
content.376 The increase of the capacity of the electromagnetic spectrum will lower the 
costs for providing television services, since it will be now possible to offer very 
specialized pay-television channels. This fact also renders also the argument about the high 
costs necessary to enter the market of electronic media, which is closely connected to the 
scarcity rationale, questionable. This will make it equally difficult to publish a magazine or 
to start up a television channel.377
Although the influence is not visible at first sight, with the advent of digital television also 
the pervasiveness argument becomes contested. The multiplicity of channels and the 
following segmentation of the market into a vast number of special interest channels is said 
to diminish this special effect the medium television has on the consumers. Most viewers 
already today rarely stay for a long time period with one program and this tendency will
371 S ee  E n g e l, M u ltim e d ia  und das d e u tsch e  V e rfa ssu n g sre c h t, pp . 161-163; h e  d em an d s an  u n ita ry  free d o m  to  
c o m m u n ica te  “ e in h e itlich e  K om m u n ik a tio n s frei he il” , p . 163; se e  a lso  S c h o lz , Z u k u n ft v on  R u n d fu n k  v o n  
F e rn seh en : F re ih e it  d e r N achfrage  od e r re g u lie r te s  A ngebot, p . 3 5 9 ; see a lso  B ullinger, S tru k tu rw a n d e l v o n  P resse  
und R u n d fu n k , p . 388ff.; see fo r the  u n equal trea tm e n t o f  p re ss  and  e le c tro n ic  m edia , C o n g d o n , T h e  M u ltim e d ia  
R ev o lu tio n  a n d  th e  O pen  Society , in: T h e  C ro ss  M ed ia  R ev o lu tio n , ed ited  b y  C o n g d o n /G rah am /G reen /R o b in so n , 
L o n d o n , 1995, p . 21 ; see for the sam e  from  a  G erm an  pe rsp ec tiv e , S to ck m an n /Z ig e lsk i, N o v e llie ru n g  d e s  
R u n d fu n k sta a tsv e rtra g e s , in: Z U M , 8 /9 /1 9 9 5 , p . 542 ; see  fo r th e  d eb a te  in  the  U SA , w here m a n y  c o m m u n ica tio n  
re g u la tio n s  h a v e  b e en  challenged  in  C o n g re ss  an d  in th e  co u rts  an d  w h ere  th ese  co n situ tio n al a ttack s h a v e  p lay e d  a 
c o n s id e ra b le  ro le  in  the reform  o f  th e  te leco m m u n ica tio n  re g u la tio n  w ith  th e  liftin g  o f  m an y  re s tr ic itio n s  re g a rd in g  
o w n e rsh ip , c ro ss  o w n ersh ip  and  b u sin ess  r e s t r ic t io n  ru les, s e e  L iv e ly , M o d e m  M ed ia  and  T h e  F irst A m e n d m e n t, 
p. 6 2 3 ; see  a lso  V ick , T he F irst A m e n d m e n t L im ita tio n s  on  M e d ia  R e g u la tio n  in  the U n ited  S ta te s  a f te r  T u rn e r  
B ro a d ca stin g  v. F C C , in: M edia L aw  & P ra c tic e , V ol. 16, N o  3 , 1995, p. 9 4 .
376 See E n g e l, M u ltim e d ia  und das d e u tsch e  V erfassu n g srech t, p . 163 ; see fo r  the  sam e a rg u m en t, 
S to c k m a n n /Z ig e lsk i, N ovellie rung  d es  R u n d fu n k staa tsv e rtrag es , p. 543 ; se e  fo r  th e  U SA , H am m o n d  w h o  p ro p o ses  
new  re g u la to ry  m o d els  fo r the c o n v erg in g  m e d ia  re ly in g  m ore  o n  access r ig h ts , H am m ond, R eg u la tin g  B ro a d b a n d  
C o m m u n ic a tio n  N etw orks, pp. 2 2 3 -2 2 4 ; a rg u in g  in  th e  sam e d ire c tio n , h o w e v e r, from  a  B ritish  o r  E u ro p e a n  
p e rsp ec tiv e  an d  n o t as e labo rated , D oyle , T h e  C ro ss M ed ia  O w n e rsh ip  D e b a te , p . 38.
377 S ee  E n g e l, M u ltim e d ia  und  das d e u tsch e  V erfassu n g srech t, p . 161, w ho  re fe rs  to  pay -te lev isio n  sp ec ia l in te re s t 
c h a n n e ls , w h ich  in  h is  v iew  w ill co m p e te  w ith  sp ec ia l in te res t m ag az in es ; h e  sees  in a  p ay -te lev is io n  m o v ie  
c h an n e l on ly  a  d iffe re n t w ay o f  d is trib u tio n  co m p a red  to  a  v id eo th eq u e . Il
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increase with the multiplication of channels in the future, so its effect on them cannot be 
very high. The rest of the consumers select the program they want to watch beforehand 
and are resistant to manipulative effects anyway. The other development which is brought 
forward for as weakening the pervasiveness rationale is the individualization of the 
medium. With the introduction of multiplexing and later real video-on-demand the real 
time reception will diminish more and more. The viewer will be able to chose the time of 
watching a television program as he decides when he wants to read the newspaper or a
• 178magazine.
c) Remaining Risks for Pluralism
Contrary to the views outlined above, many also, see after digitalization, considerable risks 
for pluralism in the electronic media remaining or arriving. The arguments for continuing 
strict regulation of television in order to prevent detrimental concentration and secure 
pluralism can be divided in three different strands. First of all it is argued that the 
development to a more segmented and individualized market will not occur in the near 
future or at least not to the degree expected by the proponents of a more liberalized 
regulatory framework. This is reasoned on the assumption that the habits and preferences 
of the viewers and consumers will not change radically with the advent of new television 
services and program variety, but rather remain the traditional way and transform veiy 
slowly. According to that view television will also, after digitalization, stay for the most 
part traditional broadcasting with its described effects, since programs with a media 
content are transmitted to a non-individualized circle of viewers via the traditional ways of 378
378 See for this development Bullinger, Strokturwandel von Rundfunk und Presse, p. 388; see Engel. Multimedia und 
das dcutsche V erfassungsrecht, pp. 161-162.
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transmission. The above identified trend of developing from a mass communication 
medium to a more individualized medium is acknowledged only for real interactive 
television services, where less strict regulations may be considered.379 Another argument 
simply states that the European tradition of giving an objective dimension to the freedom 
of broadcasting and safeguarding of pluralism will continue to exist after the digitalization 
and the abolition of the spectrum scarcity. The duty of the state will remain to protect 
broadcasting in so far as its exercise promotes the goals of free speech, namely an 
informed society and a lively discussion of a variety of views. General competition law is 
mainly concerned with securing economic objectives. By many this is not considered to be 
sufficient to secure free and varied media.380 However, the most convincing argument 
brought forward is the new risks arising out of the introduction of the new technology for 
the free access to provide television services. The bottleneck problem of the set-top-box
379 M an y  o f  the g iv en  argum en ts s te m  from  the  G erm an  m ed ia  a n d  co n stitu tio n a l law  d iscussion  o n  the  sc o p e  o f  the 
d e f in itio n  o f  b ro a d ca stin g , w hich  d ec id es w h e th e r  the  o ffe re d  fo rm  o f  te lev is io n  still falls u n d e r  the  s tr ic t 
re g u la to ry  fram e w o rk  o r not; h o w ev er, leav in g  the  G erm an  co n stitu tio n a l law  dogm atics a sid e , the  a rg u m e n ts  pu t 
fo rw a rd  re p re se n t the  general co n flic tin g  v iew s he ld  in  th is d e b a te  w hich  a re  re levan t for the  o th e r  E u ro p ean  
c o u n tr ie s  as w e ll;  see for doub ts reg ard in g  the  d ev e lo p m en t o f  s e g m en ta tio n  a n d  in d iv id u a lisa tio n  as p re d ic te d  by 
the a d v o c a te s  fo r  a  libe ra liza tion  o f  the  re g u la to ry  fram ew o rk  a n d  the p o sitio n  fo r m ain tain ing  str ic t re g u la tio n  a lso  
for th e  new  fo rm s o f  telev ision  in tro d u ced  th rough  d ig ita liza tio n , H offm ann-R iem /V esting , E n d e  der 
M a ssen k o m m u n ik a tio n , in: P erspek tiven  d e r  In fo rm atio n sg ese llsch aft, e d ite d  by  H o ffm an n -R iem /V estin g , B aden- 
B a d en /H a m b u rg , 1995, pp. 16-18, 19-22; sh a rin g  th is v iew , H o lz e r , D as M a rk tan te ilsm o d ell a u f  dem  P rü fs ta n d  - 
e in  P ro b le m a u fr iß , in: Z U M , 8 /9 /1995 , p. 5 8 4 , fo o tn o te  15; fo r  a  b road  a p p lic a tio n  o f  trad itio n a l b ro a d ca stin g  
re g u la tio n  see  a lso  E berle , N eue  Ü b ertrag u n stech n ik en  und V e rfa ssu n g s re c h t, p. 254 ; see a lso , K iefer, 
K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro lle , B e m essu n g sk rite rien  a u f  dem  P rü fs ta n d , in: M e d ia  P erspek tiven , 2 /1 9 9 5 , p. 6 2 ; se e  for 
the g e n e ra l co n stitu tio n a l d ebate  in  G erm an y  o v e r  the  d e fin itio n  o f  b ro a d ca stin g , P ieper, D e r R u n d fu n k b e g riff , in: 
Z U M , 2 /1 9 9 5 , p . 82 ff,; see  also , M ü lle r-U sin g /L ü ck e , N eue T e led ie n ste  u n d  a lte r R un d fu n k b eg riff , in: A rc h iv P T , 
1 /1995 , p . 32 ff.; see  a lso  B u llin g er, D er R u n d fu n k b e g riff  in  d e r  D iffe re n z ie ru n g  k o m m u n ik a tiv e r  D ie n ste , in: A fP , 
1 /1996 , p . I f f .;  se e  from  the sam e  au th o r, O rd n u n g  o d e r F re ih e it fü r M u ltim ed iad ien s te , in: JZ , 8 /1 9 9 6 , p p . 385- 
391 ; se e  a lso  H offm an n -R iem , D e r R u n d fu n k b eg riff  in d e r D iffe re n z ie ru n g  k o m m u n ik a tiv e r D ien ste , in: A fP ,
1 /1 9 9 6 ,p. 9 ff.; fo r  the  attitude o f  the  C o n se il S u p é rieu r  d e  l’A u d io v isu e l (C S A ) the  reg u la to ry  b o d y  in  F ra n c e  
w h ic h  ten d s to  ap p ly  the trad itio n a l reg u la to ry  fram ew o rk  to  n e w  te lev is io n  se rv ices, see  M e ise , F ran k re ich : 
S te in ig e r  W eg  z u r  D aten au to b ah n , p. 446 , w h o  c ite s  from  C S A : R a p p o rt d ’ac tiv ité  pour 1994, P aris 1995, p . 144; 
see  fo r  th e  d if fe re n t legal reg im es H uet, P ro b lè m e s ju rid iq u e  re la tifs  aux au to ro u tes  de l’in fo rm a tio n  e t  au  
m u ltim é d ia , in: D ro it de l 'In fo rm a tiq u e  &  d e s  T é léc o m s, 2 /1 9 9 5 , p , 9ff.
380 S ee  fo r  the  sp e c ia l s ta tu s o f  the  m ed ia  in d u stry  w h ich  w ill e x is t  a lso  a fte r th e  in troduction  o f  th e  d ig ita l 
tec h n o lo g y , G re e n , P reserv ing  P lu ra lity  in  a D ig ita l W orld , p . 3 0 ; see a lso  D oy le , G ro ß b ritan n ien : D e reg u lie ru n g  
fü r d e n  M e d ien m ark t, in: M ed ia  P e rsp ek tiv en , 3 /1996 , p. 169.
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and the vertical integration incentives of the new distribution system of digital television 
programs pose great new dangers not only for competition but also for pluralism.381 The 
different subtle ways of influencing and controlling the market described above might 
demand even stricter regulation than applied until now.382 Certainly in the present stage of 
the division of the new market, heightened attention has to be paid to the concentration 
processes by the regulators. Considering the increasing activities in the electronic media 
market regarding joint ventures, alliances or mergers triggered by the introduction of 
digital technology to television it is questionable why now less media concentration 
regulation should be needed than before.383
d) Demand for Regulation at European Community Level
The question whether the current rules on media concentration have been overtaken by 
events in the media world are asked all over Europe and as well in the USA. The USA has 
already reacted with a reform of telecommunication and broadcasting legislation allowing 
cross ownership between cable and telecommunication companies and liberalizing the 
ownership restriction on the big broadcasting networks. The latter is meant to be a 
response to the continuing diversification of the programs and the development of new 
special interest channels.384 In the UK and in Germany new media concentration
381 See G ra h am , E x ch a n g e  R ates a n d  G a tek e ep e rs , pp . 4 6 -4 7 ; se e  a lso  H o lzn ag e l, P rob lem e d e r  R u n d fu n k re g u lie ru n g  
im M u ltim e d ia -Z e ita lte r , p. 19; E b erle , N eu e  Ü b ertrag u n g stech n ik en  u nd  V erfassu n g srech t, p . 2 5 1 ; see  H o lz e r , 
D as M a rk ta n te il  m odelt a u f  dem  P rü fs tan d  - e in  P ro b lem au friß , p . 5S4 w h o  s till  considers n e ce ssa ry  large  
in v es tm e n ts  a  h ig h  m ark e t en try  ba rrie r.
383 See a b o v e  III .l .b ); II1.2.; III.3.
383 S ee  D ö rr ,  D ie  E n tw ic k lu n g  d e r  M e d ien re ch ts , in : N JW , 2 5 /1 9 9 5 , p . 2 2 6 4  w h o  sta tes  th a t c o n s id e rin g  th e  
co n ce n tra tio n  m o v em en t cau sed  b y  the d e v e lo p m en t o f  the in te rn a l m arket a n d  the tech n o lo g ica l d e v e lo p m e n ts  a  
need fo r  se c u rin g  p lu ra lism  on the  E u ro p ean  lev e l c an n o t be d o u b ted .
384 See fo r  a  su m m ary  o f  the new  T e lec o m m u n ic a tio n s  A c t o f  1996 , K reile . D as n e u e  am erik an isch e  
T e lek o m m u n ik a tio n s rec h t, pp. 22 7 -2 2 8 .
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regulations have been discussed for the last couple of years. The proposals are directed to 
a more liberal framework and seek to introduce new more effective models of measuring 
media influence, like market share or audience share models.385 Also in France after a 
liberalization of some concentration rules in 1993 a new debate and new proposals are 
expected for media concentration rules.386 The plans for new regulatory frameworks show 
that the governments in Europe are not ready yet to leave the regulation of the media over 
to the market and competition law.387 However, in many cases the motivation for the new 
regulatory frameworks seems not to be a serious consideration of the technological 
developments and the resulting changes in the form and character of the media, like the 
above described convergence processes, but rather the enlarging of the competitiveness of 
the national media companies in the arising multimedia markets.388 And too often the 
debate just repeats the traditional free market versus state discussion regarding regulation 
using the changes brought about by technological innovation just as spurious arguments to
M5 Sec fo r  the  U K  o n  the  review  o f  the  c u rren t reg u la tio n , D o y le , T h e  C ro ss  M e d ia  O w n ersh ip  D ebate , p. 3 8 ff .;  see  
R o b in so n , M a rk e t S hare  as a M e a su re  o f  M e d ia  C o n c en tra tio n , p . 50ff. fo r  an  analysis o f  th e  W h ite  P a p e r  o f  the  
U K  G o v e rn m e n t, M ed ia  O w n ersh ip : the G o v e rn m e n t’s  P ro p o sa ls , 1995 a n d  th e  assessm en t o f  d iffe re n t fo rm s o f  
m easu rin g  m e d ia  in fluence ; see a lso  fo r a n  a sse ssm e n t o f  the p ro p o sa ls  w h ic h  recen tly  h ave  b eco m e in c lu d in g  
som e ch an g es  th e  B roadcasting  A c t 1996, S c h o les /W o o d s, M e d ia  O w n ersh ip : T h e  U K  G o v e rn m en t’s P ro p o sa ls , in: 
E n te rta in m e n t L aw  R eview , 1 /1996 , pp. 7 -1 5 ; se e  fo r G e rm an y , H o lzer, D a s  M ark tan teils  m o d e  II a u f  d e m  
P rü fs ta n d  - e in  P ro b lem au friß , in : Z U M , 8 /9 /1 9 9 5 , p. 5 7 7 ff.; K u b ie r, A rg u m e n te  fü r  e in  W erb e m a rk tan te il  m odel!, 
in: M e d ia  P e rsp e k tiv e n , 2 /1995 , p . 4 8 ff.; S to c k m a n n /Z ig e lsk i, N o v e llie ru n g  d es  R u n d fu n k staa ts  V ertrages, p .
5 3 7 ff .;  K ie fer, K o n zen tra tio n sk o n tro lle : B em essu n g sk rite rien  a u f  d em  P rü fs ta n d , p. 58ff.
m  S ee  fo r  th e  lib e ra liz in g  leg isla tion  in  1994, “ L o i C arig n o n ”  o f  1 F eb ru a ry  1994 , M eise, M e d ien v e rfle c h tu n g e n  un d  
a n d ere  A llia n z e n , in: Z U M , 3 /1 9 9 5 , p . 129 w h ic h  a llo w ed  a  c o m p a n y  to  o w n  u p  to  4 9%  o f  a  te lev is io n  p ro g ra m  
p ro v id e r; see  fo r  th e  m ore recen t d e b a te  in  F ra n c e  w h ich  tak es in to  the a c c o u n t the tech n o lo g ica l d e v e lo p m en ts , 
M e ise , F ra n k re ic h : S te in ig er W e g  z u r  D a ten a u to b a h n , pp . 4 4 6 -4 4 7 .
3,17 S ee  fo r  th e  re lu c ta n c e  o f  the U K  g o v e rn m e n t, w h ich  is c o n sid e re d  to be  th e  lead in g  coun try  in  E urope  re g a rd in g  
the l ib e ra liz a tio n  an d  p riv a tiza tio n  o f  in d u str ie s , tow ards a  to ta l d e re g u la tio n  o f  th e  m arke t fo r  e le c tro n ic  m e d ia  
ev en  w ith  tak in g  tech n o lo g ica l d e v e lo p m en ts  in to  accoun t, D o y le , G ro ß b ritan n ien : D ereg u lie ru n g  fu r d e n  
M u lti m ed ie n  m a rk t,  p . 169.
3M S e e  fo r  c o m p e titiv en e ss  o f  G e rm an  m ed ia  c o m p a n ies  as m o tiv e  fo r  th e  a g re e m e n t by the L ä n d e r  in G e rm a n y  o n  a  
m o re  lib e ra lize d  reg u la tio n  re g a rd in g  m ed ia  co n cen tra tio n  in  th e  n ew  R u n d fu n k staa tsv e rtrag , D er S p ie g e l, ** D as 
e n tfe s se lte  F e rn se h en ” , 29 /1 9 9 6 , p . 34; see  fo r  F rance , M eise , M ed ien  V erflech tungen  und a n d e re  A llia n z e n , p . 
129; se e  fo r th e  U K , D oy le , T h e  C ro ss  M e d ia  O w n ersh ip  D e b a te , p . 38 ; s e e  a lso , D oy le , D e reg u lie ru n g  fu r  d e n  
M ulti m e d ia m a rk t, p . 168; see a lso . G reen . P re se rv in g  P lu ra lity  in  a  D ig ita l W o rld , p . 29.
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support already existing deeply rooted convictions. The approaches concerning the 
development and application of new more sophisticated models and tools to measure 
media influence are interesting.389 However, the impact of digitalization on the electronic 
media industry would need more attention in the debate about new regulatory 
frameworks.390 The proposals by the UK government, which with some minor changes 
have become law with the adoption of the Broadcasting Act 1996, stand more or less 
alone in considering the transformation process in television from analogue to digital 
transmission in the reform plans for the media concentration regulation. They are 
concerned with digital terrestrial broadcasting and regulate already which numbers of 
digital channels are allowed to be held by the companies which is adapted to the general 
media concentration reform proposals.391 The most interesting question in the European 
context is, however, whether the introduction of digital television provides new arguments 
for a regulation of media concentration on the European Community level. An abstract 
discussion on what influence the introduction of digital television has on the debate on
3X9 S e e  fo r p ro p o sa ls  for a m ark e t sh are  m o d e l to  m easure  m e d ia  co n ce n tra tio n  in the UK, R ob inson , M a rk e t Share as 
a  M e a su re  o f  M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n , p. 5 0 ff .;  see  for p ro p o sa ls  o f  a m a rk e t share  m odel in  G e rm an y , H o lzer, D as 
M a rk ta n te ilsm o d c ll a u f  dem  P rü fs tan d  -  e in  P ro b lem au friß , p . 577ff.; see  fo r the sam e K u b ie r, A rg u m e n te  fü r ein 
W erb e m a rk tan te ilm o d e ll, p . 4 8 ff .;  see  fo r  th e  sam e K iefer, K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro llen : B e m e ssu n sk rite r ien  a u f  dem  
P rü fs ta n d , p . 6 2 ff .;  se e  fo r a  m ark e t sh a re  m o d el and  fo r th e  ‘‘o n e  m an  - o n e  sh o w " m o d el, the  la tte r p e rm its  the 
o w n e rsh ip  o f  o n ly  one  te lev is io n  c h an n e l; h o w ev er, th e re  th e  o w n e rsh ip  th en  can  reach u p  to  100% , 
S to c k m a n n /Z ig e lsk i, N o v e llie ru n g  d es  R u n d fu n k sta a tsv e rtra g e s , p . 5 4 0 ff .
390 S e e  fo r  th e  sp e c ia l reg u la to ry  d e m a n d s c o n c e rn in g  c o n ce n tra tio n  ru les  fo r  d ig ita l te le v is io n  in G e rm a n y , H ege, 
O ffe n e  W eg e  in  d ie  d ig ita le  Z u k u n ft, p p . 4 4 -4 6 .
391 T h e  U K  h as in tro d u ced  new  b ro a d ca stin g  reg u la tio n  w ith  its  B ro a d ca s tin g  A c t 1996 m ak in g  it the f i r s t  c o u n try  in 
E u ro p e  to  d e a l w ith  the a rriv a l o f  d ig ita l te le v is io n  in its b ro a d ca s tin g  law ; see  P a rt I D ig ita l T e rre s tr ia l T elev is io n  
B ro a d c a s tin g ; w ith  the new  leg isla tio n  it d em o n s tra tes  its c o m m itm e n t to  fu ll tran sfo rm atio n  p ro cess fro m  
a n a lo g u e  to  d ig ita l;  in genera l i t  holds the  v iew  that the  p rin c ip le  o f  p lu ra lism  app lies in  the  sam e  w a y  to  the  new  
fo rm  o f  tran sm iss io n , see, S te em e rs , D ig ita le  M ed ien p o litik  in  G ro ß b ritan n ien , pp. 4 0 2 -4 0 4 ; see  D o y le , 
G ro ß b rita n n ie n : D ereg u lie ru n g  fü r  d en  M u ltim ed iam ark t, p . 169, se e  th e  W h ite  P ap e r o n  d ig ita l te rre s tr ia l 
b ro a d c a s tin g , C m  2946 . D ig ita l T erre s tria l B roadcasting : T h e  G o v e rn m e n t’s P roposals (L o n d o n  H M S O ) 1 9 9 5 ,4  
C o m p e titio n  a n d  O w n ersh ip  (i) p rin c ip le s ; se e  a lso  the W h ite  P ap e r o n  m ed ia  o w n ersh ip . C m  28 7 2 . M e d ia  
O w n ersh ip : T h e  G o v ern m en t’s P ro p o sals  (L o n d o n  H M SO ) 1995.
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media concentration regulation on European Community level can hardly be found. 
Considering that the future of television is predicted to be digital this question should be 
an important issue if one does not want to reduce an upcoming regulation to 
obsolescence. The debate on a European regulatory framework as described above mainly 
revolves around the assumption of expanding media giants and conglomerates which are 
prone to dominate the European media market. Certainly also aspects like the 
convergence processes between telecommunication and broadcasting and technology and 
content were mentioned. However, the most imminent development of the transformation 
process of the broadcasting landscape through the new digital transmission technology 
hardly ever paid or plays a role in this debate.392 The incentives to vertical integration and 
concentration, in general almost indispensable because of the high investment necessary 
and the different know-how demanded, certainly are aspects of the introduction of digital 
television which favor European wide rules. The subtle ways of manipulating competitors 
and exercising market control offered by the new means of distribution of the digital 
television programs will increase for a media giant who can act on the whole internal 
market. Also the fact that the special interest channels expected to emerge are more apt to 
be marketed Europe wide, than full program channels which are much deeper rooted in 
the national cultures of the different Member States, seems to argue for a European 
regulatory framework. The same is even more true for new television services like video-
392 S e e  a s  a  g o o d  e x am p le  fo r  th is  the d e b a te  in  G erm an y  a b o u t th e  re fo rm  o f  the Rundjunkstaatsvertrag, w h ich  w as 
m a in ly  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  d iscu ssio n s on  th e  co m p e ten ces o f  th e  federal g o v e rn m e n t and th e  s ta te s ; th e  n e w  
leg is la tio n  c o m in g  in to  fo rce  1 Jan u a ry  1997  w ill in tro d u ce  m o re  libera l reg u la tio n  re g a rd in g  c o n c e n tra tio n , though 
it d o e s  n o t to  re fe r  to  the  p ro b lem atic  q u e s tio n s  co n ce rn in g  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  d ig ita l te le v is io n , fo r e x am p le , how  
to  se c u re  o p e n  a ccess  to the m ark e t o f  d ig ita l te lev is ion  an d  h o w  to  g u a ra n te e  equal c h an c es  fo r a ll p ro v id e rs  in  the 
d ig ita l  te le v is io n  age; see  S ü d d eu tsch e  Z e itu n g , “G esetzc  o h n e  G re n z e n " . 22 . A ugust 19 9 6 , p. 17; a ls o  th e  d ebate  
in  Ita ly  o n  th e  re fo rm  o f  the m ed ia  c o n ce n tra tio n  ru les  fo c u ses  on  o th e r  is su e s ; see F in an cia l T im e s , " I ta lia n  
g o v e rn m e n t se t to  ru le  on  T V  o w n e rsh ip " , 2 7  A u g u st 1996, p .  2.
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on demand, telebanicing or teleleaming or video games. To sum up, a possible effect of the 
digital technology in Europeanizing the television landscape in bringing together the 
providers and the consumers of television services, could serve as a strong argument for 
Europe wide rules on media concentration. Even if one is skeptical towards the described 
development concerning its scope and time dimension it should be at least a greater issue 
in the debate on new regulation not only on the European level, but also in the Member 
States. This development might make a new national regulation on media concentration 
outdated before it has been introduced.
VII. The European Community Legal Framework
In the following chapter the existing regulatory framework of the European Community 
for broadcasting and television will be examined. However, the analysis will be focused on 
the aptness of the existing rules to deal with the above described problems, arising out of 
the introduction of digital television, for competition and concentration in the European 
electronic media market. The legislation examined will be the Television Directive and the 
discussed amended proposal, the application of the competition law to the electronic 
media, the proposal for a Media Concentration Directive and the policy of the European 
Commission regarding standards. The legislation concerning the network infrastructure 
like cable and satellite, which is mainly aimed at liberalizing the telecommunication sector 
will only be dealt with to the extent it contains implications for the digitalization of 
television. The aim is to find out whether the existing framework is sufficient to deal with 
the new problems. If the outcome is negative, the analysis wants at least to show whether 
the existing rules offer the potential for an extension to a functioning, fully fledged
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regulatory framework in the future that would be advantageous to different national 
regulations by the Member States.
1. The Television without Frontiers Directive
The main regulatory framework for television and broadcasting on the European level is 
still represented by the Television Without Frontiers Directive adopted on 3 October 
1989.3” The Directive is based on the idea of the free movement of television programs 
throughout the European Community. It wants to bring about a Community wide audio­
visual arena,* 394 *or to couch it more in economic terms, it sought the establishment of a 
single broadcasting market, which the Commission claimed was a requirement of the 
Treaty of Rome.393 394* This should be achieved by guaranteeing that a program broadcast in 
one Member State could be received in the other Member States.396 A television broadcast 
made in a Member State which complies with the minimum standards determined by the 
directive must be freely received and transmitted in every other Community State.397 The 
common basic rules introduced to forestall unfair and unregulated competition concern the 
areas of advertising and sponsorship, program content (mainly the protection of minors),
593 D ire c tiv e  8 9 /5 5 2 /E E C  o f  th e  C o u n c il o f  3  O c to b e r 1989 o n  th e  C o o rd in a tio n  o f  C ertain  P ro v isio n s la id  d o w n  by 
L a w , R e g u la tio n  o r  A d m in is tra tio n  A c tio n  in  M em b er S ta te s  c o n ce rn in g  th e  P ursu it o f  T e le v is io n  B ro a d ca stin g  
A c tiv itie s . O J  1989  N o  L  2 9 8 /2 3 .
394 W in n , E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ity  an d  In te rn a tio n a l M ed ia  L aw , L o n d o n , 1994 , p. 224.
393 se e  C o llin s , U n iv e rs ity  in D iv e rs ity ?  T h e  E u ro p ea n  S ing le  M a rk e t in B ro ad castin g  and th e  A u d io v isu a l, 1982-92, 
in : Jo u rn a l o f  C o m m o n  M ark e t S tu d ies , V o l. 3 2 ,1 9 9 4 , p . 9 4 .
396 S e e  C lu b  d e  B ru x e lle s , M ed ia  in  E u ro p e  to w ard s  th e  M ille n n iu m , B o o k  I : R egula tions a n d  P o lic ie s , p . 5 ;  see  for 
th e  b a c k g ro u n d  o f  the D irec tiv e , ibid. p . 4 ff .;  see  a lso  fo r th e  b ack g ro u n d , H üm m erich , N a tio n a le  
R u n d fu n k o rd n u n g  o d e r E u ro p ä isch er M e d ien m ark t, in: A fP , 3 /1991 , p . 591 f.; see  also , B a ren d t, B ro a d ca s tin g  Law , 
p . 2 2 9 ff .;  se e  fo r  a  co m p reh en s iv e  a n a ly sis  o f  th e  T elev is io n  D irec tiv e  a n d  its  im p lem en ta tio n  in  th e  M e m b e r  
S ta te s ,  M a rtin -P e re z  d e  N a n c la re s , D ie  B ed eu tu n g  d e s  G e m ein sc h a fts re ch ts  fü r  das F e rn seh en : D ie 
F e m se h r ic h tlin ie ,  A u f  dem  W e g  zu  e in e r  a u d io v isu e llen  P o litik , S a a rb rü c k e n , 1991.
397 S e e  A rtic le  2  (2 ) .
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and the production, promotion and distribution of television programs. In particular the 
last contained the famous quota which fueled and still fuels the debate.398 Since the 
foreseen Directive forced the Member States to major changes in their legislation on 
television, it included in Article 26 a provision that the Commission was to submit a report 
to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee on the 
application of the Directive within Five years of adoption and make further proposals to 
adapt it to the developments in the field of television broadcasting if necessary. The 
discussion of proposals for the adaptation of the Directive launched almost two years ago 
because of the expiration of the time limit has reached in the meantime the level of a 
fundamental debate on reform which touches all aspects of the Directive in force.399 
Although there are many interesting questions involved in the analysis of the doubtful 
harmonization success of the existing directive400 as well as in the lively and wide spread 
discussion on changes and amendments, the following analysis will focus only on the 
aspects relevant for the introduction of digital television and the connected problems.
a) The Scope Regarding Digital Television and New Television Services
Essential for the regulatory framework of digital television is the scope of the Television
Directive. To what extent does digital television fall under the rules concerning 
advertising, program content and programming laid down by the Directive? Here again it 
has to be emphasized that the digitalization of television mainly concerns the way of 
transmitting the television signals. The above described expected changes of the television 391
391 S e e  D e h o u sse  F .,  L e m arché  u n iq u e  d e  l ’au d io v isu e l, in: Jo u rn a l des tr ib u n a u x , 4  fé v rie r 1995 , p. 7 8 ; se e  C lu b  de 
B ru x e lle s ,  M e d ia  in  E urope to w a rd s  th e  M illen n iu m , B o o k  1: R eg u la tio n s an d  P o licies, p . 5 .
m  S c h a rd t,  N o v e llie ru n g  dcr R ich tlin ie n  “ F e m se h e n  ohne  G re n z e n ” : Q u o te n  o h n e  E nde?, in : Z U M , 1 1 /1 9 9 5 , p. 7 35 .
* °  S e e  fo r  e x a m p le s , ib id ., p. 7 3 5 f.
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medium will merely be the result of the possibilities created by the new way of 
transmission. However, also traditional free or public television can be transmitted without 
any changes of its program form or its usage visible for the viewer except a better picture 
and sound quality, which still would depend on a more advanced television set. 
Consequently a general valid statement on the application of the Television Directive on 
digital television cannot be made. This is true independently of the agreed definition of 
broadcasting and television deciding the scope of the Directive. Whether the Directive will 
apply to digital television depends on the form of television provided by the broadcaster.
The Directive in force defines television broadcasting as the initial transmission by cable, 
over the air or by satellite, in encoded or decoded form, of television programs intended 
for reception by the public.401 On of the most controversially discussed points in the 
reform debate is the question to what extent new television services shall be included in 
the definition.402 New television services that are all interactive and on demand services 
are not contained in the definitions of Art. 1 (a). The proposal by the Commission for an 
amended Directive does not include a new definition.403 This would mean that the 
provisions of the Directive on advertising, program content and programming would also 
in the future not apply to new services.404 An exception is teleshopping which was
401 S e e  A rtic le  1 (a ) .
4,0 S e e  P ie p e r, M e d ien re ch t im  S p a n n u n g sfe ld  v o n  “ B ro a d ca stin g  und  M u ltim e d ia “ , p. 555 ; s e e  a lso , S c h a rd t, 
N o v e llie ru n g  d e r  R ich tlin ie  “ F e rn seh en  o h n e  G ren zen "; Q u o te n  ohne  E n d e . p . 736 ; N iew iarra , F o lg e ru n g en  aus 
d e n  A k tiv itä te n  d e r  E u ro p äisch en  U n ion  fü r  d ie  p riv a te  F e m seh W irtsch a ft im  H inb lick  a u f  n e u e  A n g e b o te  un d  
D ie n s te , p. 7 6 0 f .;  K resse /H einze , R u n d fu n k -D y n am ik  am  M o rg e n  des d ig ita le n  Z eita lte r, p . 579 f.
S e e  fo r  th e  p ro p o sa i, R eport o n  A p p lica tio n  o f  D irective  8 9 /5 5 2 /E E C  a n d  P ro p o sa i fo r a  E u ro p ea n  P a rlia m e n t and  
C o u n c il  D ire c tiv e  C O M  (95) 8 6 , p . 46ff.
404 P ie p e r ,  M e d ie n re c h t im  S p an n u n g sfe ld  v o n  “ B roadcasting  u n d  M u ltim e d ia ” , p. 555; S c h a rd t, N o v e llie ru n g  d e r  
R ic h tl in ie  “F e rn se h e n  ohne G re n ze n " : Q u o te n  o h n e  E nde” , p . 7 3 6 .
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regulated in the existing Directive, although in a way that does not at all live up to the 
developments, and it is part of the proposal for an amended Directive.405 Since the new 
services are the main feature of digital television, next to the multiplication of channels and 
the expected surge of special interest pay-television, such a regulatory lacuna on the 
European level would have a major influence on competition in the European television 
market. This could lead to an even greater concentration within the development of digital 
television, in order to take advantage of the freedom of normally strict regulation in 
television, in particular regarding advertising and the program content. Many experts 
advocate an overall regulation in order to prevent a discrimination against the providers of 
traditional full program television and overall distortions of competition. Within this 
overall regulation less strict rules could be laid down for the new services according to 
their impact in the process of shaping public opinion.406 The European Parliament has 
demanded in the meantime, that the new Directive should apply also to new television 
services, at least with its provisions on advertising and program content.407 However, the 
Council has already refused its approval for an extension of the scope of the Directive 
when it reached its common position on the proposal.408 Another view suggests that there 
is no need for a final definition, since it cannot be said at the moment whether and to what 
extent different definitions in the Member States would lead to a hindrance in the free 
circulation of services in the internal market. Besides that, a final judgment on the
S e e  S c h a rd t, N o v e llie ru n g  d e r  R ich tlin ie  “ F ern seh en  o h n e  G re n ze n " : Q u o te n  o h n e  E n d e? , p . 7 3 7 ; in th e  p roposa l 
by  th e  C o m m iss io n  fo r an  a m e n d ed  D irec tiv e  it  s ta te s  th a t te le sh o p p in g  is n o t  a d v ertis in g , b u t  te le v is io n  
p ro g ra m m in g ; fo r  fu ll te le sh o p p in g  ch an n e ls  th e  tim e  lim it o f  th e  p re se n t D irec tiv e  w ill b e  a b o lish e d .
**  K re sse /H e in z e , R u n d fu n k  - D y n am ik  a m  M o rg en  d e s  d ig ita le n  Z e ita lte r, p . 5 8 0 ; P ieper, M e d ie n re c h t im  
S p a n n u n g s fe ld  v o n  “ B ro ad castin g  und M u ltim e d ia " , p . 5 55 .
w  S ee  E u ro p ea n  re p o rt N o  2113  -  M arch  6 ,1 9 9 6 ,  IV , p. 13.
4,18 S ee  E u ro p ea n  R o u n d -u p , Issue  N o  0 43 , 21 Ju n e  1996, C o u n c il m ee tings: C u ltu re .
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European level can hardly be made before the regulatory frameworks in the Member 
States have come up with a final solution.409 Regulation for the new television services will 
arrive in any case.410 So it can be asked whether it will make a difference if less strict rules, 
on which also the proponents of an all encompassing definition agree, are included in the 
Television Directive or they will be the subject of a special regulation. However, 
embedded in the strict broadcasting regulatory framework, rules on new television 
services might tend to be stricter than if laid down in a separate legislation. The most 
important feature of the expected digital television world, pay-television, falls under the 
definition of the Television Directive, since it also includes transmitting television 
programs in encoded form as long as they are intended for reception by the public.411 A 
different treatment of the new television services (like video on demand as the most 
promising example) would certainly have an impact on the development of digital 
television. Whether it would lead to more concentration and distortion of competition can 
hardly be judged now. The long term investments necessary for the introduction and 
implementation of digital television need first a clear and stable regulatory framework. 
This might be a greater factor for the success of digital television than short term 
advantages because of the lack of regulation.
4,19 S e e  S c h a rd t, N o v e llie ru n g  d e r  R ich tlin ie  "F e rn seh e n  o h n e  G re n z e n ” : Q u o te n  ohne  E n d e? , p . 7 3 7 ; se e  fo r  the  
c o n tro v e rs ia l d isc u ss io n  in G e rm an y  P ie p e r, D e r  R und fu n k b eg riff , p. 8 2 ff .;  see  also , M iille r-U sin g /L ü c k e , N eue 
T e le d ie n s te  u n d  a lte r  R und fu n k b eg riff , p . 3 2 ff .; see  a lso  B uIH nger, D er R u n d fu n k b eg riff  in  d e r  D iffe re n z ie ru n g  
k o m m u n ik a tiv e r  D ienste , p. I f f .;  see  a lso  H offm an n -R iem , D e r  R u n d fu n k b e g riff  in d e r D iffe re n z ie ru n g  
k o m m u n ik a tiv e r  D ienste , p. 9 ff.
410 In  G e rm a n y  th e re  ex is t d iffe re n t p ro p o sa ls  fo r  m u ltim ed ia  re g u la tio n  b e c a u se  o f  unclear c o m p e ten c e  b e tw e e n  the 
fe d e ra l  and  th e  s ta te s  g o v e rn m en ts ; see  fo r a  p ro p o sa l by  th e  s ta te s , “E rs te  Ü berlegungen”  d e r  L än d e r ü b e r  e in en  
S ta a tsv e r tra g  d e r  M e d ien d ien s te , in: e p d /K irc h e  und  R u n d fu n k , N r. 2 1 ,2 0 .  M ärz  1996, p . 2 7 ff.; the fe d e ra l 
g o v e rn m e n t p re sen te d  a lso  a  p ro p o sa l fo r  m u ltim e d ia  reg u la tio n , B T D rs. 13 /3609: E n tw u rf  e in e s  
T e lek o m m u n ik a tio n sg ese tz es .
411 S e e  A rtic le  1 (a ); see  K resse /H e in ze , R u n d fu n k  - D ynam ik  a m  M o rgen  d e s  d ig ita len  Z e ita lte rs , p. 5 7 9 .
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b) The Quota Rule and Digital Television
Probably the most debated point when adopting the Television Directive was the 
programming, or better, the rules on introducing quotas for programs out of European 
production.412 The quota rules included in the Directive were the result of a political 
compromise after prolonged discussion.413 The Directive contains two rules for the 
purpose of generating a European television production industry and stimulating new 
sources of television production. The first rule says that Member States must reserve the 
majority of their transmission time for European works.414 The second rule is that 
broadcasters must reserve at least 10% of their transmission time for European works 
which are European productions.415 However, because of the harsh opposition from many 
Member States and the television industry the duty to legal enforcement of these 
provisions was made rather flexible and imprecise, leaving considerable discretion to 
Member States as to interpretation.416 Under Article 4 Member States must ensure “where 
practicable and by appropriate means” that broadcasters obey the quota obligation. A 
statement issued with the Directive made it clear that the Council of Ministers did not 
intend these provisions to be legally enforceable.417 In any event a violation could only be 
found in the plainest cases, when a satellite channel would show nothing else but 
Hollywood productions and American soaps.418
413 S e e  fo r  th is d e b a te , B arend t, B ro a d ca stin g  L aw , p. 273f.; se e  fo r  d e ta ils  o n  th e  q u o ta  ru le , W in n , E u ro p e a n  
C o m m u n ity  a n d  In ternational M ed ia  L aw , p. 232ff.
415 S c h o o f/W a tso n  B row n , In fo rm atio n  H ig h w a y s and  M ed ia  P o lic ie s  in th e  E u ro p ean  U nion , p . 331,
414 S e e  A rtic le  4 ( 1 ) .
4lî S e e  A rtic le  5 .
416 S e e  D e h o u sse  F ., L e  m arché  u n iq u e  d e  l ’au d io v isu e l, p. 7 8 .
417 S e e  B a ren d t, B ro ad castin g  L aw , p . 235.
4lg Ib id .
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In the discussion on an amended Television Directive the question of the quotas has 
become again the most contentious topic. In its proposal for a new Television Directive 
the Commission has suggested eliminating the above quoted provision that quotas should 
be applied where practicable. For newcomers in the market there is a transitional period of 
three years planned before they have to fulfill the quotas. However, many people consider 
this time period much too short.419 According to the proposal the quota rule will expire 
within ten years. There is also a special provision planned for channels with a share of 
more than 80% in movies in their programs, which would give them the option to spend 
25% of their programming budget on European production instead of observing the 
existing rule. Because of the strong opposition of Germany, Great Britain and other 
Member States the plans for stricter rules are not expected to pass the Council;420 
however, the European Parliament after having agreed to a compromise has again 
demanded binding rules for the quotas.421
Whatever the outcome will be in the discussion on stricter rules on quotas, it can be stated 
that strict quotas would have a considerable influence on competition and concentration 
concerning digital television. Since its main features are special interest pay-television 
channels or theme channels, the providers would need more attractive European programs 
that viewers would be ready to pay for in order to fulfill the quotas than the European film 
and television would be able to produce.422 In their efforts to fulfill their quotas with
419 S ee  S ch a rd t, N o v e llie ru n g  d e r  R ich tlin ie  “ F em seh en  o h n e  G ren zen ” : Q u o ten  ohne E nde? , p . 737.
420 S e e  N ie w ia rra , F o lg e ru n g en  a u s  den  A k tiv itä te n  d e r  E U  fü r  d ie  p rivate  F e m se h w irtsch a ft im  H in b lic k  a u f  neue 
A n g e b o te  u n d  D ien ste , p . 7 59 .
431 S ee  S c h m ittm a n n /d e  V ries, B lic k  nach B rü sse l, p. 124; E u ro p ean  rep o rt n o . 2113  - M arch  6, 1996, IV , p. 13.
422 S e e  N ie w ia rra , F o lg e ru n g en  au s  den  A k tiv itä te n  d e r  EU  fü r  d ie  p rivate  F e m se h w irtsch a ft im  H in b lick  a u f  neue 
A n g e b o te  u n d  D ien ste , p. 759 .
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attractive programs broadcasters can be expected to look for vertical links with European 
program providers which would lead to more concentration. Smaller broadcasters not 
presenting attractive partners to the program industry would be left out. Also newcomers 
expected to enter the television market after digitalization would hardly be able to provide 
themselves with enough attractive programs of European production.423 Since the access 
to program and film licenses is already identified as an additional great bottleneck problem 
in the future for the digital television with the multiplication of channels, additional rules 
prescribing the origin of the programs would aggravate the situation.424 Quota rules 
combined with the still open question of the scope of the Directive might lead to paradox 
distortions of competition. Future digital Home Cinema services might be delivered by 
broadcasters through “near video on demand” or by telecommunication operators through 
video on demand. If the near video on demand is subject to quotas as a broadcast service, 
but video on demand is not, the result would be a considerable discrimination against the 
provider of near video on demand, so the difference would only lie in the way of 
delivery.425 For the future of digital television strict quota rules can be expected to distort 
the market and lead to more concentration and discriminate against smaller 
broadcasters.426
423 S ee  S ch a rd t, N o v e llie ru n g  d e r  R ich tlin ie  “ F e rn seh en  ohne G ren zen ": Q u o te n  ohne E nde? , p . 737.
424 S ee  N ie w ia rra , F o lg e ru n g en  aus den  A k tiv itä ten  d e r  EU  fü r  d ie  p rivate  F e m se h w irtsch a ft im  H in b lick  a u f  neue 
A n g e b o te  un d  D ie n ste , p . 7 61 .
425 S c h o ff /W a tso n  B row n , In fo rm ation  H ig h w ay s and  M ed ia  P o lic ie s  in th e  E U , pp . 331-332 .
424 S e e  fo r  a  m o re  co m p reh en siv e  p re sen ta tio n  o f  th e  m ed ia  re le v a n t E C  co m p e titio n  law , W in n , E u ro p ean  
C o m m u n ity  a n d  In ternational M ed ia  L aw , p . 70 ff.
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2. The European Community Competition Law
The following overview of European Community competition law will focus on its 
aptness in dealing with the above described problems for competition and concentration in 
the European media market connected with the introduction of digital television. This 
perspective will lead to a rather sketchy and selective presentation, since the width of anti­
competitive conduct covered by the European Community competition law is immense 
and the media industry is an industry particularly rich in case law. Since this thesis leaves 
out the special situation of public broadcasters I also will not deal with the old discussion 
of the applicability of competition law to public broadcasters.427 The following section will 
first analyze the application of the different rules of European Community competition 
law, Article 85, 86 of the EC-Treaty and the Merger Regulation to media and television, 
in particular to constellations relevant for the anti-competitive conduct related to digital 
television. Then its effectiveness and limitations for the media and in particular the digital 
television sector will be analyzed.
a) The Application to Media
In the following I analyze how the competition rules are applicable to media cases. The 
focus will be on how they have dealt with and abstractly can deal with the competition and 
concentration problems connected with the introduction of digital television. First I will 
look into Article 85, 86 of the EC-Treaty, their scope for media and television and some 
relevant cases.
427 S e e  fo r  th e  ap p lic ab ility  o f  E C  c o m p e titio n  law  o n  public  b ro a d ca s te rs , W ag n e r, K o n zen tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  
M e d ie n -B in n e n m a rk t d e r  E G . in : A fP , 1/1992, pp . 3-4 .; se e  fo r  a  c o m p re h e n s iv e  analysis, H o ffm an n -R ie m  (ed .), 
R u n d fu n k  im  W ettb ew e rb sre ch t, D er ö ffen tlich e  R undfunk  im  S p a n n u n g sfe ld  zw ischen  W irtsc h a fts re c h t und 
R u n d fu n k re c h t, B ad en -B ad en , 1988.
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aa) Article 85 and 86 o f the EC-Treaty
Although the big and important media cases, in particular joint ventures to start and 
control the digitized television market, were dealt with by the Merger Regulation, that 
does not mean Article 85 and 86 would not be relevant. There exists abundant media case 
law regarding these two provisions, though not in particular on anti-competitive behavior 
concerning the start up of digital television. However, it is quite possible that in the near 
future there will be such cases, since the parties have negative experiences with the 
application of the Merger Regulation and might try to have either Article 85 or Article 86 
applied to their undertaking. The following analysis of these two provisions will focus on 
their relevance for the above described problems in regard to the introduction of digital 
television. The latter comprise mainly problems of vertical concentration, concentration in 
general, but also all other forms of cooperation between parties to foreclose or control the 
emerging digital television.
aaa) The Relevant Scope of Article 85 of the EC-Treaty
Article 85 (1) of the EC-Treaty essentially prohibits consensual activity which partitions 
the market. It covers all agreements and concerted practices between undertakings which 
present a prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market. 
In a) to e) of the Article different forms of restraining or distorting competition are 
mentioned, which might be relevant for agreements within the start up phase of digital 
television, in particular, like the fixing of prices, the limiting or controlling of production, 
markets, technical development or investment, or the sharing of markets and supplies. Art. 
85 (2) declares all agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article to be 
automatically void. Exemptions are contained in Article 85 (3). Among these in particular
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the exemption of agreements that promote technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, are of interest for competition concerns 
arising out of the introduction of digital television.428 However, the exempted agreements 
cannot impose restrictions on the undertakings which go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve this objective and cannot lead to the elimination of competition for a substantial 
part of market.429 The prohibition of agreements which restrain competition in Article 85 
is not directed against horizontal or vertical concentration in the sense of merging 
companies, since it presupposes that the participating companies are independent.430 
Article 85 does not aim to preserve the quantity of planning centers and centers of 
decision, but the quality of the planning and decision making processes of the market 
players.431 However, a state of vertical integration and line of business from the program 
supplies, to the networks, the provision of the decoders, the conditional access systems 
and the navigation software leading to the foreclosure and control of the new digital 
television markets as described above can also be achieved by agreements which are not 
concentrative. In particular the form of joint ventures falling under the application of the 
Merger Regulation, like the recent cases, could as well be in the scope of Article 85 of the 
EC-Treaty. That the separation between the application of the two regimes is rather 
delicate is shown by the notice published by the Commission giving guidelines in assessing
421 See  a s  an e x a m p le  fo r a  jo in t  v e n tu re  w h ich  w as g ran ted  an  e x em p tio n  fo r  its  p rom otion  o f  n e w  tec h n o lo g y , the 
o n e  b e tw ee n  B B C  E nterprise  L td , (a  su b id ia ry  o f  B B C ), M o rg a n  G ren fe ll &  C o  L td ., a  m erc h an t ban k , a n d  H aro ld  
H o lt  L td ., a  c o n c e r t  p rom oter a n d  m usica l a g e n t w ho  se t up  a  n e w  sa te llite  b ro ad castin g  c o m p a n y ; see, F o u rteen th  
R e p o rt o n  C o m p e titio n  Policy , (1984), p o in t 86.
429 S ee  fo r  m ore  d e ta ils  on  this V an  B ael/B ellis , C om p etitio n  L aw  o f  the E u ro p ea n  C om m u n ity , p . 2 2 5 ff.
430 H o w e v e r, fo r  a  w h ite  there w as so m e d isc u ss io n  about its ap p lic ab ility  to  co n cen tra tio n s a f te r  the  C o u r t’s 
ju d g e m e n t in B rititsh  A m erican  T o b ac co  C o . L td and  R J R e y n o ld s  Industries  Inc. v E C  C o m m iss io n  (1 9 8 7 )  EC R  
4 4 8 7 ; see  W ag n e r, K onzen traU onskontroIle  im  M ed ien -B in n en m ark t d e r  E G , in: A fP , 1 /1992 , p. 2; see a ls o  V an 
B a e l/B e llis , C o m p e titio n  L aw  o f  the  E u ro p ean  C om m unity , p . 3 6 3 ,366ff.
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cooperative joint ventures pursuant to Article 85 of the EC-Treaty against concentrative 
joint ventures falling under the Merger Regulation.431 32 That makes it as likely that in the 
future companies who want to join forces in the digital television market and assure 
themselves an advantage through an anti-competitive alliance will act in the form of 
cooperative joint ventures instead of concentrative ones. This might prove true, in 
particular considering the background of two prohibitions under an application of the 
Merger Regulation in a row.433
bbb) The Relevant Scope of Article 86 of the EC-Treaty
Article 86 prohibits undertakings abusing their dominant position within the common 
market. The provision is violated when an undertaking in a dominant position in the 
Common Market abuses its position of dominance and the abuse has an effect on trade 
between Member States. Examples of abuses are given in the second paragraph. These 
would fit very well the anti-competitive measures probable and possible within the 
implementation of digital television, like imposing unfair trading conditions, which would 
cover granting access to the network or the decoder and conditional access system, or 
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage, which would apply for vertically integrated 
undertakings who disadvantage competing program suppliers or broadcasting companies 
within the distribution system of digital television. The examples of abusive conduct listed
431 K o c h , D ie n e u e n  B efugnisse  d e r  E G  zu r K o n tro lle  von U n te m e h m en sz u sa m m e n sc h lu sse n , in: E W S , 2 /1 9 9 0 , p. 65.
432 S e e  C o m m iss io n  N o tice  c o n ce rn in g  the A ssessm en t o f  C o -o p e ra tiv e  Jo in t V en tu res p u rsu a n t to  A rtic le  8 5  o f  the 
E C -T re a ty , O J 1993 N o C  43 /2 ; see  for c o o p era tiv e  ag reem en ts  V an B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  th e  E uropean  
C o m m u n ity , p . 294ff.
433 S ee  ab o v e  the  M S G  decision  and  the N o rd ic  Sa te llite  D is trib u tio n  d e c is io n  u n d er IV.
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in Article 86 correspond largely to the examples of illegal agreements mentioned in Article 
85. The main distinguishing feature of Article 86 is that for it to apply the undertaking 
concerned must hold a dominant position in the market already. Market dominance is not 
prohibited as such, but its abuse.434 The case law of the Commission defines “dominant 
position” as a degree of market control which enables a firm to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors and customers.435 For the application of this 
definition it is essential first to establish the relevant product and geographic market within 
the boundaries of which the market power of the undertaking concerned is to be 
measured.436 To apply Article 86 to cases involving the start up phase of the digital 
television market poses difficulties since it presupposes the existence of a dominant 
position in the relevant markets. Dominant positions can only exist in stages of the digital 
distribution chain which were already there in providing traditional television. Concerning 
the anti-competitive effects of concentrations, in particular vertical ones, foreclosing the 
markets of the different stages of the distribution chain of digital television, an application 
of Article 86 is not excluded. Following the Continental Clan decision, concentrations 
which strengthen an existing dominant position are caught by Article 86.437 However, the 
practical significance of the Continental Clan doctrine remained minor. There have been 
only two formal decision in which the Commission has considered the Continental Clan
434 S e e  V an  B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  th e  E u ropean  C o m m u n ity , p . 6 8 .
435 S e e  C e n tre  B e ig e  d 'E tu d e s  d e  M arch é -T élé-M ark e tin g  S A  v . C o m p ag n ie  L u x em b o u rg o ise  d e  T é lé d if fu s io n  SA  
C a s e  3 1 1 /8 4  (1 9 8 5 ) , E C R  3 2 6 1 ; M ich elin  v . E C  C o m m iss io n , C ase  322 /81  (1983) E C R  3 4 6 1 ; see  fo r  m o re  de ta ils , 
K o ra h , E C  C o m p e titio n  L aw  a n d  P rac tice , fifth  ed ition , L o n d o n , 1994, p . 6 8 ff.
436 S e e  V an  B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  th e  E u ropean  C o m m u n ity , p . 6 9 .
437 See Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. v. E C  Commission. Case 6/72 (1973) E C R  215.
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doctrine.438 The question whether a concentration which created a dominant position 
could be caught by Article 86 was not considered. Subsequently it was assumed by the 
Commission in its case law, that it could not.439
ccc) Examples of Relevant Media/Television Cases
Although there exists a very rich case law on the media industry in general, cases related 
to the introduction of digital television until now have only been dealt with under the 
Merger Regulation. As already mentioned above this is due mainly to the construction the 
parties chose for their planned anti-competitive conduct. For example had the Media 
Service Gmbh been arranged as a cooperative instead of a concentrative joint venture it 
would have fallen under Article 85 and not under the Merger Regulation. However, there 
exist a couple of cases falling under Article 85 and 86, which might be of relevance for the 
competition concerns connected with the introduction of digital television and illustrate 
the awareness of the Commission about anti-competitive conduct in the electronic media 
sector.
(1) Article 85 Cases
Concerning television there have been important decisions on programming rights.440 The 
Commission analyzed an exclusive film exhibition agreement concluded between an 
association of German public broadcasting organizations and a subsidiary of Metro- 
Goldwyn-Meyer/United Artists.441 The agreement consisted of three agreements, a library
4iS S e e  T e tra  P ak  I (B T G  L icen ce). O J 1988 N o  L  272/27 and  M eta leu ro p , O J 1990 N o L 179/41 .
439 S e e  W ag n er, K o n zen tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M e d ien  - B in n en m ark t d e r E G , p. 3; see Van B ael/B e llis . C o m p e titio n  
L a w  o f  the E u ro p ean  C o m m u n ity , p. 365 .
44,1 S e e  fo r  an  o v e rv ie w , F roh linger, E G -W eltb ew erb srech t un d  F e rn seh en , in: R undfunk  u n d  F e rn seh en , 1 /1993 , p.
5 9 ff .
441 See ARD and Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer/United Artists (Comm. Dec. 89/536/EEC), OJ 1989 No L 284/36.
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agreement granting the rights to 1350 feature films from the MGM/UA film library, a 
James Bond agreement for the rights of 14 James Bond films and a third agreement 
containing an entitlement to exhibit all new James Bond films produced or acquired by 
MCA /UA. The Commission found a breach of Article 85 (1) in the agreement. According 
to its analysis the large number of films acquired went beyond the needs of program 
acquisition and the duration of the license. Fifteen years exceeded by far the industry 
standards and the previous practice of the ARD broadcasting organizations. In the 
following an exemption was granted because the ARD among other terms agreed on 
allowing the licensing of library films, new films, James Bond films, television products 
and cartoons to third parties by the means of windows during which the ARD would not 
broadcast those products.442 The Commission has also objected to a purchase agreement 
of exclusive sports programs licenses. The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the 
association of public broadcasters in Europe, had acquired exclusive broadcasting licenses 
to sporting events for its members.443 Next to acquiring those licenses an important task of 
the EBU lies in organizing the exchange of sports programs between the European public 
broadcasters. The Commission found that an agreement on the common and exclusive 
purchase of sports programs licenses would constitute a breach of Article 85 (1). 
However, an exemption was granted, since the EBU and its members agreed on 
purchasing those licenses only under terms which would grant third parties access to 
them.444
442 S e e  W in n , E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ity  and In tern a tio n a l M ed ia  L aw , p. 110; see  a lso , E berle , D a s  e u ro p ä isc h e  R ech t 
u n d  d ie  M e d ien  am  B eispiel d e s  R u n d fu n k rech ts , in: A fP , 1/1993, p . 4 2 4 .
443 S e e  E B U /E u ro v is io n  S ystem  (C om m . D ec. 93 /403 /E E C ), O J 1993 N o  L  179/23.
444 S e e  D örr, D ie  E n tw ick lung  d e s  M ed ien rech ts , in: N JW , 3 5 /1 9 9 5 , p. 2 2 6 4 .
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In Screensport/EBU Members the Commission intervened to prevent a joint venture 
sports channel.445 According to the terms of the joint venture the new channel would 
receive material from programs recorded by EBU members. The Commission found that 
the arrangement had the object and effect of restricting competition and was thus in breach 
of Article 85 (1). This was due firstly to the composition of the members of the agreement 
which were actual or potential competitors in the market for sport events. Secondly the 
agreements restricted competition between Eurosport and third parties seeking to 
broadcast sport events, in particular transnational dedicated sports channels. The 
Commission also refused to grant an exemption.446
(2) Article 86 Case Magill
An important media case concerning an application of Article 86 was the Magill case. It 
dealt with the abuse by three national broadcasters in the UK and Ireland, the BBC, ITV 
and Radio Telefis Eireann of their copyright in programming listings.447 The 
broadcasters, who had enjoyed a joint monopoly over television broadcasting received by 
Irish viewers, were using their copyright in the programming listing which they produced 
as part of their broadcasting activities to secure a monopoly in the derivative market of 
weekly television guides. The interesting aspect, for our analysis of the scope of Article 85 
and 86 for the competition concerns arising out of the introduction of digital television, is 
not the controversial interpretation of the use of intellectual property rights, but the
445 S e e  S c reen sp o rt/E u ro sp o rt/E B U  (C o m m . D ec. 9 1 /1 3 0 /E C ), O J 1991 N o  L  63/22.
446 S e e  for a  c lo s e r  analsy is o f  the  S c re en sp o rt d ecision , W in n , E u ro p ea n  C o m m unity  an d  In te rn a tio n a l M e d ia  L aw , p. 
9 5 .
447 T h e  o r ig in a l C o m m iss io n  d e c isio n . M a g ill  T V  G u id e /IT P , B B C  an d  R T E  (C om m . D ec. 8 9 /2 0 5 ) w a s  ad op ted  on 21 
D e c e m b e r  1988 a n d  w as p u b lish ed  in  O J 1989 N o  L 7 8 /4 3 .
134

emphasis put on the close analysis of the interplay between the television market and the 
ancillary market of television program guides. Such an interplay might also become 
relevant within the different stages of the distribution chain of digital television programs, 
for example concerning discrimination against the providers of navigation systems. The 
decision was upheld by the Court of First Instance as well as in the appeal to the Court of 
Justice.448
The decisions illustrate the concern of the Commission to keep the television and 
derivative markets open and to prevent barriers to market entry.449 Although the cited 
decisions referred mainly to programming licenses and access to content, it is clear that the 
Commission indicated its readiness to intervene also in other cases of market foreclosure 
in the television sector, like the ones relating to the introduction of digital television, with 
an application of Article 85 and 86.
bb) The Merger Regulation
The Merger Regulation has been dealt with already to a great extent above within the 
analysis of the MSG decision and the Nordic Satellite decision. In the following section I 
will only look at relevant aspects of its scope and application to cases concerning anti­
competitive conduct within the introduction of digital television, neglected in the case 
analysis above. The number of media cases dealt with by the European Commission under
448 Jo in e d  C a se s  C -241/91  P  a n d  C -242/91  P , R ad io  T e le fís  E ire an n  (R T E ) an d  In d ep en d en t T e le v is io n  P u b lica tio n s 
( IT P )  v. C o m m iss io n , ju d g m e n t o f  6  A p ril  1995, ap p ea ls  f ro m  th e  C F I  ju d g m e n t in C ase  T -6 9 /8 9  R T E  v 
C o m m iss io n  (19 9 1 ) E C R 11-485 and  C a s e  T -7 6 /8 9  IT P  v . C o m m iss io n  (19 9 1 ) EC R  H -5 7 5 ; see  fo r  m o re  d e ta ils  
T h o m p s o n . M ag ill: E C J U p h o ld s U se  o f  A rtic le  86  to  C o n tro l C o n d u c t o f  C opyrigh t H o ld e rs  on  A n c illa ry  M arkets , 
in : E n te r ta in m e n t L aw  R ev iew , 4 /1 9 9 5 , p . I4 3 ff; see  a lso  V a n  B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L a w  o f  th e  E u ro p ea n  
C o m m u n ity , p . 614ff.
449 S e e  C o m m u n ic a tio n  from  th e  C o m m iss io n  to  the C o u n c il a n d  P a rlia m en t o n  au d iov isua l p o licy , 2 .2 .2 .(b ) . C om  
(9 0 )  fina l.
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the Merger Regulation has grown considerably the last couple of years.450 Next to the two 
prohibitions dealt with above in detail, a number of mergers in the television sector have 
been permitted by the European Commission. However, they mainly deal with competition 
problems concerning traditional television and do not relate to the introduction of digital 
television.451
aaa) The Relevant Scope o f  the Merger Regulation
The Merger Regulation applies to concentrations. The concept of concentrations covers 
only operations intended to bring about a lasting change in the structure of the 
undertakings concerned. Mergers and sole or joint acquisitions of control are covered. 
Concentration is defined in Article 3 of the Regulation. According to Article 3 (1) a 
concentration arises when two or more previously independent undertakings merge; or the 
control of the whole or parts, of one or more other undertakings is acquired by one or 
more undertakings or one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking. 
The term acquisition of control refers only to external growth of an undertaking, that 
means growth through the purchase of other companies. Internal growth, for example the 
establishment of a subsidiary, does not fall under Article 3 (1) of the Merger Regulation. 
For a media company with enough resources this would mean that it could acquire
430 S e c  fo r th e  g ro w th  o f  on ly  th ree  d e c is io n s  un til the end o f  1993 to  f iv e  d ecisio n s a lo n e  in 1994 an d  fo u r decisions 
a n d  one  p e n d in g  in 1995, W illia m s/D en n c ss , Sum m ary o f  th e  M ost R e ce n t D ev elo p m en ts , p. 32; se e  fo r  the 
in c re ase  a lso , T w en ty fifth  R ep o rt on  C o m p e titio n  Po licy , (1 9 9 5 ), p o in t 132.
451 S e e , fo r e x a m p le , the c ases  A B C /G e n e ra le  d es  E au x /C an al P lus/W .H . S m ith  T V  (C o m m . D ec. o f  10 Sep tem ber 
19 9 1 ), O J  1991 N o C  2 4 4 /5 ; K irch /R ichm ont/T e lep ifl (C o m m . D ec. o f  2  A ugust 1994). O J 1994 N o  C  225/3 ; 
V O X /C a n a l P Ius/N ew s C o rp o ra tio n /B crte lsm a n n n  (C o m m . D ec. o f  21 D ecem b er 1994), O J 1994 N o  C  333/4; 
C L T /D isn c y /S u p e r  R TL  (C o m m . D ec. o f  17 M ay 1995), O J  1995 N o  C  149/11;
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limitless licenses for television or radio channels and launch newspapers and magazines 
without falling under a provision of the Merger Regulation.452
(1) Concentrative Joint Ventures
The treatment of joint ventures, as already mentioned above, poses difficulties. They are 
the most common form of operation notified to the Commission. At the same time they 
are also the most difficult to classify as either concentrative or co-operative.453 This is also 
relevant for the media and television industry, since due to the need of high investment and 
the long time to reach the break even point, broadcasting and television companies are 
usually founded as joint ventures.454 In particular this is true if new technologies and new 
markets are involved as is the case with the introduction of digital television.455 A 
Commission notice gives guidance on the problematic distinction between concentrative 
and co-operative joint ventures.456 For a joint venture to be concentrative it must be jointly 
controlled, perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, 
and not give rise to the risk of co-ordination. According to the Commission’s broadly 
economic rather than legal approach, the precise legal mechanism by which a joint venture
• • 457arises is not important.
452 S e e  W ag n e r, K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M e d ien -B in n en m a rk t d e r  E G , p . 6.
453 S e e  V an  B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  the  E uropean  C o m m u n ity , p . 397 .
454 S e e  W ag n e r, K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M e d ien -B in n en m a rk t d e r  E G , p. 6.
455 S e e  fo r e x a m p le s  o f  a llian ces and  jo in t  v en tu res  for the s ta r t  up  o f  d ig ita l  te lev ision  ab o v e  1.2.
436 C o m m iss io n  N o tice  reg ard in g  the C o n cen tra tiv e  and  C o -o p e ra tiv e  O p e ra tio n s  under C o u n c il R eg u la tio n  40 6 4 /8 9  
o f  21 D e c e m b e r  o n  the C o n tro l o f  C o n cen tra tio n  be tw een  U n d e rtak in g s  (th e  "c o n ce n tra tiv e /co -o p e ra tiv e  no tice” ), 
O J  1990 N o  C  203 /10 .
452 S e e  V an B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  the E uropean  C o m m u n ity , p . 397 .
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(2) Community Dimension
The Merger Regulation only applies to concentrations that have a Community dimension. 
The latter is reached where the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all 
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5,000 million and the aggregate Community­
wide turnover of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 
million, unless they achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate Community-turnover 
in one Member State.458 Regarding the second threshold, the Commission sees the Merger 
Regulation only not taking effect, when all undertakings involved realize more than two- 
thirds of their aggregated turnover within one Member State. This interpretation has been 
widely criticized by lawyers who favor more an application of national competition law.459 
It might prove crucial for the application of the Merger Regulation for future European 
media mergers, vertical or horizontal. It is very probable that at least one undertaking in a 
media merger will be involved which is globalized enough or better Europeanized to 
realize less than two thirds of its turnover within one Member State. This is true in 
particular for vertical mergers where usually network operators, media companies or 
broadcasters join forces.
(3) Compatibility Test
According to Article 2 (2) of the Merger Regulation, a concentration will be incompatible 
with the common market if it creates or strengthens a dominant position which results in 
an impediment of effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it.
4M S e e  A rtic le  1 (2 )  o f  the M e rg e r  R egu la tion .
459 S e e  fo r  c r it ic ism  o f  th a t in te rp re ta tio n  E b en ro th /L an g e, Z u k u n ftsm ä rk te  in  d e r  e u ro p ä isc h en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p. 2; 
se e  a lso  L an g e , R äum liche  M ark tab g ren zu n g  in d e r  e u ro p ä isc h en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , D iss ., K o n s ta n z , 1991 , p.
113 f f .
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The Commission will examine the effects of a concentration in three ways. It will look at 
horizontal relationships between at least two competing parties in the same market. These 
are its primary concerns. Also it will consider the effect of relationships between parties 
competing on up- and downstream markets. These are the vertical relationships found 
above in the merger decisions concerning the introduction of digital television. Next to 
that the Commission may examine the combination of parties of the position they hold in 
unrelated markets. These are the conglomerate features of a concentration.460 Article 2(1) 
sets out the factors which the Commission should take into account in assessing whether a 
concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition is significantly impeded. This includes, among other factors, the market 
position and the economic and financial power of the parties of the concentration, the 
access of suppliers to markets, and users to supplies, any legal or other barrier to entry, 
and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to the 
advantage of consumers and does not obstruct competition. In order to be able to analyze 
the effects of a concentration on competition it is essential to define the relevant markets. 
Within the analysis of the MSG decision above, it has been shown how the definition of 
the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market works. Due to the 
complex competition relations this poses major difficulties in the media sector.461 This will 
be discussed later, when analyzing the effectiveness and limitations of the application of 
competition law to the media.
*** S e e  V an  B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  the E uropean  C o m m u n ity , p . 4 3 6 .
461 S e e  W ag n er, K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M ed ien -B in n en m a rk t d e r  E G , p. 7.
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bbb) Problems In Applying the Merger Regulation to Media/Television Cases
Next to general deficits of competition law in its application to the media, the main
problem seen by many in the application of the Merger Regulation are the thresholds.462
There are generally viewed as being far too high for media cases. Compared to the special
merger control for the press in Germany, for example, the threshold of the Merger
Regulation is 400 times higher. The problem becomes also evident if one looks at the
turnover figures of European media and broadcasting companies. Only in recent years, due
to the consolidation process in the media industry, have more companies than only a few
media giants like Bertelsmann, surpassed the prescribed numbers. However, looking at the
introduction of digital television, which involves very high investments, it is more probable
than in other parts of the media sector, that the parties involved will be over the threshold
turnover figures. Since the media markets, due to language and cultural barriers, are quite
often confined to one Member State, it is still quite likely that in large countries the two-
thirds rule applies. This says that the Merger Rule does not apply if, according to the
contested interpretation of the Commission, all parties achieve two-thirds of their
European Community-turnover in one Member State.463 If the Member State then
responsible for the merger does not have a merger control the transaction remains
unchecked. If there exists a merger control it still leaves the possibility for Member States
to promote their national champions. Such a reaction of Member States would not be
unlikely in a future industry like digital television and multimedia, which promises *40
m  S ee  K resse , P lu ra lism u s, M a rk t, K onzen tra tion : P o sitio n en , p . 87 ; F rö h lin g er, E G -W e ttb e w e rb sre ch t u n d  
F e m se h e n , p , 62 ,
40 S e e  fo r m o re  d e ta ils  on  the tw o -th ird s ru le  a n d  the case  th a t  o n ly  one  o f  the  parties has tw o -th ird s  o f  its  tu rn o v e r in 
o n e  M e m b e r  S ta te , V an B ael/B ellis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  th e  E u ro p ean  C o m m u n ity , p. 377 .
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employment and tax revenues.464 However, the Commission has come up in the meantime 
with proposals to lower the thresholds of the Merger Regulation.463 It adopted a proposal 
to lower the aggregate worldwide turnover thresholds from 5 to 3 billion ECU and an 
average EC turnover of 250 to 100 million for each company involved. Many Member 
States, however, fiercely oppose such plans which makes a lowering rather unlikely.
ccc) The Relationship with Special Rules Safeguarding Pluralism
In Art. 21 (3) of the Merger Regulation a special provision allows the Member States to
apply national legislation to protect their legitimate interests. The plurality of media has 
expressly been recognized as such an interest.466 According to a joint statement, by 
granting this right, the legitimate concern of Member States to maintain diversified sources 
of information for the sake of plurality of opinion and multiplicity of views is 
recognized.467 This permits the Member States to apply special media legislation in order 
to regulate concentrations which may otherwise undermine the diversified nature of their 
media. Many States, not just those in the Community, apply specific media ownership 
regimes which go beyond normal competition laws.468 However, there have been hardly 
any cases reported where this provision has been applied. One case was Newspaper 
Publishing in which the UK applied its national legislation to protect plurality of opinion in
464 S e e  for an  a sse ssm e n t o f  the  th resho lds and  the ir ap p lica tio n  to m edia , W agner. K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  
M e d ie n -B in n e n m a rk t, p. 7.
465 S e e  E u ro p ea n  V o ice, 11-17 Ju ly  1996, V o l. 2 , N um ber 2 8 , p . 4 ; see fo r  the  proposal, C o m m u n ity  M e rg e r  C ontro l - 
G re e n  P a p e r o n  the R ev iew  o f  the M e rg e r R egu la tion , C o m  (9 6 ) 19 fin a l; see  for an a ssessm en t, B ro b e rg , T h e  EC 
C o m m is s io n ’s  G reen  P ap e r o n  the R ev iew  o f  the M erg er R e g u la tio n , in : E uropean C o m p etitio n  L aw  R ev iew , 
5 /1 9 9 6 , p p . 2 8 9 -2 9 5 .
466 S e e  fo r  m o re  d e ta ils  on  A rtic le  21 (3 ) o f  th e  M erg er R e g u la tio n  V an B ae l/B e llis , C o m p e titio n  L aw  o f  th e  
E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ity , p. 4 2 4 .
467 S e e  a c c o m p a n y in g  s ta tem en t en te red  ¡n the  m inu tes o f  th e  E C  C ounc il co n ce rn in g  R eg u la tio n  4 0 6 4 /8 9 , N in teen th  
R e p o rt on  C o m p e titio n  P o licy , p. 267.
^  S e e  C o o k /K e rse , E C  M erg er C o n tro l, s e c o n d  ed ition , L o n d o n , 1996, p . 219.
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its media.469 This provision would also allow the application of the proposed Media 
Concentration Directive after having been implemented into national law in the Member 
States. With this provision the Community conceded that the Merger Regulation cannot 
cover all concentrations posing a threat to pluralism.470
cc) Technical and Economic Progress
One factor, which is to be considered in assessing whether a concentration or a vertical 
agreement is impeding competition, deserves particular attention in the context of the 
introduction of digital television. This is the aspect of taking into account technical and 
economic progress in considering an exemption according to Art. 85 (3) of the EC-Treaty 
or assessing the compatibility of a concentration according to Art. 2 (1) of the Merger 
Regulation. The concept stems from Art. 85 (3) which had been there before and the 
Commission itself has stated that the concept has to be understood in the light of the 
principles enshrined in Article 85 (3), as interpreted in the case law of the Court of 
Justice.471 However, this does not mean that a concentration which fails the compatibility 
test on pure competition grounds could none the less be granted an exemption on 
technical and economic grounds.472 The development of technical and economic progress 
is to be seen as one factor to be applied in determining the effect of the concentration on 
competition.
m  S e e  N e w sp a p e r  P ub lish in g  (C o m m . D ec. o f  14 M arch  19 9 4 ), O J 1994  N o  C  85/6.
470 S e e  C o m m u n ic a tio n  from  th e  C o m m iss io n  to the  C ouncil a n d  P a rlia m en t o n  aud iov isual p o lic y , 2 .2 .3 ., C o m  (90) 
f in a l.
471 S e e  a cc o m p a n y in g  s ta tem en ts  en te red  in  the  m inu tes o f  the  E C  C o u n c il co n ce rn in g  C o u n c il R e g u la tio n  4 0 6 4 /8 9 , 
in te rp re ta tiv e  s ta te m en t by th e  C o m m iss io n  c o n ce rn in g  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  A rtic le  2 ( 1 )  (b ) , N in teen th  R e p o rt on 
C o m p e titio n  P o licy , p. 266.
473 S e e  V an  B a e l/B e llis , C o m p etitio n  L aw  o f  the  E uropean  C o m m u n ity , p . 3 7 7 .
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I have dealt with the technical and economic progress defense in Art. 2 (1) of the Merger 
Regulation extensively when discussing the MSG and the Nordic Satellite decisions. There 
the Commission emphasized the foreclosure effect of the joint ventures which could not be 
made up by providing technical or economic benefits. In case the provision had been seen 
as possible entrance to introduce industrial policy arguments in the two decisions the 
Commission clearly rejected such an interpretation.473 However, this aspect might obtain 
more weight in assessing the anti-competitive effect of a concentration if the constellation 
is less clear than in the two decisions dealt with. In particular, this might prove true, since 
the Commission, in its policies, is putting so much emphasis on the development of the 
Information Society.
Concerning an exemption for an agreement infringing on Article 85 (1) there have already 
been exemptions for agreements promoting technical progress in the media sector 
according to Article 85 (3). The Commission granted an exemption to a joint venture 
between BBC Enterprise Ltd., Morgan Grenfell&Co. Ltd., a merchant bank and Harold 
Holt Ltd., a concert promoter and musical agent, to set up a satellite broadcasting 
company which intended to broadcast live music, opera and ballet by satellite from major 
European venues to be delivered through a subscriber cable network.474 The parties 
agreed that for a period of three years they would keep information relating to a joint 
feasibility study and its results confidential and that they would not engage in competing 
activities. However, they were entitled to carry on their normal telecommunications or
473 S e e  E b cn ro th /L a n g e , Zu k u n its  m arkte  in  der eu ro p ä isch en  F u s io n sk o n tro lle , p. 8.
474 S e e  F o u rte en th  R eport on  C o m p etitio n  Po licy , (1984), p o in t 86 .
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satellite business* The undertaking did not create barriers to market entry for third 
parties.475 Also for future agreements concerning the start up of digital television an 
exemption due to the promotion of technical and economic progress might become 
relevant.
b) The Effectiveness and Limitations of the Application of Competition Law 
Competition law, on the one hand, seems to be able to deal quite effectively with the
concerns regarding competition and concentration arising out of the introduction of digital
television. On the other hand, there are limitations due to the special character of the
media market and the scope and objective of competition law.
aa) The Appraisal o f the Merger Decisions
The merger decisions discussed above analyze the problems connected with the 
introduction of digital television in a very thorough way. The risk of vertical integration 
for a foreclosure of the market was correctly identified. Also the gatekeeper function of 
the set-top-box with its decoder and conditional access function has been pointed out very 
well. Considering these two decisions competition law or rather the Merger Regulation, 
proved to be a very effective device for securing that the markets remain open and no 
barriers to entry were created. The affected markets have been examined with great care, 
expertise and insight concerning the technical and economical background of the market 
developments in television and the introduction of digital television, in particular. The 
decisions were also free of any policy considerations which might have compromised the 
goal of securing free competition. It can be concluded that the application of the Merger
475 S e e  fo r a  su m m ary  o f  the case  W inn , E u ro p ean  C o m m u n ity  and In te rn a tio n a l M edia  L aw , p, 96.
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Regulation to these cases proved to be successful and effective. It can also be expected 
that comparable cases in that field in the future will be dealt with in a satisfactory way. 
However, the two cases were quite clear concerning the anti-competitive danger. So it 
first has to be seen how the Commission will treat future cases with less obvious anti­
competitive potential. Without already giving a final judgment, the Merger Regulation, 
considering its objective and limited scope can be said to deal in satisfactorily with the 
competition and concentration concerns arising until now out of the digitalization of 
television. This assessment only refers to cases where the Merger Regulation is applicable. 
The deficits in its applicability concerning the high turnover threshold have already been 
discussed above,
bb) The Complex Markets
Above it has been pointed how essential the definition of the markets is for an assessment 
whether an agreement, the holding of a dominant position, or a concentration are anti­
competitive. However, the definitions of the product and the geographic market are often 
difficult due to the complex competition relationships within the media sector. The offered 
services and products are structured in very different ways. This concerns the technology 
used as well as the economic and legal framework. A good example of this phenomenon is 
the distinction between free advertising financed television and pay-television. Here the 
distinction in two separate markets leads to a totally different competition assessment. The 
same is true for a distinction between satellite, cable television and terrestrial television. In 
the future there will be a separate market defined for interactive television services next to 
traditional television. Digital television has not been considered as a separate market, since

it consists mainly in a different way of transmitting the television signals, however, it does 
not offer the consumer anything different from either free or pay-television. These market 
definitions might be useful and valid for pure economic objectives, but do not take into 
account any aspects of pluralism in the programs for the viewers.476 In particular, this is 
true for crossmedia relationships, e.g. between press and television, in the future between 
television and interactive services, interactive services via television and via computer, on­
line services and CD-ROM’s. In the digital age the same content will be marketed in many 
different media. One market can only be assumed if the products are interchangeable, 
which would not be the case in most of the examples given.477 Although the ownership of 
television channels in different geographical markets is compatible with competition law, it 
poses severe risks concerning pluralism and media concentration. In the European media 
market the language barriers lead to an even greater market segmentation.478 The 
geographical markets are to a great extent defined according to the language borders. Due 
to this also, the market positions of multinational media companies will be measured 
according to single markets defined by one common language. However, this underrates 
by far their real market power and resources which give them a great advantage against 
only nationally active competitors.479 Many of the described deficits will increase in the 
digital age. With the emergence of multiple special interest pay-television channels in the
476 S e e  W a g n e r , K o n zen tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M ed ien -B in n en m ark t d e r  E G , p. 7 ; see a lso  K ü b le r, A rg u m e n te  f iire in  
W erb e m a rk ta n te ilsm o d e ll, p . 54 .
477 S e e  a b o u t th e  d ifficu lties  o f  d e fin in g  th e  m arkets, R o b in so n , M a rk e t S h a re  as as M e a su re  o f  M e d ia  C o n cen tra tio n , 
p . 54 ; se e  fo r  th e  co llap se  o f  th e  p rev io u s  segm entation  o f  th e  m ed ia  m a rk e t caused  th ro u g h  tec h n ica l ch an g e , 
G ra h a m , E x ch a n g e  R ates a n d  G a tek eep e rs , p . 40 .
478 S e e  a b o v e  th e  g e o g rap h ica l m ark e t d e fin itio n  in the M S G  d e c is io n , w h ic h  w as lim ited  to  G e rm an y , a lth o u g h  K irch  
a n d  B e r te lsm a n n  have b u s in e ss  a c tiv itie s  in m any o th er E u ro p ea n  c o u n tr ie s , like sh a res  in p a y - te le v is io n  channels , 
IV .2 .b ).
479 S e e  W a g n e r, K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M ed ien -B in n en m ark t d e r  E G , p . 7.
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age of digital channels, the crossing of language barriers will become more likely, since the 
contents become more easily interchangeable than traditionally with the very much in its 
societal and cultural environment rooted conventional television. Also the expected 
emergence of interactive television services in the digital environment will lead to a more 
segmented and less transparent market.480
cc) The Limited Objective o f  Competition Law Regarding the Media Markets 
Many of the deficits pointed out above regarding the application of competition law to
media cases are due to the special character of the media market and the limited objective
of competition law. The main objective of competition law is to ensure economic
competition. Media safeguards and competition law safeguards are complementary with
different objectives, not overlapping scopes. However, pluralism and competition are
different criteria. The protection of pluralism often needs tighter control than the
protection of competition.481 There are fields where the specific safeguards for media
pluralism are lacking, in particular cases which involve cross ownership and vertical
integration. The same applies to the above described constellations of companies having
de facto gatekeeper positions. In that cases the application of competition law is essential
and beneficial to media pluralism, too.482 However, it is widely agreed that European
competition law, as well as national competition law, do not contain provisions to prevent
all concentration in the media sector which might be relevant for securing pluralism in the
4* 1 See K ie fer, K onzen tra tions(con tro lle : B em essu n g sk rite rien  a u f  d e m  Priifstand, p. 6 2 , w h o  d e m a n d s  new  rules to 
co n tro l th e  c o n cen tra tio n  reg ard in g  th e  new  m edia  lik e  in te rac tiv e  se rv ices.
41,1 See  fo r an  abstrac t d isc u ss io n  on h o w  com petition  law  secu res  a lso  p lu ra lism , ab o v e  V I. I .c) w ith  m o re  literature 
q u o ted .
482 S e e  E u ro p ea n  B ro ad castin g  U nion  (E B U ) R eply to C o m m iss io n  q u estio n n a ire  N o  III o n  P lu ra lism  a n d  M edia 
C o n c e n tra tio n  in  the In tern a l M ark et, pp . 3-4.
;
media.483 This has also been conceded by the Commission. It acknowledged that the 
application of Community competition law, Articles 85 and 86 of the EC-Treaty, 
combined with the Merger Regulation, is not able to cover all situations in which a threat 
to pluralism is posed, notably in the case of multimedia ownership.484
Concerning the introduction of digital television in the cases analyzed, competition law 
dealt very effectively with the problems of technical gatekeepers and vertical integration. 
However, competition law has inherent limitations in dealing with the peculiar 
characteristics of media products and services. In dealing with media concentration the 
concern is to ensure that firms do not have excessive influence as well as to prevent abuses 
of market power and anti-competitive behavior.485 Competition law is primarily negative 
being concerned with preventing monopolies or controlling anti-competitive practices. 
Internal growth of companies is not dealt with at all. A media company can acquire an 
endless number of television channel licenses without competition law intervening. While 
competition law permits limitless internal growth, this could lead to a dominant position 
unacceptable for the pluralism aspect attached to the media market.486 Competition law is 
not concerned with setting standards nor with the need to intervene positively to reap the 
full benefits of network externalities. Regarding the set-top-box and the conditional access 
systems there might be different systems arising from a competitive market, however, a
m  S ee  K ü b lc r, A rg u m en te  fu r  e ine  W erb c m a rk tan te ilsm o d ell, p. 53 .
4X4 S ee  C o m m u n ic a tio n  from  the  C om m iss io n  to  the C o u n c il and  P a rlia m en t on  aud iov isua l p o licy , 2 .2 .3 , C om  (90) 
fin a l.
m  S ee  R o b in so n , M arket S h a re  as a  M e a su re  o f  M ed ia  C o n c e n tra tio n , p . 55 .
See  C ra b it. "P lu ra lism  a n d  M ed ia  C o n cen tra tio n ” : 10 Q u e s tio n s  a n d  A nsw ers to the C o m m iss io n ’s W o rk , p. 13 
W ag n e r, K o n zen tra tio n sk o n tro lle  im  M ed icn -B in n en m ark t der E G . p . 6 .
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problem remains if they are incompatible with each other. Then the consumers who can 
only afford one system might well face an undesirable monopoly of media influence even 
when no such concentration was apparent at the level of the industry as a whole.487 The 
media industry will not just be another industry, even after digital technology eliminates 
many of the problems of bandwidth restrictions. Even though monopoly power endowed 
by access to scarce bandwidth will disappear, it has become clear already that other 
monopolistic powers may emerge which are not caught by the competition rules.488
3. The M edia Concentration Directive Proposal
The development of the debate on pluralism and media concentration in Europe has been 
described already above. The proposal of a Media Concentration Directive represents the 
outcome of this long ongoing discussion. In the subsequent chapter this proposal, its 
chances to become law and its possible influence on the national rules will be presented. 
The analysis will focus on how the proposal takes digital television and new television 
services into consideration.
a) The Approach
The proposed Directive is based on the goal to achieve the objectives of the Internal 
Market in the field of the media.489 It seeks to ensure the principle of free circulation and 
the creation of a border free area in that sector. Due to their disparities the various 
national legislative systems relating to pluralism and media ownership have set up a
487 S e e  G ra h a m , E xchange R a tes and G a tek e ep e rs , p. 47.
S e e  G re e n , P reserv in g  P lu ra lity  in a D ig ita l W orld , p. 31 ; see in g e n e ra l fo r the risks rem a in in g  fo r  p lu ra lism  after 
th e  d ig ita liz a tio n , above V I. 2 . c).
489 S e e  fo r  m o re  on  the b ack g ro u n d  on  th e  p lanned  D irective  ab o v e  V I. 1 .d); see  for the d isc u ss io n  o f  a  E u ro p ean  
re g u la tio n  ab o v e  V I. 2. d ).
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number of obstacles to the free circulation of services and the right of establishment. To 
maintain pluralism the Member States were legitimized in taking measures which restrict 
the freedom of the Internal Market. A frequent example was the restriction of free 
circulation between Member States, of television channels in cases where attempts were 
made to circumvent national media ownership laws by broadcasting by satellite from a 
neighboring Member States.490 The disparity in the different regulatory systems is bound 
to incite the market players to “forum shopping“.491 They are tempted to take their 
investment decisions rather according to the national regulatory framework than along 
market prospects. The differences in the national regimes tends to create distortions of 
competition. In some more liberalized Member States the national operators will become 
takeover targets for media giants of other Member States, or other countries.492 *495The 
planned Directive sets out to remove these obstacles. This shall be achieved by 
harmonizing the existing national legislation to obtain an equivalent level of protection 
between the Member States.493 *495
b) The Concept of Audience Measurement and M edia Controller
The proposal for a Media Concentration Directive sets out the conditions for media
ownership that should be applied by the national Member States when granting a license 
for a new television or radio station or for an existing one coming under new ownership.
490 S ee  E C I C a se  C - 23 /93 , T V  10SA v. C o m m issariaa t v o o r  d e  M ed ia , ju d g m e n t o f  5 O c to b e r  1994.
491 S e e  C ra b it, "P lu ra lism  a n d  M edia  C o n cen tra tio n ": 10 Q u e s tio n s  an d  A n sw ers to  the C o m m is s io n 's  W o rk , p. 13.
492 T h e  sa m e  d e v e lo p m en t can  be o b se rv ed  in th e  cable  te le v is io n  o r  in  th e  te leco m m u n ica tio n  se c to r; se e  th e  high
in v e s tm e n ts  o f  U S -am crican  co m p an ies in the libe ra lized  m ark e t fo r  c a b le  te lev is ion  n e tw o rk  o p e ra to rs  in the U K .
D o y le , K a b e l-  und S a te llite n p ro g ra m m e  in G ro ß b ritan n ien , p . 449 .
495 S e e  fo r a v iew  that o p p o ses  any  h a rm o n iza tio n  and w o u ld  see in  it  a  v io la tio n  o f  the su b s id ia rity  p rin c ip le , 
S c h c llc n b e rg , E u ro p äisch e  K o n zen tra tionskon tro lle  im  M e d ien b e re ic h  - E in  A n w en d u n g sfa ll des 
S u b s id ia ritä tsp rin z ip s , in: D Z W ir, 10 /1994 , p. 4 I0 ff .
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The planned Directive gives two criteria to apply the given conditions. These are the 
audience measurement which consists in the actual audience figures, and the concept of 
the media controller that determines which entity actually has control of a media 
corporation. The measured audience figures would then be attributed to this entity. In case 
the proposal becomes law the national supervisory body would have to decide whether in 
the case of an application for a new television or radio station the combined actual 
audience of all the media controlled by this entity in part or all of the broadcasting area 
covered by the new channel does not go beyond the thresholds laid down at Community 
level.494 The threshold laid down in the proposal is 10% of the audience in the area of 
distribution of a radio or television service for each of the media.495 In addition a 
multimedia threshold is given that also includes newspaper circulation and prescribes a 
10% audience threshold on the multi media market.496 The measurement of the real 
audience figures is seen to be superior to taking the number of channels controlled by a 
single entity as a basis for restricting the concentration of media ownership. In the age of 
the multiplication of television channels the audience measurement is considered to be a 
more significant criterion than the numbers o f stations. Concerning pluralism the audience 
figures are expected to be a more equitable method which also would be fairer to the 
operators. According to audience figures also one channel with a very high percentage of 
viewers could pose a threat to pluralism. A number of Member States discuss the use of
494 S e e  C ra b it, “ P lura lism  an d  M ed ia  C oncentration '*: 10 Q u e s tio n s  a n d  A n sw ers on  the C o m m iss io n ’s W o rk , pp. 13- 
14.
m  S ee  in te rn a l p roposa l o n  a  M ed ia  C o n cen tra tio n  D irec tiv e  in F re n c h , A rtic le  3 (1 ) an d  (2 ) w h ich  h a s  n o t been
p u b lish ed  o ffic ia lly  yet.
496 Ib id ., A r tic le  3 (3).
1 5 1

the audience measure methods in their reformed media concentration legislation or have 
already included them.497
The concept of the media controller seeks to provide a qualitative definition for the 
identification of who controls media. With such a definition the real and not just the formal 
influence of a single person or an entity in a media corporation could be determined. The 
study of the European Institute of Communication found four criteria to determine the 
influence of a media undertaking.498 There can be contractual links with media 
corporations in both upstream and downstream markets. There can exist financial links 
between the controller and the media corporation. Another criterion are personal links 
which can be used to exercise influence in a media undertaking, like the power to make 
staff appointments. The traditional links of media concentration are the ownership links, 
like holding shares in a media corporation.
c) The Scope Concerning New Television Services
The authors of the proposal claim to take the technological developments into account. 
The Information Society is supposed to have played a key role in the drafting of the 
proposal. The introduction of new technologies will increase cross-border activities which 
will exacerbate the negative effects of the patchwork of national laws governing media 
ownership. Furthermore the current national regulations have to be reformed to allow for
'W7 S e e  for G e rm a n y  and d iffe re n t form s o f  aud ience  m easu rem en ts , H o lzer, D as M a rk tan te ilsm o d ell a u f  d em  
P rü fs ta n d  - e in  P ro b lem au friß , p. 5 7 7 ff.; see for the sam e K iefer, K o n z en tra tio n sk o n tro llen : B em essu n g sk rite rien  
a u f  d em  P rü fs ta n d , p. 62 ff.; the  new  R u n d fu n k staa tsv e rtrag  com ing  in to  force in 1 Jan u a ry  1997 fo resee s  a  30%  
a u d ie n c e  sh a re  as th resh o ld ; see  for th a t  D er Sp iegel, " D a s  en tfe sse lte  F e rn seh en " , 2 9 /1 9 9 6 , p. 24 ; se e  fo r the UK, 
th e  new  B ro a d ca stin g  A ct 1996 Part III , Section  73, w hich  in tro d u c es  a  15%  audience  sh a re  th re sh o ld  fo r 
te le v is io n ; see  a lso  R o b inson . M ark e t S h are  as a M easu re  o f  M ed ia  C o n c en tra tio n , p. 5 5 ; see  a lso  D o y le , 
D e re g u lie ru n g  für den  M u ttim e d ia m ark t, p . 168.
m  S e c  In s titu t E uropéen  de la  C o m m u n ica tio n , La tran sp aren ce  d ans le c o n trô le  des m éd ias, D ü sse ld o rf , 1994.
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new technologies, like digital television. This legislative reform in the Member States 
needs co-ordination at a pan-European level in order to prevent the current disparity to 
grow even bigger.499
However, the definition used for television and broadcasting is said to be taken over from 
the Television Directive.500 This seems to leave out the new television services. The debate 
described above on the inclusion of these services under the Television Directive could 
find here its continuation.501 If these services do not fall under the other media which are 
considered by the concentration Directive proposal they will remain excluded. The 
exclusion is justified by their need for different level of protection. The debate on how 
these services are supposed to be regulated will hamper also the regulation concerning 
media concentration. If they are not included, at least a concept should exist how they 
should be dealt with from a media concentration view point. Taking this lacuna into 
account it cannot be said that concerning the introduction of digital television the 
proposed Directive presents a satisfying regime. Probably here one has to wait until the 
Member States have proposed national legislation which deals with the new television 
services. However, if Member States propose legislation which implements different 
regimes, then harmonization will meet even more opposition afterwards.
w  S e e  fo r th ese  a rgum en ts  C ra b it. “P lu ra lism  and M edia C o n c e n tra tio n ” : 10 Q uestions an d  A nsw ers o n  th e  
C o m m is s io n ’s W ork, p. 13.
5,11 T h is  w as to ld  to  the au th o r in talks w ith  E U  C om m ission  o ff ic ia ls  in v o lv e d  in d rafting  the  p roposal.
S e e  fo r th e  d e b a te  co n ce rn in g  the scope o f  the T elev ision  D irec tiv e  a b o v e  u n d er VII. 1. a ); see  for a n  o v e rv ie w  o f 
th e  d if fe re n t lim ited  d e fin itio n s  in G erm an y . Spain . F ran ce , Italy . N e th e rla n d s  and the U K , Insitu t E u ro p é e n  de la 
C o m m u n ic a tio n , L a tran sp aren ce  d an s le con trô le  des m é d ia s , p. 1S8.
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d) The Relationship with National Rules and the Chances to Become Law
If the proposal becomes law it would not leave any room for the application of the existing
national rules. Its comprehensive regime would be incompatible with any maintenance of 
national media concentration regulation. The implemented rules would deal with 
ownership constellations and transactions confined to single Member States as well as 
with cross border transactions and pan European media activities. However, the precise 
way of the method how to measure the audience will be left to the Member States. The 
possibly emerging different systems should then become subject to the principle of mutual 
recognition. Also regarding the definition of the media controller the Member States are 
said to receive some discretion concerning its interpretation. A European media agency to 
control the enforcement of the media concentration thresholds or at least to co-ordinate 
the national enforcement efforts and to deal with larger cases is not foreseen, although it 
had been discussed and asked for by many observers.502
To what extent these concessions to the Member States will win their support for the 
proposal is uncertain. Many Member States have already opposed the planned Directive. 
This might be due to the fact that a number of Member States are in the course of 
reforming their national media concentration legislation.303 These states are likely to object 
to the approach by the Commission which would nullify their own legislative efforts. This
S e e  fo r th e  d iscu ssio n . K opp , M e d ien re ch t und  neue te c h n isc h e  E n tw ic k lu n g en  - R eak tio n en  und P e rsp e k tiv e n , p. 
3 9 2 ; see in  fav o r o f  a  E u ropean  co o rd in a tio n  agency fo r  m ed ia  c o n ce n tra tio n , K lim m t, W id e r den S e lb s tla u f  der 
T e c h n ik , in: ep d /K irch  un d  R u n d fu n k , N r. 3 4 ,3 .  M ai 19 9 5 , p. 9.
5,13 S e e  the U K , w hich  has ju s t  passed  its  B ro ad castin g  A ct o f  1996; see  fo r the  p lans in G erm an y  on n e w  m ed ia  
o w n e rsh ip  ru les  and  the m o st recen t a g ree m e n t o f  the s ta te s , S ü d d e u tsc h e  Z eitung , "G ese tz  o h n e  G re n z e n " . 22. 
A u g u s t, p. 16; in  Italy the  g o v e rn m e n t h as to  in troduce n e w  leg isla tio n  to  deal w ith the ru lin g  by  th e  co n stitu tio n a l 
c o u r t  w h ich  d eclared  that the cu rren t Ita lian  law  a llow s to o  m uch co n ce n tra tio n  o f  o w n e rsh ip  in te le v is io n , sec 
F in a n c ia l T im e s , 27 A u g u st 1996, p . 2.
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might prove true in particular when their legislation seems to be more progressive and apt 
to deal with the new technological developments, like digital television.504 However, the 
resistance to the proposal can hardly be assessed at the moment. The preservation of 
pluralism and the risks of media concentration are closely connected to the maintenance of 
the cultural and national identity of countries and seen as essential for a functioning 
democratic society. This might speak for a reluctance of Member States to leave 
legislation to the European Communities.
The state of the proposal in the legislative process of the European Community is not very 
advanced. The proposal has not been adopted yet by the Commission. The discussion on 
adoption has been postponed until September 1996.505 Since the adoption of a proposal by 
the Commission is only the first step in a long and complicated legislative process the 
outcome can by no means be assessed yet. However, if a proposal for a Directive meets 
already resistance in becoming adopted by the Commission one might conclude that the 
chances of such a proposal are rather dim.
e) The Relationship with European Community Competition Law
I have discussed the relationship between media ownership rules and competition law in
the abstract above.506 If the proposed Directive becomes law the influence it might have 
on European competition law is difficult to predict. However, the broad scope regarding 
the media controller concept which would include contractual up- and downstream links, 
financial, personal and ownership links, indicates a possible broad area of conflict with *306
*w S e c  the  U K  B ro ad castin g  A c t 1996 a n d  its specia l p ro v is io n s  on  d ig ita l te rrestria l te le v is io n , Part 1.
3,8 S e e  E u ro p e  A g en ce  In tern a tio n a le  D ’In fo rm ation  P our L a  P re sse , N o 6 7 8 6 ,7 th  A ugust 1 9 9 6 ,4 4 th  Y e a r , p. 5.
306 S e e  ab o v e  V I. 1 .c).
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competition law. Within the Merger Regulation the application of the Directive provisions 
then implemented in national law would function through Article 21 (3) of the Merger 
Regulation. This provision foresees the application of national legislation in cases of 
legitimate interests, like preserving pluralism in the media. However, it is questionable 
whether this provision was foreseen to introduce a full Community based regime into 
European competition law. Certainly there will arise conflicts with the application of 
Article 85 and 86 of the EC-Treaty concerning the contractual links which might fall under 
the Media Concentration Directive proposal. Even though the arising conflicts are difficult 
to predict, there should at least be some consideration regarding the influence of this new 
regime on competition law. It is questionable whether the simple assumption that, since 
the pluralism and media concentration provisions are stricter, they just apply on top of 
competition law will serve as an overall solution. Cases will be taken away from the 
competition authorities to be dealt with by national media supervisory bodies. This needs 
co-ordination and co-operation. Will the cases first be dealt with by the competition 
authorities and then handed over to the national media supervisory bodies? There might 
also be an imbalance, since competition law has a European body to enforce it and the 
media concentration provisions will have to be enforced by national bodies. A European 
media agency which could prove essential in coordinating competition law and the media 
concentration provisions as well as the European and the Member States level is not 
foreseen. My conclusion is that the Media Concentration Directive proposal, as it stands, 
is a rather isolated legislative attempt which does not really take into account the legal 
framework which surrounds it.
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4. S tandard  Setting
Standards play an important role for competition in a sector where new technologies are 
introduced.507 The following section will give an overview of the standardization in the 
field of digital television. The focus will be on the role of the European Commission in 
these standardization measures and the importance of the new Directive on the 
transmission of television signals as the only legislative measure by the European 
Community in that field.
a) The Approach of the Commission in Standard Setting for Television
The approach of the Commission in the technical standard setting for television has
changed in recent years from being directly involved to exerting a less visible influence 
from the background. This change is mainly due to the negative experience made of the 
Commission with the introduction of the MAC (multiplexed analogue components) 
standard for satellite transmitted high definition television (HDTV). The MAC standard 
was based on digital transmission of sound and analogue transmission of images with a 
digital decoding. It was meant to provide a step- by step development for the D2-MAC 
standard with digital sound transmission, a picture with 625 lines and a 16:9 format. 
However, since the development of the technology was too much focused on the 
transmission and on Europe, affordable decoders and television-sets were lacking as well 
as sufficient program supply in the 16:9 format. Also the attitude and goals of the political 
environment and of the market players changed and the new principle became more 
channels, instead of better quality pictures.508 When it became clear in 1993 with the
5117 S e e  V. 3 . o n  stan d ard s an d  co m p e titio n .
s * S e e  N a tio n a lc  H D T V -P la ttfo rm  D e u tsch lan d , P resse in fo rm atio n  9 3 /3 .
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developments in the USA that the analogue transformation stage would be skipped, the 
European Community stopped its support for the MAC technology. However, the 
industry stresses that the learning effects and the experiences in cooperation benefits their 
efforts to find agreements in the Digital Video Broadcasting group (DVB).509 As a 
consequence of the failure, the Commission adopted a different role in the standardization 
process. It left the standard setting to the private industry organization the Digital Video 
Broadcasting group (DVB)510 512and confined itself to support their work. The standards the 
DVB agrees on then have to enter into the approval process of the European 
Standardization Organizations.511 512They then obtain the support of the Commission to 
become the European standard. However, the Commission does not propose a standard 
itself anymore but leaves it to the industry and influences the process in a more subdued
b) The Directive on the Use of Standards for the Transmission of Television Signals 
The Directive on the use of standards for the transmission of television signals513 is the
legislative act introduced by the Commission concerning standards for digital television.
The Directive is supposed to create a regulatory framework of standards for the
transmission of advanced television signals. According to the Commission the Directive
recognizes standards as an important element in establishing market confidence, both on
sw S e e  fo r  m o re  d e ta ils  on  th e  failure  o f  th e  E uropean  M A C -stan d a rd , S ceg er, S tru k tu rv eràn d cru n g en  d e s  R undfunks 
in  E u ro p a , p . 114.
5,0 Its  w o rk  w ill be  d escribed  b riefly  be lo w .
511 T h e  m ain  E u ro p ean  stan d ard isa tio n  b o d ie s  in th is field  a re  the E u ro p ea n  T eleco m m u n ica tio n s  S ta n d a rd s  Institu te  
(E T S I) a n d , c o n ce rn in g  te lev is io n  re c e iv e r  s tan d ard isa tio n , its  p a rtn e r o rgan isation  C E N E L E C .
512 T h e  in fo rm a tio n  stem s fro m  in te rv iew s with E uropean  C o m m iss io n  o ffic ia ls , 27/28 M a rc h  1996.
512 D ire c tiv e  9 5 /4 7 /E C  o f the  E uropean  Parliam en t and o f  th e  C ounc il o f  24  O ctober 1995 o n  the U se  o f  S tan d ard s for 
th e  T ra n sm iss io n  o f  T elev is io n  S igna ls , OJ 1995 N o L 2 8 1 /5 1 .
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the part of market players, and on the part of consumers. At the same time the Directive 
seeks to enable the widest range of advanced services to be offered as the market 
develops. It does not seek to support the introduction of particular services and 
technologies, but prefers a studied neutrality across the board. It also aims to create a 
common framework throughout the Europe for conditional access to digital television
• 514services.
aa) The Introduced Standards for Digital Television and Wide Screen Television
The Directive prescribe standards to be used for television services in wide format and 625
lines, and for services in high definition which are not folly digital.* 515 For the former the 
16:9 D2-MAC transmission system has to be used, and for the latter the HD-MAC 
transmission system. If the services are fully digital the provider has to use a transmission 
system which has been standardized by a recognized European standardization body. The 
prescribed standards apply to every transmission mode, be it cable, satellite or terrestrial. 
However, the new Multi Video Distribution Systems (MVDS) are not mentioned. The 
MVDS is typically transmitted from the top of tall buildings and can be received by 
inexpensive receivers which are located within the transmitter’s line of sight. It might 
become an important means of delivering a large number of channels to private households 
especially in areas where the installation of cable is not commercially viable. If it does not 
fall under one of the transmission modes mentioned in the Directives the provisions would 
not apply to it.
5,4 S ee  fo r  th e  po sitio n  o f  th e  C o m m isso n  its press re lease. *T V  s ta n d ard s  D irective  sig n a ls  d ig ita l T V  lif t-o ff  tow ards 
In fo rm a tio n  S oc ie ty , B ru sse ls , 25 Ju ly  1995, IP /95 /818.
S15 See Article 1 of the Directive.
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The Directive also mentions wide screen television services. In Art. 1 (2) it states that 
Member States shall see to it that, the transfer of wide-screen television services already in 
operation to digital transmission networks open to the public, is made easier. However, in 
the accompanying declarations the Council adopted apparently, at the request of the 
German government, a statement (ii) that endorses the Commission’s interpretation of 
Article 1 (2). According to this interpretation there should be no binding obligations on 
Member States regarding the transfer of existing wide screen television services to digital 
transmission networks.516 Article 2 (c) of the Directive rules that fully digital transmission 
networks open to the public for the distribution of television services must be capable of 
distributing wide-format services.
According to Article 3 manufactures must incorporate an open interface socket on all 
TV ’s with screens larger than 42 centimeters. This provision intends to guarantee that all 
citizens o f the European Community investing in new equipment will be able to connect 
digital TV decoders without problems.
bb) The Conditional Access
The most important of the new provisions concern conditional access. They contain legal 
safeguards for access to the conditional access systems.517 As discussed already above the 
conditional access system poses many competition problems for the market of pay- 
television in general and for digital television which in the beginning will mainly consist in 
pay-television in particular. It provides the operator with means to manipulate competition
5lft S ee  E B U  L eg a l C o m m ittee , In fo rm ation  do cu m en t N o 9 (9 5 ), p. 2 ; se e  a lso  C ouncil, p re ss  re lease  9 0 1 2 /9 5  o f  24
Ju ly  1995.
Sl7 Sec Article 4 of the Directive.
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and discriminate against competitors and favor his own channels and programs in a way 
detrimental to free competition. The Directive now requires operators of conditional 
access systems to offer their technical services to all broadcasters on a fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory basis. They also have to keep separate financial accounts regarding 
their activity as conditional access providers. It is questionable whether this general 
provisions will prove sufficient to secure a non-discriminatory treatment of all 
broadcasters. The DVB has drafted a code of conduct for the access to digital decoders 
applying to all conditional access providers. This could have served for more detailed 
provisions. However, in general from a competition view point, an open system is seen as 
being the better solution.
However, since the industry represented within the DVB could not agree on a proprietary 
or open system, the Directive also does not take a decision on that issue.518 To at least 
display a certain preference for an open system the Directive prohibits holders of industrial 
property rights to conditional access systems to subject the granting of licenses to 
manufacturers of consumer equipment on conditions which would prevent or discourage 
the inclusion of a common interface.519 Member States have to provide special procedures 
that allow fair, timely and transparent resolutions of disputes arising from the application 
of the provisions concerning conditional access. This shows that the Commission expects 
conflicts concerning conditional access and might indicate that it does not consider the laid
m  See fo r  the lack o f  a  c o n sen su s w ith in  the DV B on o n e  sy s tem , S ch o o f/W atso n  B ro w n , In fo rm atio n  H ighw ays and
M e d ia  P o lic ie s  in the E u ro p ean  U n io n , p. 335.
5IV See Article 4 (d) of the Directive.
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down provisions as an ideal solution but rather as the compromise of an hard fought over 
conflict of interests.
c) The Standard Setting of the DVB
The Digital Video Broadcasting group comprises some 180 manufacturers, broadcasters, 
infrastructure providers and national administrators and adopts specifications for digital 
video broadcasting.520 DVB has produced a family of specifications for the transmission of 
digital television over terrestrial, satellite, cable, SMATV (Satellite Master Antenna 
Television) and MDS (Multipoint Distribution Systems). The specifications are supposed 
to provide all the tools necessary to convey MPEG-2 coded video, audio and data signals 
from the broadcaster’s studio to the user’s home. As already mentioned above these 
specifications then enter the process of adoption as formal European standards by the 
standardization bodies ETSI and, concerning television receiver standardization, its 
partner organization CENELEC.521 Many o f the specifications are already European 
standards. Others are presently undergoing the formal procedures like the specifications 
for terrestrial digital broadcasting.522 The same can be said of the specifications for a 
digital broadcasting system using MVDS (Multipoint Video Distribution Systems) which 
was agreed by the DVB steering board already in December 1995.523 The standard 
developed for a common interface is at the moment undergoing standardization in 
CENELEC.
320 S ee  fo r  th e  o rig in s  o f  th e  D V B , S e e g e r, S tru k tu rv erä n d eru n g e n  d e s  R u n d fu n k s in E u ro p a , p. 123.
321 S ee  fo r h o w  th e  s tan d ard s a re  d e v e lo p ed , D V B , T h e  N e w  A g e  o f  T e lev is io n , p. 32.
323 A t lea s t u n til  Ju n e  1996 th ey  had n o t b eco m e  a  E u ro p ea n  s tan d ard .
323 S ee  D ig ita l V id eo  B ro ad castin g , p re ss  re lease. G e n ev a . 18 th  D e c e m b e r  1995.
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However, although the DVB achieves convincing results in its standardization efforts, it is 
doubtful whether the strategy of leaving this task to the industry itself represents the right 
answer to all problems involved with the introduction of new industries and 
standardization. Standardization performed by the industry itself guarantees that the 
technology agreed on is close to the market and promises to be economically a success. 
However, looking at it from a competition view point it looks quite probable that the 
already dominant companies will also prevail with their proposals in such an organization. 
It is unlikely that they will give up their competitive advantage without being forced to do 
so, which will not happen in such a voluntary organization and procedure. There might be 
standards proposed that benefit the more powerful companies who also enjoy a greater 
influence in the DVB more than smaller ones. The best example for this assertion is the 
conditional access where the choice between a proprietary system and an open system 
remained optional. On that issue the DVB could not find a consensus to make the 
common interface mandatory, although it is widely regarded to be the better system to 
guarantee an open market and free competition.524 This is due to the fact that most of the 
large providers of conditional access systems (themselves broadcasters) use proprietary 
systems which give them a competitive advantage over other broadcasters. This might be 
the stage where the European Community has to interfere with the introduction of 
legislation. Standard setting by an industry organization is important for the introduction 
of a market orientated technology. However, to secure free competition interference by 
the legislator in many cases seems to be indispensable.
524 S ee  fo r  th e  d iff ic u lt and  leng thy  d isc u ss io n  w ith in  the D V B , T h e  N e w  A g e  o f  T e lev is io n , p. 30.
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d) Remaining Problems for Competition: The Common Interface
The standardization process for digital television is quite advanced. Only for a few areas
are standards still missing, which are right now undergoing the standardization process or 
at least a specification is agreed on. However, next to the hidden competition concerns 
connected with the standardization by an industry organization indicated above the 
conditional access remains a heavily discussed issue. Many still believe that a common 
interface represents the only solution for the competition concerns linked to conditional 
access systems. The debated question is whether to make the inclusion of a common 
interface in digital decoders mandatory. However, such a provision was not included in the 
Directive, since an agreement could not be found. The Commission also does not have 
plans in the near future to introduce legislation foreseeing such a mandatory inclusion. In 
mid 1997 the Directive on the transmission of television signals is up for review.525 
Probably then the need and the political climate for a mandatory inclusion of a common 
interface will be re-examined. At the moment the Commission has accepted the 
proprietary system to be the system for the first generation of decoders. However, for the 
next generation it hopes the common interface approach will prevail.526 It is doubtful 
whether the common interface approach will find a majority then. Next to the opposition 
of providers of proprietary systems who will continue to support their system, the 
common interface approach is also criticized concerning its consumer friendliness. It is 
said that consumer will not find the use of many different smart cards convenient. In 
addition it has been shown above that the use of smart cards leaves ways to dominant
535 S e e  A rtic le  6 o f  the D irective .
536 T h e  in fo rm a tio n  stem s from  a te lep h o n e  in terv iew  w ith  a  C o m m iss io n  o ffic ia l o f  D G  X III , 9  A u g u s t 1996.
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providers to discriminate against competitors by placing them on very unattractive smart 
cards.527 The question will be which system can be better controlled.
VIII. Conclusions
The aim of this thesis has been to give a description and an analysis of the problems and 
implications connected with the introduction of digital television in Europe for 
competition and media concentration. This problem description has discussed the 
European Community legal framework for this sector in order to assess its capacity to deal 
with the newly arising risks for competition and media concentration. The regulatory 
systems in the Member States have only been dealt with to give examples and illustrate 
different approaches and deficits. The conflict of competences between the European 
Community and the Member States has been left out intentionally as well as an abstract 
discussion of assigning the different problems to the different levels of governance. The 
focus has been on the problems arising out of the introduction of digital television and the 
solutions foreseen for them by the European Community legal framework. A further step 
would have been to propose regulatory measures or a whole framework. However, this 
would not have been possible without entering into the above described discussion of 
competences. In the following final section the main points of the different chapters will be 
highlighted and the connecting line between them, as far as it has not become visible until 
now, will be drawn. Although the thesis has not proposed a certain regulatory policy, the 
problem description and the legal framework analysis by illustrating the deficits give
527 S e e  ab o v e  III. 1 .b).
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indications in what direction to go. The concluding remarks will try to concretize these 
hints though without proposing a new regulatory framework.
1. Concerns and Im plications fo r Com petition and Concentration
In the following section the main points o f the chapters above will be summarized. 
However, it will go beyond that in showing connecting lines between the chapters which 
might not have been evident up to this point. Also some additional reflections are added 
which try to clarify certain more complex aspects of the analysis delivered above.
a) Competition Concerns
The analysis showed that the main cause for competition concerns concerning the 
introduction of digital television presents the special distribution system for digital 
television programs. The new technology which is necessary for the transmission and the 
reception of the digital television programs provides possibilities to discriminate against 
competitors and incentives to integrate vertically. The analysis found, in the set-top-box, 
with the different essential functions combined in one device, the gatekeeper joint of the 
distribution chain of digital television. The conditional access systems have been in use in 
existing pay-television channels and have posed competition concerns already there. 
However, they will reach new dimensions regarding their significance and the 
sophistication of their use in digital television. The navigation systems probably integrated 
in the set-top-box will also provide possibilities for vertically integrated operators to 
discriminate against competitors. An additional element of the distribution chain 
containing competition concerns is the marketing of the new multiplicity of channels in the 
way of packages. The risk for free competition depends on the state of vertical integration
1 6 6

in the distribution chain. The set-top-box only poses a real danger for free competition 
mainly if the operator is vertically integrated and has an interest to favor certain 
broadcasters and programs and discriminate against others. However, since the digital 
television also as gateway to an interactive media world promises an immense future 
market, companies from all different stages of the distribution chains of television 
programs want to take part and have a stake in its realization. Since high and risky 
investments are necessary the incentive to join together is very high. Also the general 
convergence processes taking place between the broadcasting and telecommunication 
industry as well as between content and technology providers leads to a higher 
concentration tendency. In particular, the financial powerful telecommunication companies 
have become active, and for the sake of free competition, dangerous players in new field 
of digital television, since they for the most part still control the transmission networks in 
Europe. To summarize the competition concerns one can conclude that the new way of 
distributing digital television programs provides for a wide range of possibilities to 
manipulate and impede competition and at the same time these abstract possibilities 
become acute, since the incentives to integrate vertically due to high investments and 
promising future markets are very high. An additional incentive to integrate vertically can 
be seen in the possibility to obtain a dominant monopoly like position itself. The 
competition concerns connected with the introduction of digital television have been put 
into context with well-known competition problems from other sectors or countries. This 
comparative analysis has shown that parallels can be found. The gatekeeper position of the 
set-top-box is equivalent to the essential facility discussion of the public utility industry,
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energy, gas and other sectors. In the television sector a similar trend to vertical integration 
could be found in the US cable television industry with foreclosure effects regarding 
program access and access to distribution outlets. Also the problem of standards for 
competition has already been widely discussed in other fields. Many of the remedies used 
in these other sectors could be transferred to the digital television industry, like line of 
business restrictions, open access or “must-carry” rules. However, the analysis illustrated 
that in the complexity of its distribution chain and the different markets involved, the 
arising digital television industry stands alone, compared to other sectors discussed. 
Because of this it will prove insufficient to tackle its competition problems with the single 
solution found for one less complex industry, but rather a combination of different 
remedies will be necessary.
b) Implications for the Concentration Debate
Regarding the debate on media concentration the introduction of digital television has led 
to the revival of an old discussion with the new arguments. At first sight digital television, 
with the expected multiplication of channels, delivers arguments for the supporters of the 
liberal view who advocate less regulation for television and an abolition of the special 
treatment of broadcasting compared to other media, in particular the press. The 
anticipated segmentation and individualization of the television programs, it is argued, 
would finally invalidate the rationales traditionally mentioned to justify the special 
treatment of the broadcasting media. However, the opponents see new risks arising out of 
the introduction of the new technology w'hich provides incentives for more concentration. 
It is also difficult to draw the line between traditional television, for which the majority
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still foresees regulation, and the new television services, where less regulation is 
acceptable. Digital television will provide both, starting with rather traditional television 
(however, already with a focus on pay-television, like pay-channel television and pay-per- 
view television) and in the future providing new interactive television services. So, digital 
television has, to some extent already, and will even more so in the future, be the 
touchstone for the different theories. However, the discussion in many Member States is 
still limited to traditional broadcasting problems and outdated dogmatic debates. The main 
issue, to find an encompassing regulatory framework for the new diversity in television, 
does not receive adequate attention. In many cases the motive to introduce new, for the 
most part more liberal regimes seems not to be a change in the nature and the character of 
television; rather the aim seems to be to strengthen the competitiveness of national 
champions. The analysis showed that a new approach regarding media concentration is 
necessary, that takes into account the transformation process of the medium of television. 
Since the providers, the consumers and the equipment used mainly stay the same also, the 
regulatory system should stay unitary, just including different levels of regulatory intensity.
2. D eficits  o f the European Com m unity Legai Fram ework
The analysis of the EC legal framework was extended also to legislation not directly 
connected to competition and media concentration problems. This was done in order to 
find out whether, looked at from the perspective of digital television, a coherent system in 
the European Community legal framework could be identified. The Television Directive 
which is now in the state of becoming amended does not contain any references to digital 
television and the transformation of television in general. The proposal of the European
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Parliament, which had asked for the inclusion of new television services, was turned down 
by the Council. As an isolated aspect, new forms of television provisions on teleshopping 
are contained in the Television Directive. An aspect which has been much discussed 
already, and which might become an essential issue for digital television in the future with 
the multiplication of channels, are the quotas for European programs. The introduction of 
stricter quota provisions would have a considerable influence on competition in digital 
television. Smaller channels, and channels in the start up phase which do not have the 
financial resources to buy the then fought over attractive European programs would be 
disadvantaged, since they would not be allowed to offer affordable US-American 
programs instead. However, this foreseeable development connected to the digitalization 
and transformation of television does not seem to receive much attention in the quota 
debate.
European Community competition law has dealt with the digital television cases subject to 
its application quite well. The merger decisions MSG and Nordic Satellite Distribution can 
be seen as cornerstones in the analysis of the introduction of digital television from a 
competition view point. The Commission has identified the gatekeeper potential o f the set­
top-box and the dangers for competition by vertical integration of dominant actors of up- 
and downstream markets, in particular with the involvement of providers of transmission 
networks. In Article 85 and 86 of the EC-Treaty it has also additional instruments at its 
disposal if the market players choose anti-competitive constructions different from 
concentrative joint ventures in the future. However, also limitations regarding the 
application of the competition law to media cases, in particular the new forms of television
170
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were identified in the analysis. It is questionable whether the growing market complexity 
in the media sector which is due to the diversification of the television and the arrival of 
multimedia applications from the computer side, still can be sufficiently dealt with by 
conventional competition rules. Another often mentioned aspect regarding the limitation in 
the application of the European Community competition law to media cases, is confined to 
the Merger Regulation and concerns its high turnover thresholds. For digital television this 
argument is less applicable, since the high investments necessary to start up digital 
television usually will involve larger companies. However, the main limitation of 
competition law in dealing with media cases lies in its limited objective of securing 
economic competition. Media safeguards and competition law safeguards are 
complementary, with different objectives, not overlapping scopes. In dealing with media 
concentration the concern is to ensure that firms do not use excessive influence, as well as 
to prevent the abuses of market power and anti-competitive behavior. Being primarily 
negative in preventing monopolies or controlling anti-competitive practices, competition 
law does not give a framework for taking into account the special needs of a developing 
industry, like digital television. In particular, it does not consider internal growth and does 
not consider the importance of standards.
Because of the limitations of competition law a special media concentration regulation is 
called for, in particular considering the concentration movements in the area of digital and 
pay television. With the concept of a media controller and audience measurement the 
proposal of the Commission for a Media Concentration Directive is a reasonable and 
modem approach. However, the problem once again is the lack of scope. New television
171

services are not included, although through digital television they will be provided via the 
same medium as traditional television. There has also not been any alternative legislation 
for new television services proposed yet. Regarding the rapid developments in this field 
and in particular the convergence processes taking place, the proposal being restricted to 
traditional media, like traditional television, radio and newspaper does not seem capable of 
dealing with the recent market developments. The chances of the proposal to become law 
are rather dim because of the opposition of many Member States, in particular the ones 
which have just passed themselves new media concentration legislation.
The move by the Commission to leave the standard-setting regarding digital video 
broadcasting, to the Digital Video Broadcasting Group (DVB) can be regarded as more or 
less successful. Most of the standards for the different ways of transmitting digital 
television signals have been set. The Directive on the Use of Standards for the 
Transmission of Television Signals, provides a legal framework to get started with digital 
television in Europe. However, an agreement on one conditional access system, 
proprietary or common interface could not be found. This illustrate the problems of 
standard-setting by the industry. If the powerful companies, here the ones who already 
provide conditional access though proprietary systems, want to keep their competitive 
advantage the voluntary association cannot force them to give it up, even if it would be 
beneficial for the industry as a whole. Because of this the Commission might interfere in 
the future and impose the mandatory inclusion of a common interface in digital decoders, 
if it can reach the approval of the Council for such a legislation. However, the abstract 
problem analysis has shown that the common interface does not always have to be the best
j
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solution considering the potential for distortion of competition with the smart cards. First 
it has to be examined how the provisions foreseeing non-discriminatory treatment of the 
users of conditional access systems by the operators will work. Here the television signals 
Directive clearly contains competitive aspects. Concerning these the Commission evidently 
considered competition law insufficient to deal with them alone.
The analysis showed that coherent European Community approaches towards digital 
television, and in general new forms of television, are missing. There are bits and pieces in 
different legislative fields which make a good start, however, most of the time they remain 
isolated and do not go together. The main deficit lies in the lack of scope of the new 
legislation concerning media concentration and the amended Television Directive. 
However, here probably the European Community is influenced by the limitations and 
stagnation in the approaches of the Member States and does not have the impetus to come 
up with an independent encompassing framework.
3. Concluding Rem arks
The aim o f this thesis was a problem description combined with an assessment of the 
existing legal framework supposed to deal with the problems. The purpose has not been to 
propose an alternative regulatory framework. However, the deficits in the examined 
framework already imply some suggestions for a different approach. Above I concluded 
that the legal framework provided by the European Community for digital television is not 
coherent or complete. It is hardly understandable that newly proposed legislation does not 
take into account at all some of the recent developments in the television and broadcasting 
industry. The European Community legal framework has been chosen as subject of an
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analysis not merely out of an interest in European law. The main motive has been to look 
at a legislator who can deal with the new developments without being entangled in an 
overgrown, fixed and static broadcasting legislation. At the European Community level 
one could have expected the room and the freedom for a more functional and technical 
and less dogmatic approach. This assumption leaves out the very dogmatic and complex 
questions of the competences of the European Community. As mentioned above, good 
beginnings can be observed. Also regarding the limited scope of the proposal for an 
amended Television Directive it has to be mentioned that the European Parliament argued 
for an inclusion of the new television services. This was denied by the Council which 
means by the Member States. However, more adaptations would have been necessary than 
just extending the application of the current provisions of the Television Directive to new 
television services. Also the mandatory inclusion of a common interface in the digital 
decoders failed because of the opposition of Member States, next to the resistance of parts 
of the industry. This shows that the European Community is obstructed, by the Member 
States, in its attempts to establish a broader framework. And this is so, although almost 
none of the Member States themselves have legislation which seems able to cope with the 
new developments concerning the transformation of television and the convergence 
processes which take place between telecommunication and broadcasting, and technology 
and content. What Community law can achieve in leading the way has demonstrated the 
success of European Community competition law in Member States that did not have 
competition rules and authorities in the stricter sense until recently. The same could be 
performed for the media concentration and competition regulation in the fields of new
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media like digital television. This is an argument independent of the fact that much of the 
developments in the media field can only be controlled now on a supranational level. With 
the Directive on the Use of Standards in the Transmission of Television Signals one can 
see a good start. The same is true for the approach of the Media Concentration Directive, 
ignoring its limited scope. However, for European Community legislation to become more 
daring and more effective the Member States would have to become conscious of their 
limitations. They would have to realize the opportunity the European Community offers to 
advance a new regulatory system and develop a more favorable attitude towards 
encompassing regulation in that field by the European Community.
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